UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II The War in the Pacific THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES by Robert Ross Smith CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY UNITED STATES ARMY WASHINGTON, D.C., 1996 First Printed 1953— GMU Pub 5-8-1 Foreword The Approach to the Philippines deals principally with lesser known but highly interesting amphibious and ground operations along the New Guinea coast during 1944 and also relates the Army's part in the conquest of the southern Palau Islands. Opening the way for the Allied invasion of the Philippine Islands in the fall of 1944, the operations described in this volume involved all the mechanics of modem warfare — the complexities of amphibious landings, carrier-based and land-based air support, infantry maneuver and small unit action, artillery support, logistics, tank and flame thrower action, troop leadership, medical problems, civil affairs, intelligence, and all the rest. While primarily a story of ground combat action, the volume describes the activities of the Army's supporting services in sufficient detail to complete the history of the ground operations. Navy, Army Air Forces, and Marine Corps activities are covered as necessary to provide a well- balanced picture, and enough strategic background material is included to fit the tactical narrative into its proper perspective in the global war. Mr. Robert Ross Smith, the author, has a B, A. and M- A. in history from Duke University, and he holds a Reserve commission as a Major of Infantry. A. graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Ga., Mr. Smith served for two years during World War II as a member of the G 3 His- torical Division at General Douglas MacArthur's Allied Headquarters in the Southwest Pacific Area. Mr. Smith has been with the Office of the Chief of either as an officer on active duty or as a civilian, since January ORLANDO WARD Ma]. Gen., U. S. A. Chief of Military History. Washington, D. C. 1 May 1952 Author Robert Ross Smith received his B.A. and M.A. degrees from Duke University. A graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, Mr. Smith served two years in the G— 3 Historical Division staff at General Mac- Arthur's headquarters in the Southwest Pacific. He joined the Center of Military History in 1947 and rose to the position of branch chief before retiring in 1983. He also served as chief historian of U.S. Army, Pacific, during an important phase of the Vietnam War. Mr. Smith has written many works on military history, includ- ing Triumph in the Philippines, another volume in the U.S. Army in World War II series. He is a retired lieutenant colonel in the U.S. Army Reserve. iv Preface This volume describes the operations of Allied forces in the Pacific theaters during the approach to the Philippines, April through October 1944. While this is essentially the story of U. S. Army ground combat operations during the approach, the activities of all ground, air, and naval forces are covered where necessary for the understanding of the Army ground narrative. Eight major and separate operations, all susceptible of subdivision into distinct phases, are described. Seven of these operations took place in the Southwest Pacific Area, while one — the Palau Islands operation — occurred in the Central Pacific Area. This series of actions is exceptional in that the operations were executed in such rapid succession that while one was being planned the height of combat was being reached in another and still others had entered the mopping-up stage. Because of the nature of the combat, the level of treatment in this volume is generally that of the regimental combat team — the infantry regiment with its supporting artillery, engineer, tank, medical, and other units. The majority of the actions described involved a series of separate operations by infantry regiments or regimental combat teams, since divisions seldom fought as integral units during the approach to the Philippines. Division headquarters, often assuming the role of a ground task force headquarters, co-ordinated and administered the ofttimes widely separated actions of the division's component parts. In accomplishing the research and writing for this volume, which was begun in the spring of 1947, the author had access to the records of the U. S. Army units involved in the approach to the Philippines. Records of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Army General Staff, the U. S. Navy and Marine Corps, the U. S. Air Force, and the Australian services were also made available to the author upon request. Principal Japanese sources employed were mono- graphs of Japanese operations prepared by former Japanese Army and Navy officers, beginning in late 1946, under the direction of the United States high command in Tokyo. Unlike most operations in the Central Pacific and in Europe, those of U. S. Army ground combat forces in the Southwest Pacific Area had no contemporary historical coverage during World War II. In the last-named theater, no teams of historians accompanied combat units to observe, collect materials, conduct interviews, and prepare preliminary historical manuscripts. Thus, the sections of this volume concerning operations in the Southwest Pacific Area are based prin- cipally upon the official unit records maintained during combat and, to a lesser extent, the unit After Action Reports required by Army regulations. For opera- v tions in the Palaus, there was available an incomplete manuscript covering part of the 81st Infantry Division's actions. This was prepared partly in the field and partly during a short tour of duty with the Historical Division, War Department General Staff, by Maj. Nelson L. Drummond, Jr. For operations of the 1st Marine Division in the Palaus, the author depended for the most part on Maj. Frank O. Hough's The Assault on Peleliu, an official publication of the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. It is manifestly impossible for the author to list all those who have aided or guided him during the preparation of this volume, but he must express his gratitude to those who have made especially notable contributions. Thanks are due the personnel of the Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Office of The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, especially Mr. Wilbur Nigh and Miss Thelma K. Yarborough, for their co-operation and patience in helping the author locate source material. For similar reasons thanks are due the members of the Organization Records Branch, Records Administration Center, Office of The Adjutant General. The author is also greatly indebted to Maj. Frank O- Hough (USMCR) of the Historical Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps; to Lt. Roger Pineau (USNR) of the Naval History Branch, Naval Records and History Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. Navy; to the personnel of the Naval Records and Library Branch of the same Division; to Capt. Bernhardt L. Mortensen (USAF) of the USAF History, Re- search, and Library Division, Air University Library, Air University, U. S. Air Force; to Flight Lt. Arthur L. Davies (RAAF) of the History Section, Head- quarters Royal Australian Air Force; and to the author's personal friend Capt. John Balfour (AIF) of the Office of the Official War Historian, Australia. The list would not be complete without mention of the time and patience of fifty-odd participating commanders who provided comments on all or parts of the manu- script and, finally, official reviews undertaken by members of the Historical Sections of the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Marine Corps, the U. S. Navy, the U. S. Air Force, and the Australian Army. Especial thanks are due Dr. John Miller, jr., during whose tenure as Chief of the Pacific Section, Office of the Chief of Military History, much of this volume was written, for his sound counsel and his careful reviewing o£ the final manu- script. For his excellent guidance and valuable advice, a great debt of gratitude is likewise owed Dr. Louis Morton, under whose direction as Chief of the Pacific Section preparation of this volume was begun and (upon his return to the section after a period of service as Deputy Chief Historian, Department of the Army) completed. The help and encouragement of Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian, Department of the Army, is also keenly appreciated. The author is greatly indebted to the late Mr. W. Brooks Phillips of the Editorial Branch, Office of the Chief of Military History, who did the final editing, ably assisted by Mrs. Loretto Stevens and other members of the same branch. Mr. Leonard B. Lincoln prepared the index, and the painstaking task of final typing for the vi printer was in charge of Mrs. Lois Riley. The author acknowledges his indebted- ness to the many other members of the Office of the Chief of Military History (especially Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff, the Chief Cartographer, and his colleagues of the Cartographic Branch, as well as the members of the Photographic Branch), for the time and effort they expended during the preparation of the volume. Finally, the completion of the work would not have been possible without the support of Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, and the military members of his staff who, understanding the problems of the historian, made the path smoother. ROBERT ROSS SMITH Washington, D. C. 1 May 1952 vii . . . to Those Who Served Contents Chapter Page I. THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 1 Determining the Strategy of the Approach 1 Acceleration of Pacific Operations in Early 1944 6 The New Directive for 1944 11 II. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR THE HOLLANDIA- AITAPE OPERATION 13 Theater Organization 14 The Hollandia Area 16 The Decision to Take Aitape 19 The Forces and Their Missions 23 Logistics 32 The Hollandia Tactical Plan 42 Preliminary Operations and the Approach 48 III. THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 53 The Landings at Tanahmerah Bay 53 The 24th Division' s Drive to -the Airfields .... 59 The Seizure of Hollandia Town 68 The Drive Inland from Humboldt Bay 71 Logistic Problems of the RECKLESS Task Force 77 The End of the Operation 82 IV. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOL- LANDIA 84 Strategy and Dispositions to April 1944 84 The Japanese at Hollandia 95 V. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR ... 103 Securing the Airfield Area 103 Contact with the 18th Army on the East Flank 114 VI. DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 131 Reinforcement and Reorganization of the PERSECUTION Task Force 131 Gathering Combat Intelligence 137 The 18th Army Moves West 145 VII. THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR, PHASE I: THE 18TH ARMY ATTACKS 152 Withdrawal of the PERSECUTION Covering Force ....... 152 Restoration of the Driniumor Line 1 58 Operations West of the Driniumor 167 The Japanese Attack on the South Flank 1 70 xi Chapter Page VIII. THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR, PHASE II: THE 18TH ARMT RETREATS 177 Securing the Afua Area 177 Envelopment to the East 188 The End of the Aitape Operation 200 IX. THE SEIZURE OF WAKDE ISLAND 206 The Sarmi—Biak Plan 206 The Wakde Plan 212 Preparations for the Capture of Wakde Island 218 Small-Island Warfaie, Southwest Pacific Style 222 X. LONE TREE HILL: THE INITIAL ATTACKS 232 The Japanese at Wakde-Sarmi 232 The 158th Infantry Against Lone Tree Hill 236 Final Operations of the 158th Infantry 253 XI. LONE TREE HILL AND BEYOND 263 The 6th Division Against Lone Tree Hill 263 Final Operations in the Wakde— Sarmi Area 275 The Results of the Wakde— Sa mi Operation 278 XII. BIAK: THE PLAN, THE LANDING, AND THE ENEMY . . . 280 The Biak Plan 280 The Landing 289 The Japanese on Biak 299 XIII WEST TO MOKMER DROME 304 An Initial Reverse 304 Preparations for a New Attack 312 The Seizure of Mokmer Drome 316 XIV. FRUSTRATION AT MOKMER DROME 326 Reinforcements for the 186th Infantry 326 Operations North of Mokmer Drome 331 Allied Command at Biak 340 XV. THE JAPANESE REINFORCE BIAK 346 Biak and Japanese Naval Plans 346 The KON Operation 350 Results of the KON Operation 361 XVI. BIAK: THE REDUCTION OF THE JAPANESE POCKETS . . 365 The Reduction of the West Caves 365 Securing the Western Area 377 The Reduction of the East Caves 380 The Reduction of the Ibdi Pocket 384 The End of the Operation 390 xii Chapter Page XVII. OPERATIONS ON NOEMFOOR ISLAND 397 The Noemfoor Plan 397 The Landing 406 The Occupation of Noemfoor Island 416 Base Development on Noemfoor 421 XVIII. AIRFIELDS ON THE VOGELKOP PENINSULA 425 Early Plans for the Vogelkop 425 The Sansapor—Mar Plan 431 Operations in the Sansapor—Mar Area 440 XIX. THE PALAUS AND MOROTAI: STRATEGIC AND TACTI- CAL PLANNING 450 The Strategic Setting 450 The Objectives 456 Organization, Tactics, and Logistics 463 XX. THE MOROTAI OPERATION 480 The Landing 480 Securing and Developing Morotai 488 XXL THE LANDINGS ON PELELIU AND ANGAUR 494 Preliminary Air and Naval Bombardment 494 The Peleliu Beachhead 496 The Decision to Land on Angaur . . 498 The Assault on Angaur 499 Securing Southern Angaur 508 XXII. THE REDUCTION OF NORTHWESTERN ANGAUR .... 515 Into the Main Defenses 515 Overcoming the Last Resistance 523 Results of Operations on Angaur 530 XXIII. SECURING PELELIU ISLAND 532 Marine Operations in Southern Peleliu to 22 September 532 Dividing the Island 536 Northern Peleliu and the Offshore Islands 543 XXIV. PELELIU: THE LAST RESISTANCE 551 Compressing the Umurbrogol Pocket 551 Entr'acte: The Relief of the 1st Marine Division 559 Overcoming the Final Resistance 561 Results of Operations in the Palaus 573 CONCLUSION: THE RESULTS AND THE COSTS 576 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 579 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 595 BASIC MILITARY MAP SYMBOLS 601 INDEX 605 xiii Tables No. Page 1. American Casualties During the Approach to the Philippines: April- December 1944 577 2. Japanese Casualties, Defending the Approaches to the Philippines: April- December 1944 578 Charts 1. Operational Organization of the Southwest Pacific Area: Aprill944 . . 15 2. Air Organization for the Hollandia-Aitape Operations (Amphibious Phase) 25 3. Naval Organization for the Hollandia-Aitape Operations (Amphibious Phase) 28 4. Ground Organization for the Hollandia-Aitape Operations (Am- phibious Phase) 33 5. Japanese Army Operational Organization in the Southwest Pacific Area: April 1944 94 6. Japanese Naval Operational Organization in the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas: April 1944 96 7. The Persecution Task Force : 22 April-4 May 1944 104 8. The Persecution Task Force : 4 May-28 June 1944 115 9 . The Persecution Task Force : 28 June-1 1 July 1 944 136 10. The Persecution Task Force: 11 July-21 July 1944 160 11. The Persecution Task Force: 22 July-30 July 1 944 175 12. The Persecution Task Force: 31 July-11 August 1944 189 13. The Persecution Task Force: 11 August-25 August 1944 203 14. Organization for the Palau Operation 465 Maps 1. Situation in the Pacific, 12 March 1944 2 2. Hollandia Operation Area 17 3. Aitape Landings, 22 April 1944 106 4. Yakamul Area 124 5. Situation Along the Driniumor, Evening, 10 July 1944 141 6. Japanese Plan of Attack, 10 July 1944 149 7. Japanese Attack on Driniumor Line, Night, 10-11 July 1944 153 8. The Ted Force Action, 31 July-10 August 1944 193 9. Wakde-Sarmi Area 207 10. Capture of Wakde Islands, 17-19 May 1944 223 11. Advance to Lone Tree Hill, 23-26 May 1944 240 12. Tornado Task Force, Night, 30-31 May 1944 254 13. Schouten Islands 281 xiv JVo. Page 14. Bosnek-Sorido Coast 282 15. Attack North of Mokmer Drome, 11-15 June 1944 333 16. Securing the Airfields, 18-24 June 1944 370 17. Capture of Noemfoor, 2 July- 31 August 1944 399 18. Vogelkop Operation, 30 July-31 August 1944 431 19. Palau Islands 458 20. Morotai Landings, 15 September 1944 476 21. Terrain of Umurbrogol Pocket 552 22. Marines at Umurbrogol Pocket, 30 September-1 5 October 1944 .... 557 23. 321st Infantry at Umurbrogol Pocket, 16-25 October 1944 562 24. 323d Infantry at Umurbrogol Pocket, 26 October-27 November 1 944 . . 570 Maps 1-IX are in accompanying map envelope I. New Guinea. II. The Hollandia Operation, 22-26 April 1944. III. Securing the Beachhead, 23 April-4 May 1944. IV. Lone Tree Hill. V. Biak Landings and Seizure of Mokmer Drome, 27 May-7 June 1944. VI. Assault on Peleliu, 15-23 September 1944. VII. Assault on Angaur, 1 7-20 September 1944. VIII. Reduction of Northwestern Angaur, 21 September- 1 October 1944. IX. Dividing the Island, 24-26 September 1944. Illustrations Lake Sentani Plain, Showing Airfield? 19 Hollandia-Aitape Planners 30 Humbolt Bay 44 Tanahmerah Bay 46 Damaged Japanese Airplanes 51 Landings at Tanahmerah Bay 54 Unloading LST's 57 Hand-Carrying Supplies 63 General Douglas MacArthur 69 LVT's Crossing Lake Sentani 75 Troops Unloading Supplies at Aitape 109 Yakamul Area 124 Tadji Fighter Strip 129 Driniumor River 142 Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi 146 The Afua Area 178 Artillery Supporting Ted Force 198 Native Litter Bearers 201 XV Page Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe 220 The Assault on Wakde Island 225 Enemy Defensive Positions on Wakde 229 LCM Ferry 253 Mokmer Drome, Biak 288 Biak Coast Line 292 Unloading at Biak 298 East Caves Area 305 Scene of Tank Battle 308 The Parai Defile 314 Men of the 162d Infantry Seeking Cover 331 Disabled Japanese Tank 339 Infantrymen Moving Up to Attack 367 Entrances to the West Caves 376 Entrance to the East Caves 383 Dock Area, Biak 394 Base H and Hospital Areas on Biak 395 DUKW Burning on the Beach at Noemfoor 410 Paratroopers Landing on Noemfoor 414 Sansapor Planners 435 Bulldozer Clearing Jungle Undergrowth 448 Maj. Gen. Paul J. Mueller 467 LCPs at Morotai 484 Unloading at Morotai 486 Red Beach Unloading Operations 502 Saipan Town Area 506 Entrance to Lake Salome Bowl 520 Interior of Lake Salome Bowl 525 Mopping Up in Northwest Angaur 528 Southeast Corner of Umurbrogol Pocket 554 L VT Flame Thrower in Action 564 Moving into Mortimer Valley 568 Peleliu 574 The illustration on p. 146 is an Australian War Memorial photograph. All other illustrations in this volume are from the files of the Department of Defense. xvi CHAPTER I The Strategic Background In March 1944 the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Allied forces in the Pacific to begin an offensive toward the Philippine Islands. Recapture of the Philippines would be a profoundly important step toward the defeat of Japan, for from those islands the Allies could cut Japanese lines of communi- cation to the rich, conquered territory of the Netherlands East Indies, Indochina, Thai- land, Burma, and Malaya. In the Philip- pines the Allies could also establish bases from which to support subsequent advances against Formosa, the China coast, or Japan itself. Before March 1944 the objectives of oper- ations in the Pacific had been limited to securing the lines of communication from the United States to Australia, beginning an attack across the Central Pacific, and oc- cupying bases from which to launch future operations. During these operations Allied forces of General Douglas MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area had secured eastern New Guinea, western New Britain, and the Admiralty Islands, joining with the drive of Admiral William F. Halsey's South Pacific Area forces up the Solomon Islands in a campaign to neutralize the great Japanese base at Rabaul. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz had begun an offensive in his Central Pacific Area late in 1943 ; by March 1944 his forces had driven through the Gilbert Islands into the Marshalls. Now the war in the Pacific was ready to enter a more decisive stage, as the various land, sea, and air forces under General Mac Arthur and Admiral Nimitz attacked toward the Philippines from the bases already in Allied hands. The offensive toward the Philippines would have to be undertaken with relatively limited means. The U.S. -British Combined Chiefs of Staff, subject to whose approval the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the war in the Pacific, had from the first assigned priority in the global war to the defeat of Germany. Determining the Strategy of the Approach In May 1943 the Joint Chiefs of Staff se- cured approval from the Combined Chiefs for a course of action providing that the main offensive against Japan would be con- ducted across the Pacific, as opposed to ad- vances from the Aleutians, Southeast Asia, or China. The Joint Chiefs decided that the seizure of a foothold in the Philippines would be necessary before any subsequent opera- tions against Japan or her holdings could be launched. To the Joint Chiefs, there were two practicable routes of approach to the Philippines. One was across the Central Pa- cific via the Marshalls, Carolines, and Pa- laus ; the other in the Southwest Pacific along the north coast of New Guinea and into the islands between northwestern New Guinea and Mindanao, southernmost large island of the Philippine Archipelago. The choice of MAP 1 THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 3 routes and the direction and objectives of amphibious offensives in both the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas were not de- termined without a great deal of discussion at the highest levels of United States com- mand.1 General MacArthur 's Concepts General MacArthur, who upon orders from the President had left the Philippines in early 1942, had a burning determination to return to those islands as soon as possible. He favored the New Guinea— Mindanao axis of advance to the Philippines. Almost as soon as he assumed his new command in the Southwest Pacific Area he began think- ing about moving back to the Philippines by means of a scries of amphibious opera- tions along the north coast of New Guinea.2 He envisaged this campaign as entailing a steady advance of the Southwest Pacific's land-based bomber line northwestward to the Philippines by the successive seizure of 1 JPS 67/4, 29 Apr 43; JPS 67/5, 26 May 43; JCS 287, 7 May 43; JCS 287/1, 8 May 43. All en- titled Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and all in OPD file, ABC 381 Japan (8-27-42) Sees. 1 and 2. Min, JCS 76th and 80th Mtgs, 8 and 12 May 43; CCS 220, 14 May 43, Strategic Plan for the Defeat of Japan, and CCS 242/6, 25 May 43, Final Report to the President and Prime Minister, Trident Con- ference, last two in OPD file, bound volume of Trident [Washington, D. C] Papers, Bound folders containing minutes of meetings of the CCS, JCS, and their subordinate committees are filed in the office of ACofS, G-3, GSUSA. 2 Ltr, CofS GHQ SWPA to Comdrs Allied Land, Air, and Naval Forces SWPA (n. d., circa 13 May 42), sub: Preparations for the CounterofTensive, copy atchd as Incl 3 to Ltr, Maj Gen Charles A. Willoughby [ACofS G-2 GHQ FEC] to Maj Gen Orlando Ward [Chief of Military History, Dept of the Army] (n. d., circa 10 Mar 51), in OCMH files. For 1941-42 operations in the Philippines and General MacArthur's departure from those islands, see Louis Morton, The Fall of the Philippines, a forthcoming volume in the series, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. air-base sites along the 1,400-mile north coast of New Guinea. General MacArthur realized that once his forces began pushing on to the Philippines from the Vogelkop Peninsula of northwestern New Guinea they would present vulnerable flanks to Japanese air and sea power based in the Palau Islands to the right ( north ) and in the Netherlands East Indies to the left. He said, however, that the advance along the New Guinea coast as far as the Vogelkop could not be endangered by hostile air attacks from the Marshall or Caroline Islands to the north, that it would take "full advantage of land- based air power" and could be "fully pro- tected by naval power." Beyond the Vogelkop the Allied left wrould be protected by land-based aircraft flying from fields which would be established on islands between New Guinea and the southern Philippines. The right flank could be safeguarded by the occupation of the Palau Islands or by operations of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, the strategic missions of which, General MacArthur averred, were to pro- tect his right flank and destroy or contain the Japanese fleet. Finally, he said, the ad- vance along the north coast of New Guinea could most quickly achieve one important strategic objective — cutting the Japanese lines of communication to the Indies.3 On the other hand, declared General MacArthur, an advance toward the Philip- pines through the Central Pacific, via the 3 GHQ SWPA, Estimate of the Situation and Rough Draft, Reno Plan, 25 Feb 43, photostat copy in OCMH files; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C- 3302, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN 13149; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-1217, 2 Feb 44, CM-IN 1443. The quo- tations are from the Reno plan, hereafter cited as Reno I. CM-IN and CM-OUT numbers used in the footnotes of this volume refer to numbers ap- pearing on copies of those messages in Gen. George C. Marshall's In and Out Logs, filed in the Staff Communications Office, Office of the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army. 4 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Marshall and Caroline Islands, would have to be undertaken without any land-based air support. Such a course of action would "be time consuming and expensive in . . . naval power and shipping." It would "re- quire a reorientation of front" from that al- ready established in the South and South- west Pacific Areas during operations aimed at the reduction of Rabaul. It could gain no important strategic objectives, in General MacArthur's opinion, until a series of am- phibious frontal assaults on small, fortified islands brought Allied forces finally to Min- danao in the southern Philippines. Finally, he argued, the concept of an advance through the Central Pacific was a return to the prewar plans, which, he declared, had not been premised on the availability of Aus- tralia as a base for offensive operations.4 For a time General MacArthur's plans for the approach to the Philippines via the southern route called for the seizure of the Hansa Bay area of northeastern New Guinea as the first step of the drive to the Philippines and the last of the campaign for the reduc- tion of Rabaul. Next, the forces of the South- west Pacific would jump approximately 275 miles northwest to establish air and logistic bases at Hollandia, Dutch New Guinea, by- passing a Japanese stronghold at Wewak. Then General MacArthur intended to move on to the Geelvink Bay and Vogelkop Penin- sula regions of western Dutch New Guinea. Following these operations, airfield sites on Halmahera or the Celebes, lying between the Vogelkop and Mindanao, would be seized. If necessary for additional left flank protec- tion, air bases would also be established on the islands of the Arafura Sea (south of western New Guinea ) , simultaneously with * Reno I, 25 Feb 43; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-3302, 20 Jun 43, CM-IN 13149. The quotations are from Reno I. the advance to Hollandia, and on Ambon Island (south of the Halmaheras ) ." The Joint Chiefs' Strategic Plans General MacArthur's concept of the best course of action in the Pacific did not coin- cide with that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had decided that an advance via the Central Pacific would be strategically more decisive. The Joint Chiefs concluded that pressure applied on the Central Pacific front would bear directly on Japan's most vulner- able flank — the east — and would, indeed, outflank the enemy's positions in New Guinea. But operations along the New Guinea coast could not threaten Japan's bases in the Central Pacific and would not impair free movement by the Japanese Navy. The Joint Chiefs believed that the U. S. Pacific Fleet (commanded by Admiral Nimitz in addition to his area command) could be used to best advantage in the vast open reaches of the Central Pacific. Should naval operations in the Pacific precipitate an overwhelming defeat of the Japanese Navy, the Allies might be provided with an opportunity to bypass intermediate objec- tives and to strike directly against the Japa- nese home islands. Moreover, a drive through the Central Pacific would take ad- vantage of rapidly growing American naval power, with which it might be found easier to move into the Philippines from the Cen- tral rather than the Southwest Pacific. "Reno I, 25 Feb 43; GHQ SWPA, Reno III, Outline Plan of Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area to Reoccupy the Southern Philippine Islands, 20 Oct 43, in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific, Sec. 8-A ; Rad, CofS to CINCSWPA, 3406, 24 Jan 44, CM- OUT 9451; GHQ SWPA, Reno IV, Outline Plan for Operations of the SWPA 1944, 6 Mar 44, in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A. THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 5 Logistically, the Joint Chiefs believed that the Central Pacific route of approach to the Philippines was preferable because it was shorter and more direct. In opposition to General MacArthur's views, the Joint Chiefs felt that the longer Southwest Pacific route would be more costly in terms of money, men, aircraft, time, and ships. The Central Pacific route was also better hygienically — it would entail far less jungle and swamp warfare with attendant tropical diseases than would operations in New Guinea. Finally, there was a practical limit to the Japanese air and ground strength which could be deployed on the small islands of the Central Pacific. On the other hand, the Japanese could place men and aircraft on New Guinea and the islands between the Vogelkop Peninsula and Mindanao in num- bers limited only by the availability of troops, engineering equipment, ships, and planes.6 Another factor destined to influence the Joint Chiefs in placing emphasis on the Cen- tral Pacific offensive was the potential of the Army Air Forces' new offensive weapon, the huge B-29 bomber. Though the Joint Chiefs' plans for the defeat of Japan called for large-scale bombing of the Japanese home islands from China, as early as No- vember 1 943 there was some doubt that the Chinese armies under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek could hold eastern China fields from which the B-29's would operate. Cer- tainly the initiation of B-29 operations from those fields would prompt the Japanese to launch ground offensives to capture the air bases. But, should the Allies secure air-base sites in the Mariana Islands, lying in the Central 'JPS 67/4, 28 Apr 43; JPS 67/5, 26 May 43; JCS 287, 7 May 43; JCS 287/1; Rad, CofS (for JCS) to CINCSWPA, 8679, 2 Oct 43, CM-OUT 630. Pacific less than 1,500 miles from Tokyo, the B-29's would be provided with bases which the Japanese could not retake. The Army Air Forces was therefore eager for the cap- ture of the Marianas. The air planners found a strong advocate for the early seizure of the Marianas in Admiral Ernest J. King (Chief of Naval Operations and Commander in Chief of the U. S. Fleet), Navy representa- tive on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral King repeatedly termed the occupation of the Marianas a key operation in the success- ful prosecution of the war against Japan, since an invasion of those islands, in his opin- ion, might well precipitate a showdown battle with the Japanese Fleet and would open a line of advance aimed directly at Japan.7 Though the Joint Chiefs believed that the Central Pacific route of advance was strate- gically, logistically, and tactically better than the Southwest Pacific route, they also de- cided that it would be most wasteful of time and resources to move all the Allied forces from the Southwest and South Pacific Areas out of the firm contact with the Japanese established during the campaign for the re- duction of Rabaul. The Joint Chiefs held that the employment of both routes would prevent the Japanese from knowing where and when the next blow was to fall. It was also believed that the Australian Govern- ment would react unfavorably to redirection of all Allied effort to the Central Pacific. If the Southwest Pacific offensive were cur- tailed, Australia might well let down in its war effort, an action which would result in TMin, JPS 109th Mtg, 27 0ct43;Min, JCS 123d and 124th Mtgs, 15 and 17 Nov 43, respectively; General of the Air Force Henry H. Arnold, Glqbal Mission (New York, 1949), pp. 476-80. For addi- tional material upon the selection of the Marianas as an objective and for coverage of the fighting in those islands, see Philip A. Crovvl, Campaign in the Marianas, another forthcoming volume in this series. 6 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES a drag on all operations throughout the Pacific. In summary, the Joint Chiefs of Staff de- cided that the approach to the Philippines would be made through both the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas, with priority assigned to the Central Pacific since that ap- proach appeared strategically more decisive. Central Pacific forces would move toward the Philippines via the Marshalls, Carolines, and Palaus, while Southwest Pacific forces would drive up the northern New Guinea coast and on into the islands between the Vogelkop Peninsula and Mindanao.8 In ac- cordance with this concept Admiral Nimitz' forces, in November 1943, had taken the first step toward opening the drive across the Centra] Pacific by seizing air and naval base sites in the Gilbert Islands. This operation was a preliminary to the occupation of the Marshalls, to begin early in 1944. Acceleration of Pacific Operations in Early 1944 The Marshalls, Truk, and the Admiralties In January 1944 Admiral Nimitz was planning to move his Central Pacific forces into the eastern and central Marshalls by the end of the month. Late in March he would execute a much-desired carrier strike against Truk, a presumably strong Japanese base near the center of the Caroline chain. Whether Truk would be seized was still a moot question. Although the capture of that atoll might well precipitate a showdown bat- tle with the Japanese Fleet, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had begun to wonder if the seizure of 8JPS 67/5, 26 May 43; JCS 287/1, 8 May 43; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-6131, 28 Sep 43, CM-IN 19656; Rad, CofS to CINCSWPA, 8679, 2 Oct 43, CM-OUT 630. Truk might not prove too costly for the re- sults achieved. They agreed in late 1943 to postpone a decision concerning its capture until the U. S. Pacific Fleet could test the strength of the base in a carrier raid.9 In May, according to Admiral Nimitz' plans, the Central Pacific's amphibious as- sault forces would advance to the western Marshalls. On 1 August they would land at Mortlock and Truk in the Central Caro- lines. If, however, the invasion of Truk should prove cither unnecessary or undesir- able, then Admiral Nimitz would be pre- pared to bypass that atoll in favor of a direct move to the Palau Islands about 1 August. First landings in the Marianas were to take place by 1 November.10 At the time Admiral Nimitz prepared this plan, General MacArthur's planners were trying to find ways and means to accelerate the final phases of the campaign against Rabaul: the capture of Hansa Bay on the northeast coast of New Guinea, the occupa- tion of the Admiralty Islands, and the seiz- ure of Kavieng, on New Ireland north of Rabaul. To fit in with Admiral Nimitz' plans for the use of the Pacific Fleet's carriers dur- ing the invasion of the Marshalls and the strike against Truk, General MacArthur had had to schedule the attacks against Kavieng and the Admiralties for 1 April and the Hansa Bay operation for 26 April. For post- Hansa Bay operations, General MacArthur's current plans called for the advance to Hol- landia and the Arafura Sea islands about 1 June ; the Geelvink Bay area in mid-August ; the Vogelkop Peninsula by 1 October; Hal- mahera and the Celebes on 1 December; and, finally, an entry into the southern Phil- 0 CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Campaign Plan Gran- ite, 13 Jan 44, in files of the Navy Dept; Min, JCS 123d and 124th Mtgs, 15 and 17 Nov 43. "CINCPAC-CINCPOA, Campaign Plan Gran- ite, 13 Jan 44. THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 7 ippines at Mindanao on 1 February 1945. This schedule was slower than one approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in late 1943 ; but if the Southwest Pacific could ac- celerate the last phases of the reduction of Rabaul, all subsequent operations could be considerably speeded.11 Principally to settle details of fleet support for the Admiralties, Kavieng, and Hansa Bay operations, planners of the South, Southwest, and Central Pacific Areas met at Pearl Harbor on 27 and 28 January 1944.12 The planners also discussed in a general way the question of bypassing Truk, the target dates for other operations in the Pacific, and "Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-164, 6 Jan 44, CM-IN 3366; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-172, 6 Jan 44, CM-IN 4188; Rad, CINCPOA to CINC- SWPA, 7 Jan 44, CM-IN 8330; Rad, COMSOPAC- ADMIN to COMSOPAC [Admiral Halsey, then in Washington], 8 Jan 44, CM-IN 8331 : Rad, CINC- SWPA to CofS, G 1217, 2 Feb 44, CM-IN 1443; Reno III, 20 Oct 43. For earlier operations in the South and Southwest Pacific Areas see John Miller, jr., Guadalcanal: The First Offensive (Washington, 1949) and Samuel Milner, Victory in Papua, both in this series, the latter in preparation. These two volumes provide information concerning the estab- lishment of the Allied commands in the Pacific and the assignment of the first mission to the Allied forces. The campaign against Rabaul is to be cov- ered in John Miller, jr., Cartwheel: The Reduc- tion of Rabaul, while operations in the Gilberts and Marshalls are to be described in Philip A. Crowl and Edmund G. Love, The Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, both in this series. 13 The following information on the Pearl Harbor Conference and General MacArthur's views on the use of the B-29 is based principally upon: Rad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 7 Jan 44, CM-IN 8330; Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-1217, 2 Feb 44, CM- IN 1443; Memo, Col William L. Ritchie [Chief, SWP Theater Group, OPD GSUSA] to Maj Gen Thomas T. Handy [Chief, OPD], 4 Feb 44, sub: Briefof Pacific Conf, Pearl Harbor, 27-28 Jan 44, in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A; Min, JPS 125th Mtg, 2 Feb 44; Min, JCS 145th Mtg, 8 Feb 44; History of AFMIDPAC and Pred- ecessor Commands, I, 90ff, in OCMH; General George C. Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New York, 1949), pp. 347-49. the proposed B-29 bases in the Marianas. Admiral Nimitz presented revised plans call- ing for the invasion of the eastern and cen- tral Marshalls on 1 February and the west- ern Marshalls on 15 April. He also suggested possible revisions in his schedule of opera- tions against the Palaus, the Marianas, and Truk. Previously he had planned to take the Palaus before the Marianas, and he had believed it essential to seize Truk as an ad- vanced fleet base. Now the Central Pacific commander thought that if the proposed carrier strike against Truk drove the Japa- nese fleet westward, it might be possible to bypass Truk, seize the Marianas about 15 June, and move to the Palaus early in October. Most of the Army and Navy planners at the January conferences favored the idea of bypassing Truk. Apparently the majority of them also favored bypassing the Marianas, and the consensus at Pearl Harbor seemed to lean toward a sequence of operations which would place the emphasis of the drive to the Philippines in the Southwest Pacific Area. All the planners agreed that the Palaus would have to be taken to safeguard the right flank of the Southwest Pacific's ad- vance beyond the Vogelkop Peninsula to Mindanao in the Philippines. Most of them approved a course of action which would take Central Pacific forces directly from the Marshalls to the Palaus and provide the Southwest Pacific Area with sufficient sup- port to move up the north coast of New Guinea and into the Philippines well before the end of 1944. As far as B 29 operations against the Japanese home islands from the Marianas were concerned, there seems to have been a lack of enthusiasm at the Pearl Harbor con- ferences. General MacArthur's planners, taking their cue from their commander, de- 8 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES sired that the B-29's be sent to the South- west Pacific, whence they could strike lucrative targets in the Netherlands East Indies. General MacArthur's opinion was that B-29 operations against Japan from the Marianas would obtain negligible stra- tegic and tactical effects, that operating hazards from the Mariana bases would be great, and that logistic support of the B-29's in the Marianas would be much more diffi- cult than it would be in the Southwest Pacific. While it is noteworthy that both Army and Navy planners of the Pacific commands were, in January 1944, inclined to take issue with the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff over the emphasis on lines of advance toward the Philippines and the seizure of the Marianas, the higher level planners had already decided that the Marianas would be seized, that B-29 operations from those islands would start in 1944, and that the priority of the advance to the Philippines would be given to the Central Pacific. In- deed, so important did the Joint Chiefs con- sider operations in the Central Pacific that they were willing to delay beyond 1 April 1944 General MacArthur's attacks against Kavieng and the Admiralties if such a delay would make it possible to accelerate Admiral Nimitz' advances in the Marshall Islands.18 Such a delay would, of course, probably mean the postponement of subsequent Southwest Pacific operations along the New Guinea coast. As events turned out, the strehgth of Cen- tral Pacific forces used to invade the eastern and central Marshalls on 3 1 January proved so preponderant and Japanese resistance and reactions so weak that Admiral Nimitz' "Rad, GOMINCH to CINCPOA, 2 Feb 44, CM-IN 1854. reserves and garrison forces, already staging for the eastern Marshalls, did not have to be committed to that operation. The Central Pacific commander, urged on by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was therefore able to step up his attack into the western Marshalls to mid- February. The Joint Chiefs also instructed Admiral Nimitz to execute the scheduled March carrier strike against Truk as much earlier as possible.14 A successful invasion of the western Mar- shalls was carried out on 1 7 February 1944. To support and provide strategic cover for this operation, the long-awaited carrier strike on Truk was made on the 16th and 17th. During the ensuing week other targets in the Carolines were hit and a one-day carrier at- tack against the Marianas was also under- taken. Evaluation of the Truk strikes dis- closed that the base was much weaker than had previously been supposed. The main body of the Japanese Fleet had already left the atoll and the threat of additional attacks by the U. S. Pacific Fleet kept it in the west- ern Pacific. Truk and the eastern Carolines were eliminated as an effective section of the Japanese defense system.15 While the strikes against the Carolines and Marianas had been taking place in the Central Pacific, preparations for the sched- uled Admiralties, Kavieng, and Hansa Bay operations had been going on apace in the Southwest Pacific. Troop units were desig- nated and preliminary steps were taken to gather supplies, shipping, and personnel at "■Ibid.; Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 2 Feb 44, CM-IN 1855; Min, JCS 145th Mtg, 8 Feb 44; Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 15 Feb 44, CM-IN 10592. 15 United States Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS], The Campaigns in the Pacific War (Wash- ington, 1946), pp. 194-95; Crowl and Love, The Seizure of the Gilberts and Marshalls, passim. THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 9 staging areas.16 These preparations were never completed. From 300-mile distant airfields in New Guinea, Southwest Pacific land-based planes had for some time been flying bomb- ing and reconnaissance missions against the Admiralty Islands. On 23 February planes on armed reconnaissance over the Admiral- ties failed to elicit any response from Japa- nese ground defenses. The next day General MacArthur ordered an immediate ground reconnaissance in force to be sent to the Admiralties aboard high speed destroyer- transports ( APD's) . The troops of the U. S. 1st Cavalry Division engaged in this risky undertaking were instructed to remain ashore and secure a beachhead upon which reinforcements could be landed. The initial landings were made on 29 February. The desired beachhead was taken and the assault units were reinforced beginning on 2 March by the rest of the 1st Cavalry Division.17 The landing in the Admiralties, taking place a month ahead of schedule, gave Gen- eral MacArthur a welcome opportunity to speed the pace of operations within the Southwest Pacific Area and to keep abreast of developments in the Central Pacific Area. On 5 March he proposed a new plan of operations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He suggested that the Kavieng operation be executed as planned on 1 April but, since aircraft from the Admiralties could support operations along the New Guinea coast, that the Hansa Bay operations be canceled in favor of a direct jump to Hollandia before the end of April. "GHQ SWPA, Operations Instructions (OI) 44, 13 Feb 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 13 Feb 44. "Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo Force, XC-1428, 24 Feb 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 24 Feb 44; GHQ SWPA, OI 44/2, 19 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 13 Feb 44. For details of operations in the Admiralties see Miller, Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul. The bypassing move to Hollandia would isolate Japanese ground troops in the Hansa Bay, Madang, and Wewak areas of eastern New Guinea. Moreover, the Hollandia area was considered capable of development into a major air base from which land-based planes could dominate western New Guinea where the Japanese were building up their own air strength. If Hollandia could be seized at an early date, General MacArthur reasoned, this Japanese air redeployment could be forestalled and the westward ad- vance toward the Philippines could be has- tened by several months.18 Washington Planning Conferences, February-March The acceleration of the Marshall and Ad- miralty operations made it urgent that the Joint Chiefs of Staff issue a detailed direc- tive for the conduct of the war in the Pacific during the rest of 1944. They now had Gen- eral MacArthur's proposals to consider, as well as new plans being prepared by Admiral Nimitz, and they had yet to decide the ques- tion of bypassing Truk. Early in February General MacArthur had sent his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Richard K. Sutherland, to Washington in an attempt to persuade the Joint Chiefs to direct the concentration of all forces in the Pacific along the New Guinea axis of advance, bypassing both Truk and the Marianas. Later in the same month Admiral Nimitz and members of his staff also arrived at Washington to discuss with the Joint Chiefs plans for future opera- tions in the Central Pacific Area. General Sutherland had not been in Washington long before he found it neces- sary to advise General MacArthur that the "Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-2473, 5 Mar 44, CM-IN 3318. 10 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Mariana operation was inevitable since both the Army Air Forces and the Navy were pressing for the undertaking.19 Accepting this, General MacArthur came to the con- clusion that, assuming Truk would be by- passed, the invasion of the Marianas need not materially interfere with the schedule of Southwest Pacific operations along the New Guinea coast.20 Admiral Nimitz, discussing the possibility of bypassing Truk, told the Joint Chiefs that his forces would be ready to undertake another major amphibious op- eration about mid-June. Either Truk or the Marianas, he said, would be acceptable tar- gets, but if Truk were bypassed he thought it would still be necessary to take the south- ern Marianas and the Palaus to assure the neutralization of the central Caroline atoll. Since a good fleet base in the western Pacific would be needed before moving into the Philippines, Admiral Nimitz proposed seiz- ing Ulithi Atoll, about midway between the Marianas and the Palaus. The capture of Ulithi would, he thought, probably require the occupation of Yap, 100 miles to the southwest, and the neutralization if not the capture of the Palaus. Woleai, in the Caro- lines 400-odd miles almost due south of the Marianas, should also be taken to assure the neutralization of Truk and the protection of the lines of communication from the Mari- anas to Yap and Ulithi. Initially, Admiral Nimitz recommended that the Marianas should be taken in mid- June, Woleai a month later, Yap and Ulithi at the beginning of September, and the 19 Tel conv, Gen Sutherland [in Washington] and Maj Gen Richard J. Marshall [Deputy CofS GHQ SWPA, in Brisbane, Australia], 15 Feb 44, CM-IN, WD-Telecon 192. 20 Rad, CINCSWPA to CofS, C-1741, 16 Feb 44, CM-IN 10909. Palaus early in November.21 Reconsidera- tion of this plan led Admiral Nimitz to the conclusion that the occupation of Ulithi should follow landings in the Palaus, a se- quence which might permit the neutraliza- tion rather than the capture of Yap. This schedule would call for landings in the Mari- anas on 15 June, on Woleai 15 July, the seiz- ure of the Palaus beginning 1 October, and the occupation of Ulithi at an opportune moment after the Palau operation began.22 While Admiral Nimitz had been present- ing his plans to the Joint Chiefs, General Sutherland had also been preparing new plans on the basis of General MacArthur's proposals of 5 March. The outline which General Sutherland gave to the Joint Chiefs called for the Southwest Pacific forces to move into the Hollandia area with two divi- sions on 15 April, supported by the Pacific Fleet. Air, naval, and logistic bases would be established at Hollandia to support subse- quent Southwest Pacific advances northwest to the Geelvink Bay region of Dutch New Guinea. The Southwest Pacific forces would move to Geelvink Bay about 1 June. In the middle of the next month, accord- ing to General Sutherland's presentation, three Southwest Pacific divisions would be sent against the Arafura Sea islands, south- west of Dutch New Guinea. There, air bases would be established from which to cover later advances to the Vogelkop Peninsula and Halmahera, both scheduled for mid- 21JCS, Memo for Info 200, 7 Mar 44, sub: Sequence and Timing of Opns, Central Pacific Campaign, A Rpt by CINCPOA, in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A; Min, JCS 150th Mtg, 7 Mar 44, 21 Addendum to JCS Memo for Info 200, 8 Mar 44, sub; Sequence and Timing of Opns, Central Pacific Campaign, Further Rpt by CINCPOA, in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43), Sec. 3-A. THE STRATEGIC BACKGROUND 11 September, when Central Pacific forces might be ready to move to the Palaus. If the Marianas were bypassed, however, the Southwest Pacific chief of staff pointed out, the Palaus might then be invaded as early as mid-July. Land-based aircraft of the Southwest Pacific Area could support a July invasion of the Palaus from air bases in the Hollandia and Geelvink Bay regions. If air bases on the Vogelkop, Halmahera, and the Arafura Sea islands proved inadequate to provide left flank protection for the move into the Philippines, then airdrome sites on Ambon Island might also be seized in Sep- tember or October. The entry into the Phil- ippines would be effected at southeastern Mindanao on 15 November 1944.23 Studies of the outlines presented by Gen- eral Sutherland and Admiral Nimitz were undertaken for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by subordinate, advisory committees, which found some fault with parts of both plans. The committees concluded that Admiral Nimitz' plan to seize Woleai had little merit, because the operation threatened to be too costly in comparison with the possible re- sults. Woleai, they determined, should be bypassed and neutralized by air action. The committees also advised bypassing Truk. The capture of the Palaus they considered necessary to assure the neutralization of Truk, to protect the right flank of Southwest Pacific forces moving into the Philippines, or to support a move by Central Pacific forces directly to Formosa. Again the plan- ners turned down the suggestion that all forces in the Pacific be concentrated on the drive up to the New Guinea coast.24 The se- quence of operations ultimately recom- 2S Reno IV, 6 Mar 44. 24 JGS 713, 16 Feb 44, Strategy in the Pacific [a Rpt by JSSC] and JCS 713/1, 10 Mar 44, Future Opns in Pacific [a Rpt by JPS], both in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A. mended by the Joint Chiefs' subordinate committees provided for the invasion of Hol- landia on 15 April, the Marianas on 15 June, the Palaus on 15 September, and Min- danao on 1 5 November.25 The New Directive for 1944 On 12 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff completed consideration of the proposals submitted by their subordinate committees and the planners of the Central and South- west Pacific Areas. On the same day the Joint Chiefs issued their new directive for action in the Pacific during the rest of 1944. Reaffirming their belief that Allied strength in the Pacific was sufficient to carry on two drives across the Pacific, the Joint Chiefs' directive was, in effect, a reconciliation among conflicting strategic and tactical con- cepts. The Joint Chiefs took into considera- tion the Army Air Forces' desire to begin B— 29 operations against Japan from the Marianas as soon as possible; Admiral King's belief that the Marianas operation was a key undertaking which might well pre- cipitate a fleet showdown; the knowledge concerning the weakness of Truk gained during the February carrier attacks ; the pro- posals offered by various planner concern- ing the feasibility of bypassing Truk; Ad- miral Nimitz' belief that the occupation of the Palaus and Ulithi was necessary to as- sure the neutralization of Truk and to pro- vide the Pacific Fleet with a base in the west- ern Pacific; and, finally, General MacAr- thur's plans to return to the Philippines as early as possible via the New Guinea- Mindanao axis of advance. The Joint Chiefs instructed General Mac- Arthur to cancel the Kavieng operation, to complete the neutralization of Rabaul and 25 JSC 713/1, 10 Mar 44. 12 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Kavieng with minimum forces, and to speed the development of an air and naval base in the Admiralties. The Southwest Pacific's forces were to jump from eastern New Guinea to Hollandia on 15 April, bypassing Wewak and Hansa Bay. The Joint Chiefs stated that the principal purpose of seizing Hollandia was to develop there an air cen- ter from which heavy bombers could start striking the Palaus and Japanese air bases in western New Guinea and Halmahera. After the occupation and development of the Hollandia area, General MacArthur was to conduct operations northwest along the northern New Guinea coast and "such other operations as may be feasible" with avail- able forces in preparation for the invasion of the Palaus and Mindanao. The target date for the Southwest Pacific's landing in the Philippines was set for 15 November. Admiral Nimitz, in turn, was ordered to cancel the Truk operation and to speed the aerial neutralization of Truk, Woleai, and other Japanese bases in the central and east- ern Carolines. He was also directed to con- duct heavy carrier strikes against the Mari- anas, the Carolines (including the Palaus), and "other profitable targets," and to pro- vide carrier support and amphibious means for the Southwest Pacific's landings in the Hollandia area. The Mariana Islands were to be occupied by Central Pacific forces be- ginning 1 5 June and the Palaus starting 1 5 September. The Palaus, said the Joint Chiefs, were to be occupied for the purposes of extending Allied control over the eastern approaches to the Philippines and P'ormosa and to secure air and naval bases from which to support operations against Mindanao, Formosa, and the China coast.26 The Joint Chiefs of Staff had decreed that Pacific strategy would entail a reinvasion of the Philippines, but for operations after Min- danao no decision was made in March 1 944. The strategy for the approach to the Philip- pines was clearly delineated — the forces of the Southwest Pacific were to move north- west along the coast of New Guinea and via the islands northwest of the Vogelkop Penin- sula into the Philippines; Central Pacific forces were to continue operations in two di- rections, the first toward Japan through the Marianas and the other west toward the Philippines via the Palaus. The stage was set for the acceleration of the drive to the Phil- ippines. "Rad, CofS (for JCS) to CINCSWPA, 5171, and to COMGENCENPAC (to CINCPOA), 989, 12 Mar 44, CM-OUT 5137. This message is also JCS 713/4, 12 Mar 44, Future Opns in Pacific, in OPD file, ABC 384 Pacific (1-17-43) Sec. 3-A. CHAPTER II Planning and Preparation for the Hollandia-Aitape Operation The first step in the Southwest Pacific Area's drive to the Philippines — the seizure of the Hollandia region of Dutch New Guinea — -could have far-reaching conse- quences. (Map I) Anchorages at Hollan- dia were known to be capable of basing many of the largest combat vessels, cargo ships, and troop transports. Inland plains in the area were thought to provide almost un- limited potentialities for airdrome develop- ment. Aircraft operating from fields at Hol- landia could dominate most Japanese air- dromes in western New Guinea and nearer islands of the Indies, could fly reconnais- sance and bombing missions against the western Carolines, including the Palaus, and could provide support for subsequent land- ing operations along the north coast of New Guinea. Small naval vessels, such as motor torpedo boats ( PT's ) , operating from Hol- landia area bases, could interdict Japanese barge traffic for miles both east and west of that region. Finally, the Hollandia region was capable of development into a major supply base and staging 1 area for the sup- port of subsequent Allied operations farther to the west. General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, and its subordinate commands were to have no easy task in planning the advance to Hollandia; but by March 1944 these headquarters had accumulated two years' experience with the complex air, sea, and ground operations that characterized the war in the Pacific. Indeed, the planning for Hollandia provides an excellent case study for most amphibious undertakings in the Southwest Pacific. For this reason a detailed discussion of the work undertaken by the various theater commands, the problems they faced, and the means by which these problems were solved is included here. The planning for subsequent operations within the Southwest Pacific is treated in less detail with emphasis placed principally on the dif- ferences from the Hollandia planning. Solving the many problems faced by the Southwest Pacific commands in planning the advance to Hollandia was made more difficult by the interrelationship of many of those problems. A direct move to Hollandia from eastern New Guinea, bypassing Wewak and Hansa Bay, could not be undertaken unless carrier-based air support were made 1 The term "staging" used in the Pacific theaters during World War II had a broader meaning than that usually applied in Europe or the zone of in- terior. In the Pacific a staging base was the point of departure for an amphibious operation. At such a base not only would troop units be assembled, but supplies and equipment of all types would also be gathered to be loaded for either immediate or future use at objective areas. 14 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES available from the Pacific Fleet. It was also possible that a more powerful enemy force might be encountered at Hollandia than had been met during any previous landing oper- ation in the Pacific theaters. This meant that a larger Allied force than had ever before been assembled for any single amphibious operation in the Pacific would have to be sent against Hollandia. The size of this force would complicate logistic planning and preparations and would necessitate the use of more assault shipping than was available within the Southwest Pacific Area. Finally, the advance was to be made into terrain about which many important details were unavailable and unobtainable. Thus, all in- terested commands of the Southwest Pacific Area were to have a thoroughgoing test of their training or past experience. Theater Organization General MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area headquarters was an inter-Allied, in- terservicc command exercising operational and policy-making functions. The staff was organized generally along U. S. Army lines except that many technical and administra- tive special staff sections were not included. Administrative services for U. S. Army forces within the theater were concentrated at Headquarters, United States Army Forces in the Far East, also commanded by General MacArthur. Logistic and technical service functions for U. S. Army forces were under Headquarters, United States Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area, which also had certain inter-Allied and interservice lo- gistic responsibilities. Allied combat opera- tions were conducted through four opera- tional headquarters subordinate to General MacArthur — the Allied Air Forces, the Al- lied Land Forces, the Allied Naval Forces, and Alamo Force. Allied Air Forces was commanded by Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney (USA). Its major component parts during the early period covered in this volume wrere the U. S. Fifth Air Force and the Royal Australian Air Force Command, Allied Air Forces. Later, the U. S. Thirteenth Air Force was rede- ployed from the South Pacific Area to pass to the control of the Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area. At the time of the Hollandia operation, General Kenney was also in direct command of the Fifth Air Force, while the Royal Australian Air Force Command was under Air Vice Marshal William D. Bostock (RAAF ) , who also had operational control over the few Dutch air organizations in the theater. The Allied Naval Forces was commanded by Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid (USN) , whose organization comprised the U. S. Sev- enth Fleet ( commanded directly by Admiral Kinkaid ) and ships assigned from the Royal Australian Navy and the Royal Netherlands Navy. Admiral Kinkaid's chief subordinate for amphibious operations was Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbey (USN), who was the commander of the VII Amphibious Force, Seventh Fleet. Allied Land Forces was commanded by General Sir Thomas Blarney (AIF), who was also the commander in chief of the Aus- tralian Army and who had operational con- trol over the very few Dutch ground force troops in the Southwest Pacific Area. Alamo Force was commanded by Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger (USA), also the com- mander of the U. S. Sixth Army. The staffs of Alamo Force and Sixth Army were iden- tical. As Sixth Army, General Krueger's command was subordinate to General \TION OF THE ! GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA Gen. Douglas MacArlhur ALAMO FORCE OJ. S. SIXTH ARMY) Ll. Gen. Wallet Krueser ALLIED NAVAL FORCES Vice Adm. Thome. C. Kinkald Olhei U. S. or Allied uniii as assigned U. S. Seventh Fleet Thomas C, ALLIED AIR FORCES Ll. Gen. George C. Kenney Royal Netherlands Navy unit-, as assigned Royal Australian Air Force Command, Allied Air Forces Royal Australian Nary unili si assigned ALLIED LAND FORCES Gen. Sir Thomas Blarney U. S. Filth Air Force Ll. Gen, George C. Kennty New Guinea Force Thom«Bbn,ey Australian Aimy units assigned to SWPA Royal Nelhej lands East Indie* Air Fofci U.S. Atmy Utiiii in Australia, for defensive purposes only Royal Netherlands East Indies Army unjls LL £ ARMY FORCES IN THE FAR EAST Gen. Douglas MacA.fSur U. S. Aimy Services or Supply, SWPA Maj. Gen. J, L Frink USASOS baies or bose lections Service umft as assigned 16 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Blarney's Allied Land Forces, but as Alamo Force it was subordinate only to General Headquarters. Allied Land Forces, while re- taining operational control of U. S. Army troops in continental Australia for defensive purposes, controlled during the period of operations described in this volume the offensive operations of only those ground task forces primarily Australian in character. Conversely, Alamo Force directed offensive operations of ground organizations compris- ing principally U. S. Army troops.2 In mid- April there were almost 750,000 troops in the various ground, air, and naval services under General MacArthur's com- mand. Included in this total were approxi- mately 450,000 U. S. Army ground and air personnel. Major ground combat compo- nents of the U. S. Army were 7 divisions (6 infantry and 1 dismounted cavalry), 3 separate regimental combat teams, and 3 engineer special brigades. Australian ground forces comprised 5 infantry divisions and enough division headquarters, brigades, or brigade groups (the latter equivalent to a U. S. Army regimental combat team) to form two more divisions.3 Within the boundaries of the Southwest Pacific Area were approximately 350,000 Japanese, of whom 50,000 were hopelessly cut off in the Bismarck Archipelago. In the New Guinea area were 5 Japanese divisions (3 of them greatly understrength ) ; in the Netherlands East Indies 3 divisions and 2 independent mixed brigades (the latter somewhat larger than a U. S. Army regi- mental combat team) ; and in the Philip- 2 Milner, Victory in Papua, describes the estab- lishment of the command in the Southwest Pacific Area. 3 G-3 GHQ SWPA, G-3 Monthly Sum of Opns, May 44, 31 May 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 31 May 44. pines 1 division and 4 independent mixed brigades.4 The Hollandia Area The Terrain The Allied organizations which were to move against the Hollandia area were to find there an excellent site for a major air and supply base, including the only good anchorage between Wewak in Australian New Guinea and Geelvink Bay, 450 miles northwest in Dutch New Guinea.5 The coast line in the Hollandia area is broken by Hum- boldt and Tanahmerah Bays, which lie about twenty-five miles apart. | [Map 2) Between the two are the Cyclops Moun- tains, dominating the area. This short range rises to a height of over 7,000 feet and drops steeply to the Pacific Ocean on its northern side. South of the mountains is Lake Sen- tani, an irregularly crescent-shaped body of fresh water about fifteen and a half miles long. Between the north shore of the lake and the Cyclops Mountains is a flat plain well suited to airdrome construction, while other airfield sites are to be found on coastal flatlands just east of Humboldt Bay. South of Lake Sentani are more plains, which give way to rolling hills and a largely unexplored mountain range running roughly parallel to the coast about thirty or forty miles inland. Hollandia is a wet area. In the Humboldt Bay region the average annual rainfall is 90—100 inches; around Tanahmerah Bay * G-2 GHQ SWPA, G-2 Monthly Sum of Enemy Dispositions, Apr 44, 30 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Apr 44. See also below, [cTTlVTI 5 Terrain information in this subsection is based principally on AGS SWPA Terrain Study 78, Lo- cality Study of Hollandia, 6 Mar 44. in OCMH files. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 17 130—140 inches; and in the Lake Sentani depression 60-70 inches. April is neither the wettest nor the driest month — those distinc- tions are reserved to February and Septem- ber, respectively. But rain and mud can be anticipated at Hollandia during April, when the average rainfall is eight and one-half inches and about thirteen rainy days are to be expected. The rivers in the area flood after heavy rains, but flood conditions usually last only a few hours. The Hollandia region was well suited for defense. The Cyclops Mountains presented an almost impassable barrier on the north while the width of New Guinea, with its rugged inland mountain chains, prevented an approach from the south. Movement of large bodies of troops along the coast either east or west of Hollandia was nearly im- possible. Thus, the only practical means of access to the most important military objec- tive in the area, the Lake Sentani Plain, was by amphibious assault at Humboldt Bay, on the east, or Tanahmerah Bay, on the west. From these two bays Lake Sentani could be approached only over many hills and through numerous defiles. Roads inland through these approaches were little better than foot trails prior to the war, but it was believed that they had been somewhat im- proved by the Japanese. Landing beaches were numerous in the Humboldt Bay area, but there were few along the shores of Tanahmerah Bay. Almost all beaches in the region were nar- row, backed by dense mangrove swamps, and easily defensible from hills to their rear and flanks. Measured by standards of jungle warfare, the distances from the beaches to the center of the Lake Sentani Plain were long, being eighteen miles by trail from Humboldt Bay and about fourteen miles from Tanahmerah Bay. 18 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Japanese Developments at Hollandia Hollandia had little claim to prominence before the war. Once it had been a center of trade in bird-of-paradise feathers, but this commerce had declined after 1931. In the late 1920's and early 1930's the Netherlands East Indies Government had promoted col- onization and agriculture in the area, but labor trouble and sickness had caused these ventures to be practically abandoned by 1938. The town of Hollandia, situated on an arm of Humboldt Bay, then ceased to be commercially important and served only as the seat of local government and as a base for several exploring expeditions into the in- terior of Dutch New Guinea. The Japanese occupied the Hollandia area early in April 1942 but paid little at- tention to the region until almost a year later, when Allied air reconnaissance dis- closed that the enemy was constructing air- fields on the Lake Sentani Plain. This de- velopment progressed slowly until late 1943, by which time successive reverses in the air and on the ground in eastern New Guinea and the Bismarck Archipelago, together with increasing shipping losses in the same region, began to demonstrate to the Japa- nese the vulnerability of theif air and supply bases east of Hollandia.6 In late 1943 and ° Alamo Force, G— 2 Estimate of the Enemy Sit- uation, Hollandia— Ai tape Operation, 10 Mar 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2—14 Mar 44; Japanese Studies in World War II, No. 43, 18th Army Operations, III, 17-20, copy in OCMH files. The latter document is one of a series prepared in Japan by Japanese Army and Navy officers after the war and translated by ATIS SCAP, Copies of the translations as well as copies of most of the Japanese originals are on file in the OCMH. Dubious or questionable parts of the translations were checked against the Japanese originals before use was made of the documents. early 1 944 the enemy built three airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain and started a fourth at Tami, on the seacoast east of Humboldt Bay. Their reverses in eastern New Guinea prompted the Japanese to withdraw their strategic main line of resistance to the west, and the Hollandia airdromes were devel- oped as the forward anchor of a string of air bases stretching from the southern Nether- lands East Indies into the Philippine Islands. The Japanese 4th Air Army, principal enemy air headquarters in New Guinea, established at Hollandia an air base which ultimately became so large that it was sur- passed in size and strength only by the air center earlier developed by the Japanese at Rabaul. At Hollandia the 4th Air Army and its operating echelon, the 6th Air Division, felt comparatively safe, for prior to 1944 that area lay beyond the effective range of Allied land-based fighter planes. In addition, because of shipping losses east of Hollandia, the Japanese began to de- velop Humboldt Bay into a major supply base and transshipment point. Large ships would unload at Hollandia, whence cargo would be carried by barge to points south- east along the coast of New Guinea as far as Wewak, 215 miles away. Much of the cargo of the large ships remained at Hol- landia to build up the base there. Continu- ous Japanese shipping activity throughout western New Guinea indicated to General MacArthur's Intelligence (G-2) Section that reinforcements were pouring into that area — reinforcements which might reach Hollandia. At the same time, it seemed possible that the Japanese 18th Army might send reinforcements to Hollandia from east- ern New Guinea. Time favored whatever development the Japanese were undertaking PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 19 LAKE SENTANI PLAIN, SHOWING AIRFIELDS. Between the north shore of the lake and the Cyclops Mountains is a flat plain well suited to airdrome development. at Hollandia. It was highly important that the Allies seize the area before the enemy could build it into a formidable fortress.7 ' 1 8th Army Opns, III, 17-20; Amendment 2, 17 Mar 44, to GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Respect to an Opn Against Hollandia, 1 7 Feb 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 29 Feb 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 Daily Summary of Enemy Intelligence [DSEI] 719, 720, and 759, 11 Mar, 12 Mar, and 20 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, 11 Mar, 12 Mar, and 20 Apr 44, respectively. A Japanese area army is equivalent to the U. S, Army's field army; a Japanese army roughly equals a U. S. Army corps. Some special Japanese organi- zations, such as the Southern Army and the Kwantung Army, are equivalent to the U. S. Army's army group. A Japanese air army was theoretically equivalent to a U. S. Army air force, such as the Fifth Air Force; and the Japanese air division, while having no exact equivalent in the U. S. forces, would occupy the same relative command position as a The Decision to Take Aitape Preliminary planning for an advance to Hollandia had been undertaken in General Headquarters during late February 1944. On 3 March representatives from major commands in both the South and Southwest Pacific Areas gathered at General MacAr- thur's command post in Brisbane, Australia, to discuss the problems involved in carrying out the direct advance to Hollandia without seizing an intermediate base in the Hansa Bay-Wewak area. It was immediately ap- parent to the Brisbane conferees that the U. S. bomber command or fighter command. Actu- ally the Japanese 4th Air Army contained fewer planes than the average U. S. air group. 20 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES basic problem was that of obtaining air support. Obtaining Carrier-Based Air Support Previous operations in the Southwest Pa- cific Area had been undertaken within effec- tive range of Allied land-based fighter cover, but Hollandia was beyond this range, since the nearest Allied base was Nadzab in Aus- tralian New Guinea, almost 500 miles south- east of the objective. On the other hand, the Japanese had completed one airfield and were constructing two others in the Wakde Island-Sarmi area of Dutch New Guinea, only 125 miles northwest of Hollandia. Neither the Wakde-Sarmi nor the Hollan- dia fields could be kept neutralized by long- range bomber action alone. Fighter sweeps against both objectives would be necessary before D Day at Hollandia. Since land-based fighters could not ac- complish these tasks, the long jump to Hol- landia could be undertaken only if carrier- borne air support could be obtained. The Southwest Pacific's naval arm had no car- riers permanently assigned to it. Therefore, carriers had to be obtained from sources out- side the theater.8 In their 12 March directive the Joint Chiefs had instructed Admiral Nimitz to provide support for the Hollandia opera- tion.9 Now, in accordance with these instruc- tions, Admiral Nimitz proposed that he pro- vide air support for Hollandia by undertak- ing carrier-based air strikes against Wakde— "Min of Conf, 3 Mar 44, held at GHQ SWPA between representatives of GHQ SWPA, COMSOPAC, ANF SWPA, et al, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 3 Mar 44; Rad, CINCSWPA to CINCPOA, C-2853, 14 Mar 44, CM-IN 9841. "Rad, CofS (for JCS) to CINCSWPA, 5171, and to COMGENCENPAC (for CINCPOA), 989, Mar 44, CM-OUT 5137. Sarmi and Hollandia prior to D Day. In addition, he would provide air support for the landings and, for a limited period there- after, operations ashore. This support was to be made available by two groups of fast carriers assigned to Task Force 58 of the U. S. Fifth Fleet, an operational part of Admiral Nimitz5 Pacific Fleet.10 Initially, General MacArthur planned to have these carriers conduct fighter sweeps against Hollandia and the Wakde-Sarmi area on D minus 1 and D Day of the Hol- landia operation. On D Day carriers would support the landings at Hollandia and then would remain in the objective area to fur- nish cover for ground operations and un- loading of supplies and troops through D plus 8 or until fields for land-based fighters could be constructed at Hollandia.11 This plan was opposed by Admiral Nimitz on the grounds that it would invite disaster. In western New Guinea the Japanese were building many new airfields to which they could send large numbers of planes from other parts of the Netherlands East Indies or from the Philippines. There was no assur- ance that Allied carrier-based aircraft and land-based bombers could keep these enemy fields sufficiently neutralized to prevent the Japanese from staging large-scale air attacks against the Hollandia area. Admiral Nimitz therefore refused to leave the large carriers in the objective area for the period desired by the Southwest Pacific Area. Instead, he would permit Task Force 58 to remain in the Hollandia region only through D plus 3. 12 General MacArthur reluctantly accepted wRad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 14 Mar 44, CM-IN 9944; Rad, CINCPOA to COMINCH, 17 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44. 11 GHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan, 29 Feb 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 12 Memo, Asst ACofS G-3 Alamo for ACofS G-3 Alamo, 31 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA -AIT APE 21 this condition, although it left unsolved the problem of obtaining air support at Hol- landia from D plus 3 until land-based fighters could be sent there. Many solutions were proposed for this problem. Land-Based Air Support General Headquarters, Southwest Pacific Area, had once given serious consideration to a plan to drop parachute troops on the Japanese-held airfields north of Lake Sen- tani. Since a large Japanese force was esti- mated to be defending Hollandia, there was no assurance that this action would be tac- tically successful. Even if the paratroopers captured the airfields quickly, there could be no assurance that enough men and engineer- ing equipment could be flown to the Lake Sentani Plain in time to construct a fighter strip there before Task Force 58 was sched- uled to retire. This plan was therefore abandoned.13 The Allied Air Forces proposed the estab- lishment of land-based fighters on Wuvulu Island, which lies about 1 25 miles northeast of Hollandia. This plan was also given up. Little was known about terrain conditions on Wuvulu, the island was much closer to Jap- anese bases than to Allied, and its seizure would disclose the direction of the main at- tack. Furthermore, the Wuvulu operation would absorb ground forces, amphibious shipping, and engineering equipment sorely needed for the Hollandia campaign.14 "Ibid,; GHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan Draft, 28 Feb 44, and Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF-1012, 7 Mar 44, both in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 11 Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, XC-1855, 8 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 8 Mar 44; Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF-1453, 10 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 10 Mar 44; Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, A plan to develop a fighter strip at Tanah- merah ( inland in south-central Dutch New Guinea and not to be confused with Tanah- merah Bay) was likewise proposed and dis- carded. The terrain at the inland Tanah- merah was poor and the transportation of supplies and engineering equipment to the site would present major problems. Since Tanahmcrah lies south and Hollandia north of the great unexplored inland mountain range which laterally bisects New Guinea, bad weather over this range, by no means unusual, might prevent fighters based at Tanahmerah from supporting landings at Hollandia.15 Also given serious consideration was the possibility of seizing a field in the Wakde— Sarmi area simultaneously with Hollandia. The principal obstacle to the ex- ecution of this plan was lack of sufficient as- sault shipping and landing craft to insure tactical success. Information about the Wakde-Sarmi area was exceedingly meager, but it was estimated by General MacAr- thur's G-2 Section that enemy strength there was growing rapidly.16 It was finally decided to obtain land-based air support for Hollandia by seizing an air- field site on the northern New Guinea coast east of the main objective. The location chosen was a lightly held area already par- tially developed by the Japanese near Ai- tape, which lies in Australian New Guinea WF-1555, 10 Mar 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 1S GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan, 29 Feb 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 10 GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA Memo, no addressee, 1 Mar 44, sub: Consider- ations Affecting the Plan to Seize Humboldt Bay Area with Strong Support of Carriers, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Wakde-Sarmi Area, 8 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 8 Apr 44. 22 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES about 125 miles east-southeast of Hol- landia." The Aitape Area Aitape had been occupied by the enemy in December 1942.18 Before the war the town was the seat of local government and an interisland trading point of but small commerce. The entire region is a coastal plain, varying from five to twelve miles in width, swampy in many places and cut by numerous streams. The only prominent ter- rain feature on the coast is a small hill at Aitape. There are no natural eastern or west- ern boundaries in the area. To the north lies the Pacific Ocean, and south of the coastal plain rise the foothills of the Torri- celli Mountains. Offshore, about eight miles east of Aitape, are four small islands. Good landing beaches exist throughout the region, the best a few miles east of Aitape. The absence of suitable terrain features makes difficult the defense of the area against am- phibious assault. The many rivers could pro- vide some defense against lateral movement, but these rivers vary greatly in width and depth according to the amount of rainfall. April marks the end of the wettest season in the Aitape region, where rainfall aver- ages about 100 inches per year. Though June is one of the dryest months, July is one of the wettest, with almost eight inches of rain. Torrential tropical downpours rather than prolonged rains are to be expected at Aitape. Japanese development in the area cen- tered around airfield construction near "GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, XC-1753, 5 Mar 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 18 The description of the Aitape area is based principally on AGS SWPA Terrain Handbook 21, Aitape-Vanimo, 21 Mar 44, copy in OCMH files. Tadji Plantation, about eight miles east- southeast of Aitape. At least three fields were begun by the enemy near Tadji at one time or another, but terrain conditions and lack of equipment prevented the Japanese from completing more than one of these strips. They used this field as a staging area for air- craft flying between Wewak and Hollandia and as a dispersal field for planes evacuated from heavily bombed airdromes east of Aitape. Intelligence reports indicated that Japanese ground defenses in the Aitape area were weak. It therefore seemed probable that there would be little opposition to a landing and that the assault force, once ashore, could quickly seize the airstrip area. It was estimated that Allied engineers could rehabilitate one of the Tadji strips for the use of fighter planes within forty-eight hours after the initial landings. Aircraft based on the Tadji strips would be within easy sup- porting distance of Hollandia, able to pro- vide air cover after the carriers departed from Hollandia.19 The seizure of the Aitape area had an ad- ditional important aspect besides providing land-based support for Hollandia. Once es- tablished ashore at Aitape, Allied forces could provide ground flank protection for Hollandia against any westward movement on the part of the Japanese 1 8th Army. Additional Air Support Problems Although the decision to seize the Tadji airstrips assured that the departure of Task Force 58 would not leave ground operations at Hollandia without air support, other air 18 GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Perse- cution [Aitape], 24 Jan 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 26 Jan 44; Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA for CINCSWPA, 25 Mar 44, sub: Air Tasks for the Hollandia Opn, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLAND IA -AITAPE 23 support problems arose. The seizure of the Aitape area itself required air support, but Aitape, like Hollandia, was beyond the most effective range of Allied land-based fighters. Not enough large carriers had been made available to support the Hollandia landings ( providing support for operations there for a few days and carrying out air strikes against Japanese bases in western New Guinea) and also to support the landing at Aitape. Eight escort carriers (CVE's), together with the large carriers, had been made avail- able by Admiral Nimitz to support the Hol- landia operation. At first General Mac- Arthur planned to use the escort carriers for close support missions at both Hollandia and Aitape,20 but it was decided that Task Force 58's carriers could provide all the air sup- port necessary in the Hollandia area. There- fore the eight CVE's were to be used to support only the assault at Aitape and to cover ground operations in that area until one of the Tadji strips could be rehabilitated. They were to be released for return to the Central Pacific Area no later than D plus 19 of the Hollandia and Aitape landings, and earlier if possible.21 In order to carry out all the air support missions which might become necessary, it was extremely important that the maximum possible number of fighters be based on the Tadji strips at an early date. Originally it was planned to send one fighter group of the U. S. Fifth Air Force to Tadji, a group con- taining both P-38 and P-40 aircraft; but it was expected that the airstrips, if in opera- " GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44. " Memo, G-3 GHQ Opns Div for ACofS G-3 GHQ, 25 Mar 44, no sub, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Mar 44 ; Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ for CINCSWPA, 25 Mar 44, sub: Air Tasks for the Hollandia Opn, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 28 Mar 44. tion by D plus 1 , would be rough and lack- ing many normal airfield facilities. It was therefore decided to send No. 78 Wing of the Royal Australian Air Force to Tadji. This Australian unit, which was comparable in size to an American group, was equipped solely with P-40 aircraft, planes peculiarly suited to operations under the rough condi- tions and incomplete facilities that could be expected at Tadji.22 The Forces and Their Missions Once it had become certain that close air support for the assaults at Hollandia and Aitape could be obtained, it was possible to undertake detailed logistical and tactical planning. D Day, originally set for 1 5 April, was postponed to 22 April, with the ap- proval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Tide con- ditions along the north-central coast of New Guinea, the schedule of carrier operations already planned by Admiral Nimitz, and logistic problems within the Southwest Pa- cific Area combined to force this change in date. On 22 April the air, sea, and land forces of the Southwest Pacific, supported by Task Force 58, were to seize the Hollandia and Aitape areas, isolating the Japanese 18th Army to the east. The operations of forces assigned to the Southwest Pacific Area were to be co-ordinated by General MacArthur's headquarters in accordance with the princi- ples of unity of command. The action of Task Force 58 was to be governed by mutual agreement and co-operation between Gen- eral MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. At "Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, CX-10218, 30 Mar 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 28-30 Mar 44; Rad, Advon5AF to GHQ SWPA, R-6915-F, 31 Mar 44, and Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF-118, 1 Apr 44, last two in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44. 24 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Aitape minor air and naval facilities were to be established. At Hollandia a major air base, a logistics base capable of supporting and staging 150,000 troops, and a small naval base were to be constructed.25 The Air Plan and Organization Long-range or strategic air support, both before and during the Hollandia-Aitape operation, was to be provided by Task Force 58 and the Allied Air Forces, Southwest Pacific Area. Task Force 58, commanded by Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitscher (USN), consisted of the large carriers and escorting battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. The escort carriers scheduled to support the Aitape landing were to operate as Task Force 78 under the command of Rear Adm. Ralph E.Davison (USN).24 Prior to 22 April the land-based bombers of the Allied Air Forces were to undertake neutralization of enemy air installations along the northern coast of New Guinea as far west as the Wakde-Sarmi area. Japanese air bases on islands in the Arafura Sea, on the Vogelkop Peninsula, and in the Caroline Islands were all to be hit by Allied Air Forces bombers. The missions against the Carolines were to be carried out for the most part by planes of the XIII Air Task Force, an ad- vanced group of the Thirteenth Air Force, the latter then in process of moving from the South, Pacific to the Southwest Pacific Area. Aircraft under control of the Allied Air Forces were also to provide aerial reconnais- sance and photography as required by the1 23 GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44. aANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44; CTF 58 Opn Plan 5-44, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 21 Apr 44. ground and naval forces participating in the operation.25 Land-based fighters of the Allied Air Forces were to cover convoys within range of Allied Air Forces bases, while Allied ship- ping beyond this range was to be protected by aircraft from escort carriers. In order to prevent the Japanese from deducing the di- rection and objective of the operation, Gen- eral Headquarters had decided to route the assault convoys from assembly points in eastern New Guinea north to the Admiralty Islands and thence west-southwest toward Hollandia and Aitape. Since this extended route would take the convoys into ocean areas which could not be covered by land- based fighters, the escort carriers had been assigned their additional support role.26 Medium bombers (B-25's and A-20's) of the Allied Air Forces, based in eastern New Guinea, were to undertake such close support missions at Hollandia and Aitape on D Day and thereafter as might be requested by the ground force commanders and per- mitted by distance and weather. Escort carrier aircraft would, if necessary, fly close support missions at Hollandia as well as at Aitape after Task Force 58 left the former area. Task Force 58 planes were to operate against targets designated by General Head- quarters and requested by the ground com- manders at Hollandia. The primary mission of Task Force 58, however, was to destroy or contain Japanese naval forces which M GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44; AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 30 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Mar 44. " Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA for CINC- SWPA, 25 Mar 44, sub: Air Tasks for the Hollandia Opn, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44; ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 28 Mar 44. Chart 2 — Air Organization eor the Ho llandia-Ait ape Operations (Amphibious Phase) GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA CINCPAC-CINCPOA Allied Air Forces Allied Naval Forces (U. S. Seventh Fleet) U. S. Fifth Fleet Royal , Air Force Command, stralian fKir l-orce l-ommand, Allied Air Forces T Royal Netherlands East Indies Air Force Task Force 73 (Naval Land-Based Aircraft, SWPA) 1 I I I U. S. Fifth Air Force Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force Task Force 78 (Escort Carriers, Operational control. Co-operation or joint planning. 26 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES might attempt to interfere with the Hol- landia operation. The air support missions of the force were secondary to the destruc- tion of the Japanese fleet.27 Most of the air support tasks assigned to land-based aircraft of the Allied Air Forces were to be carried out by the U. S. Fifth Air Force. Forward area operations were as- signed to the Advanced Echelon, Fifth Air Force, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ennis C. Whitehead. Many missions against the islands of the Arafura Sea and the Geelvink Bay area were to be undertaken by Air Vice Marshal Bostock's Royal Australian Air Force Command. American air missions were to be flown principally from Fifth Air Force bases in eastern New Guinea. Aus- tralian planes, aided by bombers of the Fifth Air Force and a B-25 squadron of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Air Force, were to strike most of their targets from fields at Darwin in northern Australia.28 In addition to conducting a fighter sweep of the Hollandia and Wakde-Sarmi fields prior to D Day and covering the landings at Hollandia, Task Force 58 was assigned an- other important air support mission. Carrier strikes by the U. S. Fifth Fleet during Febru- ary had driven the main body of the Jap- anese fleet west from its forward base at Truk in the Carolines. In March the Jap- anese began to reassemble naval power in the Palau Islands, some 800 miles northwest of Hollandia. This new naval strength con- stituted a potentially serious threat to the * AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 30 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Mar 44; Change No. 1, 10 Apr 44, to CTF 58 Opn Plan 5^1-4, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 21 Apr 44; ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44; Rad, CINCPOA to Com5thFlt et al, 27 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 27 Mar 44. 28 AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 30 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Mar 44. success of the Hollandia operation. It was therefore considered imperative to conduct a carrier strike against the Palaus in order to drive the enemy fleet still farther west, an operation scheduled by Admiral Nimitz for about 1 April. After the strike against the Palaus, Task Force 58 was to retire from the Carolines and western New Guinea until 2 1 April, D minus 1 of the Hollandia operation, when it was to return to sweep the Wakde- Sarmi and Hollandia fields.29 Admiral Nimitz requested that Southwest Pacific aircraft cover the strike against the Palaus by undertaking reconnaissance and bombardment missions over those islands and others in the Carolines during the pas- sage of Task Force 58 to and from its objec- tive. He also asked for missions against Jap- anese air and naval installations in the Bis- marck Archipelago and along the northern coast of New Guinea. There were not suffi- cient long-range aircraft available to the Allied Air Forces to carry out all the missions requested by Admiral Nimitz and at the same time continue necessary bombing and reconnaissance preparations for the advance to Hollandia. Therefore a squadron of PB4Y's (the naval version of the Army B- 24 ) was transferred from the South Pacific to the Southwest Pacific. These planes were stationed initially in eastern New Guinea and then sent to the Admiralties when the fields there became operational. Other long- range missions in support of the Palau strike were carried out by Fifth Air Force B-24's "GHQ SWPA Conf, 3 Mar 44; Memo, GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 1 Mar 44, sub: Considera- tions Affecting the Plan to Seize Humboldt Bay Area with Strong Support of Carriers, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Rad, Com3dFlt to CINCPOA, 8 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 9 Mar 44; CINPAC-CINCPOA Opn Plan 1-44, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 Jnl, 19 Mar 44; Rad, CINCPOA to Com5thFlt, et al., 27 Mar 44, CM-IN 19262. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 27 and PBY's (two-engined patrol bombers) of the Allied Naval Forces, Southwest Pacific Area.30 Aircraft of the South Pacific Area (the operations of this area were under General Mac Arthur's strategic direction) were to continue aerial blockade of the Bismarcks and Solomons. The same air units were to assist in reconnaissance missions required to cover the operations of both Task Force 58 and the movement of Southwest Pacific forces to Hollandia and Aitape. Finally, with naval forces of the South Pacific assist- ing, the South Pacific air was to halt Japa- nese sea-borne reinforcement and supply ac- tivities within the area.31 Naval Plans The Allied Naval Forces was to transport and land the assault troops and supporting forces, together with their supplies, and to furnish necessary naval protection for the overwater movement to the objectives. Ad- miral Kinkaid's command was also to con- duct hydrographic surveys of harbors and approaches at Hollandia and Aitape, under- take mine-sweeping at both objectives, and carry out submarine reconnaissance as re- quired by General MacArthur. Admiral Kinkaid delegated control of both ground and naval forces during the amphibious phase of the operation to Admiral Barbey. In case of an engagement with Japanese fleet units, Admiral Kinkaid would assume 30Rad, CINCPOA to CINCSWPA, 14 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44; Rad, CINCSWPA to COMSOPAC, XC-2255, 20 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 20 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 48, 24 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 24 Mar 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to ANF SWPA and AAF SWPA, CX-10113, 27 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 27 Mar 44. 31 GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 48, 24 Mar 44. direct command of Allied Naval Forces combat ships supporting the Hollandia— Aitape operation, but otherwise Admiral Barbey would remain in control.32 For the Hollandia-Aitape operation Ad- miral Barbey's command was designated Task Force 77. It contained all the attack shipping available to the Allied Naval Forces and also covering and support forces of escort carriers and American and Aus- tralian cruisers and destroyers. Task Force 77's attack shipping and fire support vessels were divided into three main sections — the Western, Central, and Eastern Attack Groups. The first two were responsible for the Hollandia area landings, while the East- ern Attack Group was to carry assault troops to Aitape.33 Naval fire support for the landings was primarily a responsibility of Task Force 77, but the battleships, cruisers, and destroyers of Task Force 58 were also to be ready to provide fire support for the landings and operations ashore at Hollandia, should such additional bombardment prove necessary.34 In case of fleet action, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 would retain its independence and would not come under the control of General MacArthur or of the latter's naval commander, Admiral Kinkaid. Task Force 58 could depart the Hollandia area at a mo- ment's notice to carry out its primary mis- sion, destruction or containment of threaten- ing Japanese fleet units. Conversely, the combat ships and escort carriers of the Allied Naval Forces would not pass to the control of Admiral Mitscher. There was no provi- ss GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44; ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44. 33 Ibid.; CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 4—5 Apr 44. 3,ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4^*4, 1 Apr 44; CTF 58 Opn Plan 5-44, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 21 Apr 44. Chart 3 — Naval Organization for the Hollandia-Aitape Operation (Amphibious Phase) SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA CINCPAC-CINCPOA Allied Naval Forces (U. S. Sevenlh Fleet) Vice Adm. Thomas C. Kinkoid U. S. FihJi Fl«l Adm. Raymond A. Sprironce Tosk Force 77 (Naval Attack Force) (VII Amphibious Farce) Task Force 74 (Covering Force A) Rcor Adm. V. A. C. Crutehley, RN 9 CA (RAN) 2 DD (RAN) 9 OD Talk Group 77.1 (Western Attack Group) Rear Adm. Daniel E. Barbcy 7 DO 1 AK 1 AT 3 APA 15 LCI 2 YMS 1 LCI (R) 1 LSD 7 LST 2 SC Talk Force 75 (Covering Force B) Rear Adm. Russell S. Berkey 3 CL 6 DD Task Farce SB Vice Adm. Marc A. Mitseher 5 CV 7 CVL 6 BB 3 CL 2 CL (A A) 6 CA Task Group 77.9 (Central Atlack Group) Rear Adm. William M. Fechleler S DD 1 APA 1 LSD 1 AK 1a LCI 7 LST 1 AT 2 YMS 2 SC 5 APD 2 LCI £R> S DMS Task Force 78 (Escort Carrier Force) Rear Adm. Ralph E. Doviian SCVE 16 OD (Under TG 77.3 during assault) Talk Group 77.3 (Eastern Attack Group) Copt. Albert G. Noble 6 DD 9 APD 1 LSD 1 AK 2 DMS 7 LST 1 AT 4 YMS 4 SC Task Unit 77.4.1 (Western Unit) 1 AKA 7 LST 2 DD 1 PF Task Group 77.4 (Firil Reinforcement Group) Copt. Edward M. Thompson (D plu, 1) Task Unit 77.4,2 (Centra) Unit) 5 LST 1 PF 2 DD Task Group 77.6 (Floating Reserve Group) Cap!. George E. McCabe 1 AKA 2 APA (sailed with TG 77.4 and stopped a) Artapi with TU 77.4.lf Task Unit 77,4.3 (Eastern Unit) 1 AK 2 DD 6 LST 2 PF (At staging areas) Task Group 77.5 (Second Reinforcement Group) Capl. John B. MeGoverr. (Ophr. 2) I Task Unit 77.5.2 (Central Unit) 5 LST 2 DD Task Unit 77.5.1 (Western Unit) 2 APA 2 DD 7 LST 2 DE PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA -AITAPE 29 sion made for unified air or naval command in the objective area — a situation similar to that which obtained six months later at Leyte Gulf. The Ground Forces Ground operations at Hollandia and Aitape were to be under the control of Alamo Force, commanded by General Krueger.35 General Headquarters' early plans, which were based on the assumption that Hollandia would be a single objective, had assigned to Alamo Forge one and one- third reinforced divisions, totaling about 32,000 combat and service troops. When intelligence estimates indicated that nearly 14,000 Japanese troops, including two in- fantry regiments, might be stationed at Hol- landia by D Day, it became obvious that General Krueger would need more strength. When Aitape was added to the Hollandia plan, another need for increased strength became apparent. Japanese forces at Aitape were estimated at 3,500, including 1,500 combat troops. Since the Japanese used Aitape as a staging area for troop move- ments between Wewak and Hollandia, it was considered possible that before 22 April enemy strength at Aitape might fluctuate from one to three thousand above the esti- mated figure.36 As a result of these estimates, two and one-third reinforced divisions, total- ing almost 50,000 troops, were made avail- 36 GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 28 Mar 44. ™ Memo, GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 1 Mar 44, sub: Considerations Affecting the Plan to Seize Humboldt Bay Area with Strong Support of Car- riers, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2—14 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Persecution [Aitape], 24 Jan 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 26 Jan 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEFs 710-761, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, I Mar-22 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, 22 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 22 Mar 44. able to General Krueger for the assault phase of the Hollandia-Aitape operation.37 Responsibility for ground operations at Hollandia was delegated by General Krue- ger to Headquarters, U. S. I Corps, which for this undertaking was designated the Reckless Task Force. Commanded by Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, I Corps head- quarters had seen action during the Papua Campaign. Since then it had been based in Australia, operating as a training and defense command. Early in 1944 the corps headquarters had moved to Goodenough Island, off the eastern tip of New Guinea, to prepare for the now canceled Hansa Bay operation. At Hollandia General Eichelber- ger was to control the action of the 24th and 41st Infantry Divisions (the latter less one regimental combat team). The 24th Divi- sion, when alerted for the Hollandia opera- tion, was finishing amphibious and jungle training at Goodenough Island in prepara- tion for the Hansa Bay campaign. Elements of the 41st Division, which was commanded by Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller, had partici- pated in the Papua Campaign, while other parts of the unit had gained experience in the Lae-Salamaua operations. At the time it was alerted for Hollandia, the 41st Divi- sion was rehabilitating and retraining in Australia.38 Two regimental combat teams of the yet untried 24th Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Frederick A. Irving, were to land at Tanahmerah Bay, while two regimental " GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44. 38 Alamo Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44 ; GHQ SWPA, G-3 Hist Div, Chronology of the War in the SWPA, copy in OCMH files; Memo, CINCSWPA for COMSOPAC, Comdr AAF SWPA, Comdr ANF SWPA, et al., 9 Feb 44, sub: Outline Plan Hansa Bay Opn, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 9 Feb 44; Reckless Task Force (hereafter cited as RTF) Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 6. 30 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES HOLLANDIA-AITAPE PLANNERS. Left to right: Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichel- berger, Rear Adm. Daniel E, Barbey, Ma]. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin, Lt. Gen. Walter Krueger. Officer at right is unidentified. combat teams of the 41st Division were to go ashore at Humboldt Bay.30 At Aitape, the 163d Infantry of the 41st Division was to make the initial landings. Operations at Aitape were to be con- trolled by Headquarters, Persecution Task Force, commanded by Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe, Assistant Division Commander, 41st Division. The Persecution Task Force, organized on 23 March, was an Allied head- quarters especially set up for the Aitape 39 RTF FO 1, 27 Mar 44, atchd to RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 6. operation. It was to exercise its command functions directly under Alamo Force and was on the same level of command as the Reckless Task Force.40 Until a beachhead was secured in the Aitape area, control of the landing and oper- ations ashore was to be vested in Admiral Barbey as the Attack Force commander, who was to be represented at Aitape by the Commander, Eastern Attack Group, Capt. 40 Alamo Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44; Persecution Task Force (hereafter cited as PTF) FO 1, 6 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 5-6 Apr 44. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 31 Albert G. Noble (USN). General Doe was to assume command of operations at Aitape upon the seizure of the beachhead, at which time the Persecution Task Force was auto- matically to pass from the control of the Navy to Alamo Force. At Hollandia the control of operations was to pass from the commanders of the W estern and Central Attack Groups to the commanders of the 24th and 41st Divisions, respectively, when those units had secured their beachheads. Admiral Barbey was to retain control over ground action in the Hol- landia area until General Eichelberger saw fit to move his headquarters ashore. The task force would then revert from naval control to the supervision of Alamo Force.41 To reinforce the 24th and 41st Divisions for the Hollandia— Aitape operation, three separate field artillery battalions, four engi- neer combat battalions, seven (plus) anti- aircraft battalions, a tank destroyer battal- ion, and the bulk of three engineer boat and shore regiments were made available. Other reinforcing units included a medium tank company of the 1st Marine Division, then on New Britain, and another from the 1st Cav- alry Division, which was operating on the Admiralty Islands. Among the service organizations assigned to the operation was No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, to which was assigned the task of rehabilitating an airfield at Aitape by D plus l.42 General Headquarters Reserve for the operation was the 6th Infantry Division, then finishing training for amphibious and jungle warfare at Milne Bay, New Guinea. 41 Alamo Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44; ANF SWPA Opn Plan 4-44, 1 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44. 4i Annex 1, Tentative Troop List, 13 Mar 44, to GHQ SWPA Warning Order 4, 7 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 7 Mar 44; Alamo Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44. About a week before the landings the 503d Parachute Infantry, veteran of one combat jump in eastern New Guinea,- was desig- nated as an additional General Headquar- ters Reserve. Alamo Force Reserve for the Hollandia- Aitape operation was originally the 127th Infantry (and regimental combat team at- tachments) of the 32d Division. It was brought out of reserve and assigned to the Persecution Task Force to arrive at Aitape on D plus 1 because, as D Day approached, General Krueger became increasingly con- cerned over the capabilities of the Japanese 18th Army, concentrating a strength of fifty to sixty thousand at Wewak, only nine- ty-four miles east-southeast of Aitape. The G-2 Section of General MacArthur's head- quarters estimated that a large part of the 18th Army could march overland from We- wak to Aitape in two weeks, an opinion not shared by the Operations Section (G-3) of the same headquarters. The 18th Army, ac- cording to General MacArthur's G— 2, could be expected to make determined efforts to recapture the Aitape area.43 <* GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Hollandia, 22 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 22 Mar 44; Amend- ment 2, 17 Mar 44, to GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Respect to an Opn Against Hol- landia, 17 Feb 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 29 Feb 44; GHQ SWPA, DSEI's 710-761, 1 Mar-22 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnis, 1 Mar-22 Apr 44; remarks of Maj Gen Stephen J. Ghamberlin, ex-AGofS G-3 GHQ SWPA, at Hist Div SSUSA Seminar, 23 Jan 48, copy in OCMH files. General Willoughby, General MacArthur's G-2, as late as 4 March opposed the jump to Hollandia because he doubted the ability of distant land-based and local carrier-based air- craft to protect Allied forces until land-based planes could be established at Hollandia, and he advised adhering to the earlier plans for an operation against the Hansa Bay-Wewak area. General Chamberlin had much more faith in the carriers. General Willoughby's views are to be found in Memo, ACofS G-2 GHQ SWPA to ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA, 4 Mar 44, no sub, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 3 Mar 44. The G-3's reply is attached. 32 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES General MacArthur considered General Krueger's commitment of the 127th Regi- mental Combat Team to operations at Aitape at least premature, if not unneces- sary. The theater commander had planned to relieve the 32d Division, then at Saidor on the Huon Peninsula, with Australian troops. The division was to be staged at Saidor for an operation against the Wakde— Sarmi area in quick exploitation of expected success at Hollandia and Aitape. General MacArthur believed, however, that Aitape might ultimately have to be reinforced. Re- luctant consent was therefore given to Gen- eral Krueger's plan and General MacArthur made provision to use other units at Wakde- Sarmi. Alamo Force Reserve then became the 3 2d Division less two regimental com- bat teams — the 127th at Aitape and another which was to remain in the Saidor area for an indeterminate period.44 Reckless Task Force Reserve at Hollandia was the 34th Infantry (and combat team attachments) of the 24th Division. Persecution Task Force Reserve during the landings at Aitape was the 1st Battalion, 163d Infantry.45 Ground forces of the South Pacific Area were to continue their campaigns in the Sol- omon Islands and the Bismarck Archipelago during the Hollandia- Aitape operation. New Guinea Force, commanded by General Blarney and consisting principally of Aus- tralian troops, was to continue pressure against 1 8th Army elements southeast of Wewak. This action was expected to help " GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44; Alamo Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44; Rad, Alamo to 3 2d Div, no number, 13 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 13 Apr 44 ; Memo, ACofS G-3 GHQ SWPA for GofS GHQ SWPA, 14 Apr 44, no sub; Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF-2393, 14 Apr 44 ; Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, C-10671, 14 Apr 44. Last three documents in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 14 Apr 44. "RTF FO 1, 27 Mar 44; PTF FO 1, 6 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 5-6 Apr 44. prevent the 18th Army from moving west- ward at will either to attack or to bypass the Aitape area. New Guinea Force was also to defend all of eastern New Guinea it then occupied.48 Logistics Logistic support of the Hollandia-Aitape operation was the responsibility of the United States Army Services of Supply, Southwest Pacific Area. The magnitude of the logistic problem is illustrated by the fact that the grand total of all Southwest Pacific Area forces assigned directly to the Hollan- dia-Aitape operation was over 84,000 men. There were approximately 50,000 ground combat troops and almost 23,000 personnel of all types of service units. Allied Air Forces units scheduled to move forward to Hollan- dia and Aitape during the opening stages of the operation, including both ground and air echelons, totaled over 12,000 men. Of the 84,000 troops assigned to the operation, about 52,000 men were to land in the objec- tive areas by the evening of D plus 3, con- sidered the, end of the assault phase.47 Never before had an operation of this size been undertaken in the Southwest Pacific Area. Other problems existed, some of them di- rectly and others indirectly related to the size of the force. Heading the list was the theater's chronic and sometimes acute short- age of ships. There were to be three widely separated beaches, each far more distant from supply bases than had been the case in ""GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, and OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 48, 24 M.ir 44. " Annex 1, Tentative Troop List, 13 Mar 44, to GHQ SWPA Warning Order 4, 7 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl 7 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, and OI 46 (Rev), 28 Mar 44; Alamo Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44. Chart 4— Ground FOR THE HOLLANDIA— AlTAPE GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SOUTHWEST PACIFIC AREA GENERALRHEADQUARTERS (6th Infantry Division) (503d Parachute Infantry) RECKLESS TASK FORCE L (G S' {RbPfl ALLIED LAND FORCES Gen. Sir Thomas Blarney ALAMO FORCE RESERVE (32d Infantry Division Less Two RCT s) Maj. Gen, William H. Gill RECKLESS TASK FORCE RESERVE (34th RCT) NOI< LANDI* (24th Infantry Division, less 34th RCT) Mai. Gen. Frederick A. Irving 1 LA (41st Infantry Division, less 163d RCT) Maj. Gen. Horace H. Fuller 34 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES earlier operations in the theater. The neces- sity for hurried airdrome construction at the objectives made it imperative that large quantities of engineering equipment and materiel be sent to Hollandia and Aitape during the first two or three days of the oper- ation. Plans to develop Hollandia into a major air center and logistic base involved a long-range program of construction. Stag- ing the troops was complicated by the fact that the units were scattered from points in southern Australia to the Admiralty Islands and from the Huon Peninsula to western New Britain. The Logistic Plan While logistic support of the Hollandia- Aitape operation was a responsibility of the Services of Supply, Alamo Force was re- sponsible for the co-ordination of all detailed logistic planning.48 For the purposes of co- ordination, General Krueger was authorized to call to his headquarters representatives of the Services of Supply, the Allied Air Forces, and the Allied Naval Forces. The Allied Naval Forces was responsible for the logistic support of its own elements, but in case of emergency it could draw sup- plies from Services of Supply stocks. All air force technical supplies required to support air force units moving to Hollandia or Aitape were to be provided by the Allied Air Forces. That headquarters was to be pre- pared to fly emergency supplies to Hollandia and Aitape upon call from Alamo Force. The latter organization was to provide main- 49 The material in this subsection is based prin- cipally on : Annex 4, Logistics, to GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 18 Mar 44; USASOS Logistics Instructions 46/SOS, 2 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 3 Apr 44; Alamo Force Adm O 7, 6 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44. tenance and rations for troops staging for Hollandia and Aitape, establish initial sup- ply bases at the objectives, and initiate numerous construction projects, including airfields at Hollandia and Aitape. To insure supply of units moving to Hol- landia and Aitape, the Services of Supply was to provide at forward bases a thirty-day supply of rations, unit equipment, clothing, fuels, and lubricants. Six units of fire49 of all types of ammunition were to be stock- piled for ground assault troops. Construction materiel, in amounts and types determined by Alamo Force, was also to be provided at forward bases. The responsibility for obtain- ing these supplies from the Services of Sup- ply and assembling them at Reckless and Persecution Task Force staging areas was vested in Alamo Force. Assault units of the Reckless and Per- secution Task Forces were to carry ashore a five-day supply of rations. Additional rations to assure food until D plus 20 for all units of the Reckless Task Force landed through D plus 3 were to be moved to Hollandia with those units. Sufficient rations were to be loaded for Persecution Task Force assault echelons to supply them through D plus 29. Both task forces were to take with them a fifteen-day supply of unit equipment, clothing, fuels, and lubricants. Engineer construction materiel was to be loaded on ships scheduled to land through D plus 3 in such quantity as to satisfy the minimum pre- 49 From available evidence, it appears that at the time of the Hollandia-Aitape operation the unit of fire used in the Southwest Pacific was the same as that established by the War Department. Later, however, some changes were effected within the theater, notably an increase in the rounds per unit of fire for the BAR and the 105-mm. howitzer and a reduction in rounds for the Ml rifle. The War Department unit of fire during 1944 is to be found in the 1944 edition of FM 101-10, Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical, and Lo- gistical Data. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 35 scribed by Alamo Force, and in additional quantities as required by the commanders of the Reckless and Persecution Task Forces. Fifteen days' supply of other types of construction and maintenance materiel was to be moved to Hollandia and Aitape during the assault phase of the operations. Provision for ammunition supply was more complex and depended to a large ex- tent upon the nature of individual combat organizations. Assault troops moving to Hol- landia were to be provided with at least two units of fire for all weapons. On the other hand, the Persecution Task Force was to be supplied with four units of fire for the landing. Sufficient ammunition for field and antiaircraft artillery weapons, 4.2-inch mor- tars, and hand grenades was to be shipped forward on assault convoys to provide each task force with six units of fire by D plus 3. Other types of ammunition, to establish a total of five units of fire by D plus 3, would also be shipped to Hollandia and Aitape. Resupply of ammunition for the Reckless and Persecution Task Forces was a re- sponsibility of Alamo Force. Two units of fire for all weapons were to be brought for- ward on convoys scheduled to arrive at the objectives on D plus 8. After this first auto- matic resupply, the two task forces would requisition from Alamo Force ammunition as needed. Extra rations, fuels, lubricants, and am- munition were to be stockpiled at forward bases so as to insure uninterrupted flow of these items to the objectives. The Services of Supply was to hold two large cargo vessels empty at a forward base for possible emer- gency use until D plus 30, and was also to furnish, prior to D Day, 1,000 tons of space on small ships for emergency use. The Allied Naval Forces and the Services of Supply were to co-operate in providing tankers for movement of bulk-loaded aviation gasoline, barges for handling such fuel at the objec- tives, and harbor and lightering craft. Through D plus 45 the control of all ship- ping moving to Hollandia and Aitape was to rest with Allied Naval Forces. After that date the Services of Supply was to assume this responsibility. Principal supply and stag- ing bases were to be at Goodenough Island and Finschhafen. The latter base would be the point of departure for resupply ships con- trolled by Allied Naval Forces. Services of Supply shipping was to use such bases as might be determined by that headquarters. Obtaining the Shipping Early plans for the operation had indi- cated that 32,000 troops with 28,500 meas- urement tons of supplies would be ample to secure the Hollandia area. Enough shipping could have been scraped up within the Southwest Pacific to carry out an operation of that size, but the scope of the undertaking was entirely changed by the enlargement of the forces and the decision to seize Aitape. The 52,000-odd troops finally assigned to the assault phase of the operation would require 58,100 tons of supplies and equipment. There was not enough assault shipping with- in the theater to meet such requirements of troop and cargo space.50 Most of the necessary additional shipping was obtained by borrowing for a limited pe- riod assault vessels from the South and Cen- tral Pacific Areas and by utilizing some theater ships normally engaged in training activities or operations in rear areas, sub- stituting civilian-manned vessels for the lat- 50 Annex 4, Logistics, to GHQ SWPA OI 46, 18 Mar -44~;-.GHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan Draft, 28 Feb 44, and atchd, unsigned, undated memo, sub : Comments on Hollandia Outline Plan, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44. 36 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES ter. By mid-March it appeared that these steps had secured the minimum shipping space needed for the operation. However, requirements for hurried airdrome and base construction made it necessary to add more service troops and larger quantities of engi- neer equipment to assault cargoes than had been contemplated when arrangements for borrowing ships were first completed.51 General Krueger proposed that additional shipping space be obtained by using large cargo vessels ( AK's) which were not usually employed during assaults. These vessels, often of the Liberty-ship type, differed from attack cargo ships (AKA's) principally in that they did not carry enough small boats to unload themselves. Four AK's, manned by U. S. Navy or Coast Guard personnel, were operating in rear areas in the theater where dock facilities and large cranes were available. General Krueger requested that these four be made available for the Hol- landia— Aitape operation, a request which seemed justified in the light of expected Allied air superiority at the objectives and which had a precedent in Japanese practice during the early months of the war in the Pacific.52 Admiral Barbey, in charge of the amphib- ious phase of the operation, opposed this plan. He felt that AK's would be especially "Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, XC-1753, 5 Mar 44, and Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF- 1012, both in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Memo, G-3 GHQ Opns Div to ACofS G-3 GHQ, 25 Mar 44, sub: Shipping Borrowed from SOPAC, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Mar 44; Memo, ACofS G-3 Alamo for CofS Alamo, 27 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 24-27 Mar 44. s! Memo, GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 1 Mar 44, sub: Considerations Affecting the Plan to Seize Humboldt Bay Area with Strong Support of Car- riers, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Memo, G-3 Alamo Ping Div for ACofS G-3 Alamo, 11 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Rad, Com7thFlt to Alamo, 15 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 16 Mar 44. vulnerable to attack in the forward areas if they were to remain at the objectives until completely unloaded of a capacity cargo. The Supply Section (G— 4) of General Mac- Arthur's headquarters did not entirely agree with the admiral and was, indeed, inclined toward the point of view that AK's ". . , should be operated with a view to support rather than preservation of naval facilities 5) 53 The G-4 Section's point of view repre- sented one side of a basic disagreement be- tween Army and Navy circles not only in the Southwest Pacific Area but also, to varying degrees, in other theaters of operations. To the Navy, the shipping shortage in the Southwest Pacific, together with the impor- tance of keeping in operation ships capable of providing further logistic support, out- weighed the necessity for employing mer- chant-type shipping, such as AK's, in the early phases of amphibious operations. The loss of a single vessel of that type would be keenly felt in both rear and forward areas in the Southwest Pacific for months to come. Moreover, to the Navy a piece of capital equipment such as an AK was not as ex- pendable as such items of ground force equipment as an artillery piece, a tank, or a truck. An AK represented months or per- haps years of construction effort and crew training.54 Admiral Barbey finally determined to "Memo, ACofS G-2 Alamo to CofS Alamo, 15 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 15-18 Mar 44; Memo, ACofS G-3 Alamo, for CofS Alamo, 27 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hol- landia, 24-27 Mar 44; Ltr, Col Harold E. Eastwood [of G-4 GHQ SWPA] to ACofS G-4 Alamo, 26 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G— 4 Jnl Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44. The quotation is from the latter document. " Ltr, Rear Adm Albert G. Noble [Chief, BuOrd USN and, in 1944, one of Admiral Barbey's chief deputies] to Gen Ward, 18 Dec 50, no sub, in OCMH files. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA -AITAPE take some calculated risks that seemed to be warranted by the importance of the cargo which AK's could carry to the ob- jectives. He decided that two lightly loaded AK's would move to Hollandia with the D-Day convoys. These two ships were to leave that area on D plus 2 whether or not their unloading was completed. Another AK was to reach Aitape on D Day and the fourth would arrive at Aitape on D plus 1 . Both the latter were to have a capacity load and were to remain at Aitape until com- pletely discharged. During the period that the four AK's were operating in the forward area, the Services of Supply, by arrange- ment with Allied Naval Forces, was to provide civilian-manned vessels totaling equivalent tonnage for operations in the rear area.55 The fact that the AK's scheduled to ar- rive at Hollandia on D Day were not to be completely loaded resulted in a reduction of tonnage space — space which Alamo Force believed necessary for the success of the operation. During the discussion con- cerning the dispatch of AK's to Hollandia, the Allied Naval Forces had made available six landing ships, tank (LST's) which had not previously been assigned to the opera- tion, apparently in the hope that Alamo Force would accept these vessels in lieu of the AK's. Even with this addition, space was still lacking for 3,800 tons of engineer- 53 Ibid.; Rad, Com7thFIt to Alamo, 15 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 16 Mar 44; Rad ComServFor- 7thFlt to GTF 76, 15 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 16 Mar 44; Rad, CTF 76 to Alamo and ANF SWPA, 1 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, C-10273, 1 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 1 Apr 44; Rad, CTF 76 to Alamo and Com7thFlt, 1 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-4 Apr 44; Annex 6, Assignment of Shipping, 1 Apr 44, to Alamo Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar. 44. 37 ing equipment and other cargo that Alamo Force desired to send forward with initial convoys. This cargo had to wait for later convoys.66 As another result of the limitations on cargo space, the quantity of supplies to be carried forward after the assault phase, on Services of Supply ships manned by civilian crews, was increased beyond that originally contemplated. In addition, some of the ships sailing with the D Day through D plus 3 convoys would have to unload at Hollandia and Aitape, return to eastern New Guinea bases for reloading, and go back to the for- ward objectives with a new series of convoys beginning on D plus 8." The first detailed plans for the Hollandia operation had been drawn up during the last week of February 1 944 and final major changes were completed in the second week of April. As a result of the various changes, ships scheduled to arrive at the objectives during the assault phase of the operation had increased as follows : Plan of 28 Plan of 9 February April 4 Attack Troop Transports 8 (APA's) 1 Attack Cargo Ships (AKA's) 2 1 Landing Ships, Dock (LSD's) 3 10 Destroyer Transports (APD's) 14 30 Landing Craft, Infantry 31 (LCI's) 27 Landing Ships, Tank (LST's) 51 — Cargo Ships (AK's) 4 M Memo, ACofS G-3 Alamo for CofS Alamo, 27 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G— 3 Jnl Hollandia, 24-27 Mar 44; Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, CX-10175, 281' Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 28 Mar 44. "Memo, ACofS G-4 Alamo for ACofS G-4 USASOS, 9 Apr 44, no sub, in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44; CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 4-5 Apr 44. 38 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES After 9 April the number of assault vessels was not changed and the quantity of per- sonnel and supplies scheduled to be landed through D plus 3 remained substantially the same.5* Loading and Unloading Problems Because of the shipping shortage, it was extremely important to make use of all avail- able cargo space on each vessel. In accord- ance with common practice in amphibious operations, the ships of the Hollandia- Aitape assault convoy were to be combat- loaded, which is to say that supplies most needed ashore would be the last loaded at staging areas, and the most important ma- teriel would be aboard ships to be first dis- charged. This would insure that priority cargo would be the first ashore. Combat loading could take a variety of forms or com- binations thereof. All cargo could be loaded in bulk in the holds of ships, or could be stowed aboard wheeled or tracked vehicles, themselves to be combat-loaded. Another possibility considered during preparations for the Hollandia-Aitape operations was to lash supplies onto prefabricated platforms — - known as pallets — which could easily be loaded aboard cargo ships. For unloading, these platforms could be lowered by deck cranes into small boats or, occasionally, into MGHQ SWPA, Hollandia Outline Plan Draft, 28 Feb 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Alamo Force FO 12, 23 Mar 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44. The second column includes the AK's, the shipping listed in CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44 of 3 Apr 44, the ships carrying the 127th RGT to Aitape (shipping which was committed to the assault phase on 9 April), and miscellaneous other additions in the period prior to 9 April. The totals agree with those set forth_in Alamo FO 12 and with the naval reports of the operation, although not with the naval plans. water to be dragged behind small craft to the beach.58 Pallet-loading had been used extensively during operations in the Central Pacific Area but had been little employed in the Southwest Pacific. The system had the ad- vantage of saving much time and labor by reducing to a minimum the handling of individual boxes, crates, and cartons. But it had the disadvantage of using somewhat more space in holds than simple bulk stowage. Moreover, not many pallets were readily available in the forward areas of the Southwest Pacific and, again, the theater had had little experience in their use. To save all possible space and to take advantage of theater experience, Alamo Force decided that bulk combat-loading would be em- ployed for all cargo not stowed aboard vehicles.80 Another problem was that of lighterage at the objectives. Since the AK's did not carry small craft with which to unload themselves provision had to be made to secure such boats. For Aitape, Alamo Force believed that one landing craft, tank (LCT), and twenty landing craft, mech- anized (LCM's) would be required on D Day and twice that number on D plus 1, when the second of the two AK's was scheduled to arrive. General Krueger there- fore requested that Allied Naval Forces set up an LCT-LCM convoy or its equivalent raThe water drag method could, of course, be used only for items such as canned rations which were to be used immediately ashore and which would not suffer from temporary immersion in salt water. 60 Memo, Alamo G-3 Ping Div for ACofS G-3 Alamo, 11 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; Memo, Alamo QM for ACofS G-4 Alamo, 21 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 1 1 Feb-2 Apr 44. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 39 in other landing craft to arrive at Aitape on D Day. Admiral Barbey would not approve this plan. He felt that it would not be practical for LCM's and LCT's to move to Aitape un- der their own power nor to be towed there by large ships. The distance from staging areas to Aitape would increase the possibility of mechanical failures on the part of the LCT's and LCM's moving under their own power. Towing would decrease the speed of the assault convoy, thereby increasing the possibility of Japanese air attacks on the con- voys and lessening chances for tactical sur- prise at the objectives. Admiral Barbey therefore felt that the Aitape unloading plan would have to be based on the use of small craft carried forward by the assault shipping scheduled to arrive on D Day.61 To obtain some additional lighterage, it was decided to carry extra landing craft on all large assault ships arriving at Aitape on D Day.62 In addition, three landing ships, dock (LSD's) scheduled to arrive at Hol- landia and Aitape on D Day were ordered to make a rapid return trip to eastern New Guinea bases to pick up another load of small craft. On the return trip the LSD's were to carry a total of three LCT's and twenty-four LCM's to Aitape, which, to- gether with one LCT and six LCM's that could be loaded on D-Day shipping, was considered ample. It was hoped that this re- 61 Rad, Alamo to CTF 76, WF-4237, 25 Mar 44, Rad, CTF 76 to PTF, 25 Mar 44, and Memo, ACofS G-3 Alamo for CofS Alamo, 27 Mar 44, no sub, all three in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandla, 24-27 Mar 44; Memo for record, G-3 Alamo, 28 Mar 44, sub: Status of Planning, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 28-30 Mar 44. 62 Available documents do not indicate how many landing craft were to be so carried forward nor on which large ships they were to be carried. turn trip of the LSD's could be accomplished by the afternoon of D plus 3. Because of the distances involved, however, Admiral Bar- bey could not promise that the LSD's would arrive at Aitape on their second trip prior to the morning of D plus 4. 63 Since it was not necessary to unload as much engineering construction equipment at Hollandia during the assault phase as at Aitape, the lighterage problem at Hollandia did not appear acute prior to the landings. It was thought probable that such shortages as might occur there would be eased by send- ing forward extra small craft aboard the ships of the first resupply convoy on D plus 8.64 A third problem of supply movement was to find a method of transporting supplies from the water's edge to dump areas by means other than the conventional, time- consuming individual handling of each item or container. Alamo Force decided that beach sleds — which could be dragged any place on a beach negotiable by wheeled vehicles, tractors, or bulldozers — would be the answer. About 150 sleds had been manu- factured in Australia for use by the 1st Cav- alry Division in the Admiralties, but they had not been ready in time for that opera- tion. Alamo Force obtained a high shipping priority for the movement of 34 sleds from Brisbane, Australia, to the staging area of the 24th Division at Goodenough Island. 85 Memo, ACofS G-3 Alamo for CofS Alamo, 31 Mar 44, no sub, and Rad, Alamo to CTF 76, WF-5127, 31 Mar 44, both in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 31 Mar-1 Apr 44; Rad, Alamo to CTF 76, WF-834, 6 Apr 44, and Rads, CTF 76 to Alamo, 6 and 7 Apr 44, last three in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44. "Rad, CTF 76 to Com7thFlt, 7 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 Apr 44; CTF 77, Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 4-5 Apr 44. 40 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES These sleds arrived at Goodenough too late to be loaded on the Hollandia convoy.65 Meanwhile, Alamo Force had discovered that another 26 sleds were on the way from Australia to Oro Bay, New Guinea, and that the remainder of the original 150 had supposedly been shipped during March to Gape Cretin, New Guinea.80 From the middle of March to the middle of April the Alamo G^ Section directed a widespread search for these two shipments, all trace of which had apparently been lost. An officer from the Alamo Ordnance Section looked for the sleds to no avail at various Services of Supply bases in New Guinea and Aus- tralia. Finally, official channels having failed, the Alamo G— 4 Liaison Officer at Oro Bay, who was also engaged in the search, followed a hunch. He had a ser- geant from his liaison group informally establish contact with a supply sergeant at the Oro Bay Base Engineer Section. This supply sergeant immediately located 60 beach sleds at the base engineer supply dump. These sleds were perhaps not the par- ticular ones for which the search was being 63 Rad, G— 4 Alamo to Alamo G— 4 Liaison Offi- cer (LO) at Hq USASOS, WF-2088, 14 Mar 44, in 24th Div G-4 Ping Jnl, Hollandia; Rad, GHQ Chief Regulating Officer at Goodenough Island to G-4 Alamo, WA-409, 15 Mar 44, in Alamo G-4- Jnl Hollandia, 1 1 Feb-2 Apr 44 ; Memo, Asst ACofS G-4 Alamo for Alamo G-4 LO at USASOS Base B, 23 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44; Memo, ACofS G-4 Alamo for Alamo Engr, 18 Apr 44, no sub, in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 17-29 Apr 44; Ltr, Alamo G-4 LO at Hq USASOS to ACofS G-4 Alamo, 9 Apr 44, in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44. 88 Memo, Asst ACofS G-4, Alamo for Alamo G-4 LO at USASOS Base B, 23 Mar 44, no sub, and Memo, G— 4 Alamo for Alamo Engr and Alamo Ord O, 31 Mar 44, no sub, both in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 11 Feb-2 Apr 44. conducted, since their dimensions differed slightly from those specified. However, the liaison officer was acting on instructions from the Alamo G-^r to get some beach sleds to Cape Cretin, where some of the Hollandia-bound convoy was loading, no later than 1 7 April. He therefore drew the 60 sleds from the base engineer and had them shipped forward from Oro Bay by small boat. Taking this action on his own responsibility, the liaison officer assured at least a partial supply of beach sleds for the Reckless Task Force.87 Problems of Subordinate Commands While sufficient supplies were on hand within the Southwest Pacific Area to provide assault units with almost all the materials they needed for initial operations, some shortages did exist which could not be filled prior to the assault. Other logistic difficulties were caused by the rather hurried organiza- tion of the task forces and by the fact that units assigned to the operation were scattered all over the eastern part of the theater. The Reckless Task Force G-4 complained that many units scheduled to engage in the oper- ation were assigned to the task force so late that it was nearly impossible to ascertain their supply shortages. General Krueger had originally approved a plan to make the task force responsible only for the supply of units specifically assigned to it. But the task force was later ordered to assure completeness and serviceability of supplies and equipment of *' Rads, Alamo G-4 LO at Base B to Alamo, WO-1702 and WO-1710, 14 and 15 Apr 44, re- spectively, and Ltr, Alamo G-4 LO at Base B to ACofS G-4 Alamo, 15 Apr 44, all three in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA -AITAPE 41 all units scheduled to be controlled by the task force at Hollandia, whenever assigned.03 In order to carry out its broad supply duties, the Reckless Task Force G— 4 Sec- tion decentralized responsibility for the sup- ply and equipment of various attached units to the headquarters' Special Staff Sections of corresponding services. This step, which speeded communication between the task force headquarters and the scattered at- tached units, made possible quick and accurate determination of shortages and insured that steps would be taken to fill requisitions from attached organizations. Nevertheless, because so many units were assigned to the task force quite late, the Ordnance Section declared that determina- tion of numerous ammunition shortages could be made only on "suspicion." 68 Another means by which the Reckless Task Force solved some of its logistic prob- lems was to make minor modifications in the Tables of Equipment and Basic Allow- ances of various units assigned or attached to the task force. Alamo Force approved this step only on the condition that such changes would not materially affect unit tonnage and space requirements, thereby creating a need for more shipping space or causing major last-minute changes in loading plans.70 Subordinate units of the Reckless Task Force had their own supply problems. On 8 5S RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 65; Ltr, CofS I Corps [Reckless TF] to ACofS G-4 Alamo, 15 Mar 44; Ltr, ACofS G-4 Alamo to CofS I Corps, 22 Mar 44; Rad, Alamo to I Corps, WF-96, I Apr 44. Last three in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, I I Feb-2 Apr 44. M Rad, I Corps to Alamo, RM-2362, 7 Apr 44, in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 36, 65. " Rad, I Corps to Alamo, RM-1 103, 25 Mar 44, and Rad, Alamo to I Corps, WF-4218, 25 Mar 44, both in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 1 1 Feb-2 Apr 44. March, with little more than a week's notice, the 41st Division had to begin moving from Australia to Cape Cretin, New Guinea, where it was to stage for Hollandia. On such short notice a good portion of the division's supply shortages could not be filled on the Australian mainland. The division sent liai- son officers to Services of Supply headquar- ters, to Alamo Force headquarters, and to Services of Supply forward bases in New Guinea to find out where shortages could be filled and to start the movement of neces- sary items to Cape Cretin. Most shortages were filled without undue difficulty from New Guinea bases, but there was a perma- nent shortage of wheeled vehicles. The 4 1 st Division had no 2 J/2 -ton 6x6 trucks and only 50 percent of other authorized vehicles. Some vehicles were supplied in New Guinea, but the fulfillment of authorized allowances had to await post-assault shipment.71 The 24th Division, staging at Good- enough Island, had especial difficulty in procuring certain types of ammunition. The division was unable to procure enough 2.36-inch bazooka rockets to build its stocks to the prescribed level of five units of fire. Theater stocks of bazooka rockets were so low that the success of future operations might have been jeopardized if all those available were issued for the Hollandia- Aitape attacks. Therefore, only three units of fire of the 2.36-inch rockets could be issued to the 24th Division itself and only two units of fire to attached units.72 Some 71 Rad, Alamo to 41st Div, WF-1247, 8 Mar 44, and Memo, ACofS G-4 41st Div for ADC 41st Div, 11 Mar 44, no sub, both in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 1 1 Feb-2 Apr 44. 72 Alamo Force Adm O 7, 6 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-23 Mar 44; Rad, Alamo to USASOS, WF^530, 27 Mar 44, and Rad, USASOS to Alamo, ABO-265, 27 Mar 44, both in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 1 1 Feb-2 Apr 44. 42 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES lots of 60-mm. mortar ammunition supplied to the 24th Division were found to be de- fective— a condition which obtained for a large portion of theater stocks of this item. The division was advised that it would have to use the 60-mm. ammunition issued and that the defective lots were not to be fired over the heads of friendly troops.73 One regiment of the division was initially short of both 60-mm. and 81 -mm. mortar shells. Most of these shortages were made up from stocks in Services of Supply bases in New Guinea, and the shells were shipped to Goodenough Island by small craft. The re- mainder was shipped by air from these bases or Australia to Goodenough just in time to be loaded on the 24th Division assault convoy.74 Like the Reckless Task Force, the 24th Division was not made responsible for the supply of many attached units until late in March. Some of these units had difficulty obtaining needed supplies and equipment, although they made efforts to fulfill their re- quirements. General Irving, the division commander, felt so strongly about the diffi- culties of attached units that he requested investigation of the failure on the part of some Services of Supply bases to provide spare parts and maintenance supplies for attached artillery and tank units. Spare parts for artillery mounts, tractors, and tanks were ultimately located at various Services of Supply installations and shipped to Goode- nough. However, all the desired spare parts for engineer and ordnance equipment could not be found before the division left its stag- "Ltr, Ord O 24th Div to Ord O I Corps, 29 Mar 44, and atchd, undated Memo for record from Ord Sec. Alamo, in Alamo G— 4 Jnl Hollandia, 1 1 Feb-2 Apr 44. " Ltrs, Alamo G-4 LO with 24th Div to AGofS G-4 Alamo, 6, 11, and 15 Apr 44, in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44. ing area, and provision had to be made to ship such items to the objective on resupply convoys.75 The Persecution Task Force had few separate logistic problems. The principal as- sault element of the task force was the 163d Infantry of the 41st Division, and that regi- ment's supply problems were solved along with those of the division. The 167th Field Artillery Battalion, which was to support the 163 d Infantry at Aitape, had some difficul- ties. Because of the shortage of shipping space, the battalion's organic transportation could not all be sent forward on assault con- voys. The unit's radio and wire would there- fore have to be manhandled at the objective, and liaison and fire control parties attached to the battalion were to be without their usual transportation.76 The Hollandia Tactical Plan While the problems of logistics were being solved, the tactical plans for the Hollandia and Aitape assaults were being drawn up. Limited knowledge of the terrain at the ob- jectives was a major obstacle to detailed planning, but by early April the ground, air, and amphibious force commanders, in co- operation, had solved most of their problems and had published their final tactical plans. Humboldt Bay Two regimental combat teams of the 41st Division were to start landing at Humboldt 15 Notes of Conf between Ord O'i 24th Div and I Corps, 30 Mar 44, and atchd, undated notes by Alamo Ord O, in Alamo G— 4 Jnl Hollandia, II Feb-2 Apr 44; Ltrs, Alamo G 4 LO with 24th Div to ACofS G-4, 6 and 15 Aj&r 44, in Alamo G-4 Jnl Hollandia, 3-16 Apr 44. Apparently noth- ing ever came of General In/ing's request for investigation. 79 167th FA Bn Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1-2. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 43 Bay on 22 April at 0700, high tide time in the Hollandia area. Simultaneously, two reg- imental combat teams of the 24th Division were to go ashore at Tanahmerah Bay. After securing their beachheads, the two divisions were to drive inland through successive phase lines to complete a pincers movement aimed at the rapid seizure of the Japanese- held airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain. It was intended that the main effort should be made from Tanahmerah Bay by the 24th Division, since known and sus- pected Japanese defenses seemed concen- trated at Humboldt Bay. While the Reck- less Task Force Reserve (the 34th Regi- mental Combat Team of the 24th Division) might actually be more needed by the 41st Division at Humboldt Bay, General Eichel- berger, the task force commander, planned to land the reserve at Tanahmerah Bay in an endeavor to exploit expected enemy weaknesses there. Task force headquarters and most of the reinforcing units and service organizations were also to land at Tanah- merah Bay. The 41st Division was to be pre- pared to drive inland from Humboldt Bay, but its role might be limited to containing Japanese strength which could otherwise move against the 24th Division. Neverthe- less, the 41st Division's plans were made to take advantage of whatever weaknesses might be found in enemy defenses at Hum- boldt Bay." The Humboldt Bay landing areas se- lected for the 41st Division, White Beaches 1-4, presented complex problems of co- ordination and control. From the north- western and southeastern shores of the inner reaches of Humboldt Bay ran two low sand spits, divided one from the other by a nar- row channel leading from Humboldt Bay "RTF FO 1, 27 Mar 44; RTF Opns Rpt Hol- landia, p. 6. southwestward into smaller Jautefa Bay. Narrow, sandy beaches lined the Humboldt Bay side of the two spits, but the Jautefa Bay shore was covered with tangled man- grove swamps. White Beaches 1-3 were located on the two sand spits. None was ideally located in relation to division objectives, but the beaches were the best in the area. Access to the mainland from the spits could be obtained by movement along the Humboldt Bay side to inland ends of both peninsulas. The northern spit was flanked inland by an open-topped height called Pancake Hill, which was suspected of containing Japanese defensive installations. North of Pancake Hill, toward the town of Hollandia, lay wooded hills rising to a height of over 1,000 feet. The southern spit opened on marshy ground along the southeastern shore of Humboldt Bay. White Beach 1 , about 800 yards long and 70 wide, ran along the northern spit south from the point at which that peninsula joined the mainland. White Beach 2 was at the outer end of the same spit, while White Beach 3 was located at the northern end of the southern peninsula. White Beach 4 was on the western shore of Jautefa Bay and was situated just north of Pirn, a native village at the eastern terminus of a motor road running inland to Lake Sentani and the task force objectives.78 Close air support for the landings of the 41st Division was the responsibility of planes aboard the carriers of Task Force 58. These aircraft were to maintain combat air patrols over enemy airstrips in the Hollandia area from earliest light on D Day until H plus 60 minutes (0800), or until such patrols 78 Letterpress Landing Force [41st Inf Div] FO 1, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 Annex to 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia. HUMBOLDT BAY PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 45 proved unnecessary. Fighter planes engaged in these patrol missions were to have free- dom of action over the entire Hollandia re- gion until H minus 30 minutes, after which they were to confine their operations to tar- gets two or more miles inland from the landing beaches at both Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bays. At Humboldt Bay, from H minus 15 min- utes until H minus 4, or until the 41st Divi- sion's leading landing wave was within 800 yards of the shore, carrier-based aircraft were to hit enemy antiaircraft batteries and other known or suspected defensive positions around Humboldt Bay, especially on hills near White Beaches 1 and 4. At H minus 4 minutes, carrier-based bombers were to drop their bombs on the beaches in an attempt to detonate possible beach mines. At H minus 3, when the first wave was scheduled to be 500 yards from shore, antipersonnel fragmentation bombs were to be dropped on White Beach 1 . Naval fire support at Humboldt Bay was to be provided by three light cruisers and six destroyers of the U. S. Navy, firing to begin at H minus 60 minutes. Principal tar- gets were Hollandia, Pirn, heights north of White Beach 1, Cape Soedja at the north- western end of Humboldt Bay, and the four landing beaches. Two rocket-equipped land- ing craft, infantry (LCI's), were to accom- pany the leading boat waves, one to fire on Pancake Hill and the other to bombard high ground north of Pancake. A single destroyer was to accompany the first waves to bom- bard Capes Pie and Tjeweri (the tips of the two sand spits ) and to support movement of amphibian tractors (LVT's) from White Beach 2 to White Beach 4.79 The first landings to take place on White 18 CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44. Beach 1, at H Hour, were to be exe- cuted by the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry. After landing, the battalion was to push rapidly north along the beach to the main- land and make ready to descend into Hol- landia from hills south of that town. One company was to move west from the main body to establish a block across a road con- necting Hollandia and Pirn. The seizure of the northern section of the Hollandia-Pim road was assigned to the 2d Battalion, 162d Infantry, which was to follow the 3d ashore on White Beach 1 . The 2d was to push up the road toward Hollandia and assist the 3d Battalion in securing that town. The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, was to land at White Beach 1 still later and assemble in- land as division reserve. White Beach 2 and Cape Pie were to be seized at H Hour by a reinforced rifle platoon from the 1st Battalion, 162d In- fantry. The beach was to be used by the 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, which, aboard LVT's, was to move across the spit, push through the backing mangrove swamp, and land on White Beach 4 across Jautefa Bay. Then the battalion was to clear neighboring hills and advance south toward Pirn along the Hollandia-Pim road. The rest of the 186th Infantry was to land on White Beach 1 after H Hour and move inland around the upper end of the spit. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, was to move to Pim while the 2d Battalion assembled in division reserve. Seizure of White Beach 3 on the southern sand spit was designed as a security measure, and the beach was to be occupied by a rifle company of the 3d Battalion, 186th In- fantry, at H Hour. This unit was then to secure Cape Tjeweri, at the northern tip of the spit, and patrol southeastward from the peninsula along the shore of Humboldt Bay TANAHMERAH BAY PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA-AITAPE 47 to ward off or delay any Japanese counter- attacks from that direction. Artillery landing on D Day was to take up positions either on the northern spit or near the Hollandia-Pim road and from those positions provide support for infantry advancing inland and toward Hollandia. Antiaircraft artillery was to be grouped ini- tially on or near White Beach 1. The first duties of engineers were to unload ships, construct or improve exit roads from White Beach 1 to the Hollandia-Pim road, and improve the latter track. The 41st Recon- naissance Troop was to scout along the shores of Humboldt Bay as far as Tami Air- strip, eight miles southeast of Hollandia, and to Imbi Bay and Cape Soedja at the north- western limits of Humboldt Bay.80 Tanahmerah Bay Landing points chosen for the 24th Di- vision at Tanahmerah Bay were designated Red Beaches 1 and 2 and the principal thrust was to be made over the latter. Sit- uated on the east-central shore of Tanah- merah Bay, Red Beach 2 ran north and south about 800 yards, boasted clear ap- proaches from the sea, and was steeply inclined. It was known to be narrow and backed by a swamp, the nature of which could not be ascertained before the landing. Red Beach 1 was located at the southern end of Depapre Bay, a narrow south- eastern arm of Tanahmerah Bay. The nar- row approach to Red Beach 1 was flanked on each side by hills only 600 yards from the central channel, and the landing area was fronted by a coral reef, the characteristics of which were unknown before D Day. Red Beach 1 opened on a small flat area Letterpress LF FO 1, 9 Apr 44. at the native village of Depapre, near the beginning of the only road between Tanah- merah Bay and the inland airfields. Little was known about this road, but it was be- lieved to be extensively used by the Japa- nese, passable for light wheeled vehicles, and subject to rapid improvement. West and south of Red Beach 1 lay a swamp backed by heavily forested hills. To the north was more difficult terrain, dominated by three prominent hills overlooking both Red Beaches. The division expected to find a road running along the sides of these heavily forested hills over the two miles which separated the beaches.81 H Hour at Tanahmerah Bay was the same as for Humboldt Bay, 0700, and carrier- based aircraft from Task Force 58 were to support the landings of the 24th Division in much the same manner they were to support the 41st Division's assault. Naval fire sup- port at Tanahmerah Bay would be provided by two Australian cruisers and by Australian and American destroyers. Targets and tim- ing of naval support fires were similar to those to be used at Humboldt Bay. Most of the fire at Tanahmerah Bay was to be di- rected at Red Beach 2 and its environs and, prior to H Hour, only one destroyer was as- signed to fire on Red Beach 1 . After H Hour all fire support ships would be available to fire on targets of opportunity or objectives designated by the forces ashore. One LCI was to support the leading waves to Red Beach 2 with rocket and automatic weapons fire, which was to begin when the carrier- based planes finished their close support mis- sions (about H minus 4 minutes) and con- tinue until the first troops were safely ashore.82 " Noiseless Landing Force [24th Inf Div] FO 1, 5 Apr 44, in 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 24ff. 82 CTF 77 Opn Plan 3^4, 3 Apr 44. 48 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES On the northern half of Red Beach 2 the 19th Infantry (less one battalion in division reserve) was to land. The two assault bat- talions were to secure half the beachhead, establish left flank security for the rest of the division, prepare to assume responsibility for the protection of the entire beachhead, and undertake mopping up north of the beach. Simultaneously two battalions of the 21st Infantry were to land on the southern half of Red Beach 2. After securing their sectors of Red Beach 2, these battalions were to push overland and south toward Red Beach 1 . The division planned to improve the road which supposedly connected the two beaches or, if necessary, construct a new road be- tween the two. Initial landings on Red Beach 1 were to be undertaken by three reinforced rifle com- panies bf the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, and were to begin at H plus 25 minutes, 0725. The primary missions of this force were to start rapidly inland over the road leading to Lake Sentani and the airfields and to report the size and condition of pos- sible additional landing points in the Depapre area. Movement inland was to be- gin before the Japanese could organize de- fenses along that portion of the road which wound snake-like over rugged hills south and east of Depapre. The Allied Naval Forces originally ob- jected to a landing on Red Beach 1 and by arrangement with General Eichelberger had had this plan canceled. But General Irving, who wished to provide for every contingency in a landing area where terrain conditions were practically unknown, wanted the Red Beach 1 landing to remain in the plan, even if naval fire support for the assault could not be obtained. He considered it possible that failure to secure quickly the entrance to the Depapre— Lake Sentani road might have dis- astrous consequences were it found imprac- ticable to build a good road from Red Beach 2 to Red Beach 1 . Seizing an opportunity to reopen the discussion of a landing on Red Beach 1 , General Irving made personal pleas to General Eichelberger and Admiral Bar- bey, and succeeded in having the landing reinstated in the plan. This proved one of the most important tactical decisions of the Hollandia operation.83 Preliminary Operations and the Approach Intelligence Operations Early in 1944 General MacArthur's G-2 Section had noted that the Japanese were increasing their activities in the Wewak area and near-by Hansa Bay. As D Day for the Hollandia— Aitape operation approached, it was discovered that the bulk of the Japa- nese 18th Army was withdrawing from for- ward bases at Madang and Alexishafen and was moving rapidly westward across the Ramu and Sepik Rivers to Wewak and Hansa Bay. These activities seemed to indi- cate that the Japanese probably expected the next Allied attack to be aimed at the Wewak— Hansa Bay area. Every effort was made to foster in the mind of Lt. Gen. Hatazo Adachi, command- ing the 18th Army, the growth of the idea that a major assault in the Wewak sector was imminent. During March and early April, Wewak was heavily bombed by the Allied Air Forces, not only to prevent the Japanese from using their airfields there but also to lead the enemy to believe that the usual aerial softening-up process preceding an amphibious operation was taking place. 8' Noiseless LF FO 1, 5 Apr 44; 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 23 ; Ltr, Gen Irving to Gen Ward, 3 Nov 50, in OCMH files. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDI A -AITAPE 49 Minor naval bombardments of the Wewak and Hansa areas were carried out in March and early April, and PT's of the Allied Naval Forces patrolled actively along the coast north from Madang to Wewak. By various means propaganda was spread to convince the 18th Army that a landing was soon to be made at Wewak, and dummy parachutists were dropped in the same vi- cinity. Allied Naval Forces submarines launched empty rubber life rafts along the coast near Wewak in an endeavor to make the Japanese believe that reconnaissance pa- trols were active in that area.84 One effort was made to obtain terrain in- formation and knowledge of enemy troop strength and dispositions in the Hollandia area. About two weeks before the landing a Seventh Fleet submarine landed an Allied reconnaissance patrol at Tanahmerah Bay. The venture proved completely abortive. Local natives betrayed the patrol to the Japanese, and the members were killed, cap- tured, or dispersed. A few men of the origi- nal party eluded the enemy and were found alive after the Allied landings.85 Air Operations The scheduled strike by Task Force 58 against the Palaus, designed both for stra- tegic support of the Hollandia operation and the destruction of enemy air and surface "Memo, GHQ SWPA for ANF SWPA, AAF SWPA, and Alamo, 30 Mar 44, no sub, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-4 Apr 44; Rad, Com7thFlt to CTF 75, 5 Apr 44, in GHQ Jnl, 5 Apr 44; Rad, CINCSWPA to COMINCH, 11 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 12 Apr 44; 18th Army Opns, III, pp. 17-20, 39-40. ™ Alamo Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp. 20-21. For a complete account of the scouting at- tempt at Hollandia see Comdr. Eric A. Feldt (RAN), The Coast Watchers (Melbourne, 1946), pp. 364-74. units, was carried out on 30-31 March. Other islands in the western Carolines, in- cluding Yap, Ulithi, Ngulu, and Woleai, were hit during the same two days or on 1 April. The raids resulted in the loss for the Japanese of almost 150 aircraft either in the air or on the ground. Two enemy destroyers, four escort vessels, and 104,000 tons of merchant or naval auxiliary shipping were sunk and many other ships, of both combat and merchant classes, were damaged. In addition, airfields and shore installations at all objectives were damaged and the main channels into the Palau fleet anchorage at least temporarily blocked by mines. Unfortunately, Task Force 58 had been sighted by Japanese search planes prior to its arrival off the Palaus, and many enemy combat ships and a number of merchant vessels had fled from the area. The desired results were achieved, however — the enemy naval units at Palau were removed as a threat to the Hollandia-Aitape operation and driven back to more westerly bases. Task Force 58 lost twenty planes, but its ships suffered no damage.33 The efforts of Task Force 58 had been supplemented by South and Southwest Pacific aircraft which, from bases in eastern New Guinea and the Admiralties, bombed islands in the eastern Carolines and under- took many long reconnaissance missions. Meanwhile, Southwest Pacific aircraft had been neutralizing enemy air bases in western New Guinea and eastern islands of the Netherlands East Indies. Most of the strate- gic support missions flown to western New Guinea were undertaken by U. S. Fifth Air 86 U. S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The Cam- paigns of the Pacific War, p. 207; Japanese Studies in WW II, No. 34, Naval Operations in the Western New Guinea Area, 1943-45, p. 11, and No. 60, The A-GO Operation, 1914, p. 2, copies in OCMH files. 50 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Force planes while the Royal Australian Air Forces Command assumed responsibility for the majority of the strikes against the islands in the eastern Indies. These operations were intensified about six weeks before the landings at Hollandia and Aitape. From Wewak to the Vogelkop Peninsula of west- ern New Guinea, and from Biak to Timor, the Allied Air Forces destroyed Japanese planes and airfield installations, rendered many air bases at least temporarily unus- able, and hindered enemy attempts to fly air reinforcements to New Guinea from the Philippines.*7 Spectacular results were achieved by the Fifth Air Force at Hollandia, where the Japanese 6th Air Division had recently re- treated from Wewak and received strong reinforcements. The air unit conserved its planes, apparently waiting to see where the Allies would strike next.88 The Japanese waited too long. The Fifth Air Force shifted the weight of its attack from the Wewak area to Hol- landia, and, during the period 30 March through 3 April, destroyed or damaged over 300 Japanese aircraft, most of them on the ground. On 30 March, when over 100 planes were destroyed at Hollandia, the Japanese were caught completely unpre- pared. Faulty intelligence, resulting partially from insufficient radar warning facilities, found many Japanese planes on the ground refueling after early morning patrols. Others had been left unattended upon receipt of " USSBS, op. ext., p. 1 79; GHQ SWPA OI 48, 24 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 24 Mar 44; Rad, CINC- SWPA to CINCPOA et al, CX-10718, 15 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 15 Apr 44; AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 30 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 30 Mar 44. 88 AAF SWPA Int Sum 193, 25 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 24 Mar 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEPs 737 and 742, 26 Mar and 3 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, 26 Mar and 3 Apr 44; 18th Army Opns, III, 4-9, 17-20. reports that a large Allied air formation had turned back eastward after bombing Aitape. Finally, earlier Fifth Air Force attacks had so cratered runways and taxiways of two of the three enemy fields at Hollandia that there was little room to disperse the planes. The Fifth Air Force, in a series of low-level bombing attacks, covered and aided by newly developed long-range fighters, found enemy aircraft parked wing tip to wing tip along the runways. By 6 April the Japanese had only twenty-five serviceable aircraft at Hollandia.89 They made no attempt to re- build their air strength there and, after 3 April, Fifth Air Force raids were met by only a small number of enemy fighter planes which made but desultory attempts at interception.90 The Japanese did build up a small con- centration of air strength farther west, at Wakde— Sarmi, and continued airfield de- velopment at still more westerly bases. The Fifth Air Force and Australian aircraft in- creased their efforts against these latter installations,91 while planes of Task Force 58 effectively neutralized Japanese air power at Wakde-Sarmi just prior to 22 April. "* 18th Army Opns III, 35-37; AAF SWPA Int Sum 197, 8 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 7 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 742, 3 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 3 Apr 44. Many additional details of AAF SWPA action against Hollandia are provided in the Air Force's official history: Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cates (Eds.), The Pacific: Guadal- canal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944 (Chi- cago, 1950), pp. 587-98. " 18th Army Opns, III, 41-46; Japanese Studies in WW II, 31, History of the 2d Area Army, 1943- 1945, pp. 30-40, copy in OCMH files; Alamo Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp. 45-48 ; AAF SWPA Int Sum 197, 8 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 760, 21 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 21 Apr 44. For additional information on the effects of Jap- anese air losses at Hollandia, se ejCh. I Vj below. 01 GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Wakde- Sarmi, 8 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 8 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 760, 21 Apr 44. PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR HOLLANDIA -AITAPE 51 Task Force 58's efforts at Wakde and Hoi- landia on D minus 1 and D Day bagged an estimated thirty-three aircraft shot down. Damage to planes on the ground at either objective was difficult to assess because of the degree of destruction previously achieved at both places by the Allied Air Forces.02 Attack Force Preparations Meanwhile, Allied ground and amphibi- ous forces had been engaged in final prep- arations and training for the coming assault and, on 8, 9, and 10 April, had undertaken last rehearsals. The 24th Division's rehearsal MUSSBS, op. cit., p. 208; Alamo Force Opns Rpt Hollandia— Aitape, pp. 45^4-6. at Taupota Bay, on the coast of New Guinea south of Goodenough Island, was incom- plete. Little unloading was attempted, and the area selected did not permit the employ- ment of naval gunfire support. The 41st Division had a more satisfactory rehearsal, with realistic unloading and naval fire, near Lae, New Guinea.93 Final loading began on 10 April. LCI's of the Reckless Task Force left their load- ing points on 16 April in order to allow the troops aboard to disembark at the Admi- ralty Islands for a day of exercising, resting, 93 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 37 ; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, p. 29; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 3; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-^t Mar 44, p. 1 ; 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 1. 52 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES and eating. Other vessels of Hollandia- bound convoys left the Goodenough Island and Cape Cretin staging areas on 1 7 and 1 8 April. Ships carrying the Persecution Task Force moved out of the Finschhafen area on 18 April and on the same day rendez- voused with the vessels bearing the 41st Division toward the Admiralties. All convoys moved north around the east- ern side of the Admiralties and, at 0700 on 20 April, the various troops assembled at a rendezvous point northwest of Manus Island. Moving at a speed of about nine knots, the massed convoys steamed west- ward from the Admiralties all day and at dusk turned southwest toward Hollandia. At a point about eighty miles off the New Guinea coast between Hollandia and Aitape, the Persecution Task Force con- voy— the Eastern Attack Group — broke off from the main body and swung southeast toward Aitape. The ships bearing the Reck- less Task Force proceeded to a point twenty miles offshore between Humboldt and Tanahmerah Bays. There, at 0130 on D Day, this convoy split. The Central At- tack Group, with the 41st Division aboard, turned southeast toward Humboldt Bay and arrived in the transport area at 0500. The ships of the Western Attack Group, carrying the 24th Division and the re- mainder of the Reckless Task Force, moved into Tanahmerah Bay at the same time.94 "RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, Map 1, p. 5; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay— Aitape, pp. 9-10; CTG 77.2 (Central Attack Group) Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay, p. 3; CTG 77.3 Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1-2. CHAPTER III The Hollandia Operation First light in the Hollandia area on 22 April 1944 disclosed a heavily overcast sky from which a light drizzle intermittently fell upon the ships bearing the Reckless Task Force toward its objectives. (Map II) The weather gave no promise that aircraft abpard the carriers of Task Force 58, stand- ing offshore between Humboldt and Tanah- merah Bays, would be able to execute all tmeir assigned support missions. On the other Hand, the weather conditions aided Allied forces, for the approach of the convoys to Hollandia was at least partially concealed from Japanese eyes. Chances for local sur- prise seemed excellent. The Landings at Tanahmerah Bay The assault ships of the Western Attack Group, carrying the 24th Infantry Division to Tanahmerah Bay, anchored some 1 0,000 yards off Red Beach 2, about a mile farther than planned. This change was due to bad weather, which obscured landmarks ex- pected by ships' pilots to guide them to the proper anchorages. The troops of the 24th Division quickly breakfasted and assault personnel then began clambering down nets into waiting landing craft of the 542d Engi- neer Boat and Shore Regiment. The transfer to small craft, although hampered by rough seas in the transport area, was completed about 0535, and the leading waves formed rapidly. The Assault Naval fire support vessels, operating un- der the command of Rear Adm. V. A. C. Crutchley ( RN ) , picked up their landmarks through the mist as best they could, and at 0600 the roar of 8-inch guns from the heavy cruisers HMAS Australia and HMAS Shropshire shattered the silence of the steaming tropical morning.1 To this din was added the sharper crack of 5 -inch and 4.7-inch weapons from American and Aus- tralian destroyers. In order to obtain ob- servation of important targecs, the fire support ships stood as close inshore as the weather conditions and incomplete knowl- edge of the waters at Tanahmerah Bay allowed. The fire continued until 0645, by which time 600 rounds of 8-inch and 1,500 rounds of 5 -inch and 4.7-inch ammunition had been expended. The naval bombard- ment was carried out according to plan and without response from Japanese shore 1 Information in this and the following subsec- tion is from: 24th Inf Div [Noiseless Landing Force] Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 56-79, 223-24; 24th Div G-3 Jnl, Hollandia; 21st Inf Jnl, Hol- landia; 19th Inf Jnl, Hollandia; RTF G-3 Jnl Hol- landia; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Hum- boldt Bay-Aitape, p. 24; Ltr, CG 2d ESB to Comdr Alamo Force, 24 Apr 44, sub : Observations, D Day, Red Beach, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollafidia, 25-26 Apr 44 ; draft MS History of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, Ch. VII, "The Reckless Task Force," pp. 13-20, copy in OCMH files; Co A, 1st Tank Bn, 1st Mar Div, Opns Rpt, 15 Apr-13 May 44, pp. 1-2 ; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 46. 54 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES LANDINGS AT TANAHMERAH BAY. Landing craft heading toward Red BeacH2. Despite unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 managed to maintain planes on uir alert over the Hollandia area. defenses. At its conclusion Allied destroyers moved still closer inshore to fire on targets of opportunity. Despite the unfavorable weather, Task Force 58 had managed to maintain planes on air alert over the Hollandia area since dawn. No enemy aircraft flew up from the Hollandia fields, and the few apparently operational planes sighted on those strips were strafed. In general there were no indications that Japanese defenses or de- fenders existed in the Tanahmerah Bay area. Task Force 58's scheduled bombing and strafing missions for that region were there- fore canceled. As the leading wave of landing craft, ve- hicle and personnel ( LCVP's ) , approached Red Beach 2, which was obscured by smoke from the naval bombardment, a rocket barrage was laid on the landing area by one Seventh Fleet LCI and two landing craft, support (LCS's), of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. Machine guns mounted aboard the leading LCVP's kept up a steady fire against the beach. There was no answer from the Japanese, and the THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 55 only opposition to the landing was scattered small arms and light automatic weapons fire from points far on the flanks of the beach and from a small island in Tanah- merah Bay. This fire was so quickly silenced by supporting destroyers that the assault waves suffered no casualties before reaching shore. The first group of LCVP's, carrying men of the 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, and the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, was eight or nine minutes late in reaching Red Beach 2. But this tardiness did not prevent a success- ful landing, and after orders were issued to add eight minutes to the starting time of each, succeeding waves were almost per- fectly timed. Tactical surprise was evidently complete. No Japanese defended the beaches and the two assault battalions had no difficulty occupying the initial beach- head. The 3d Battalion, 19th Infantry, quickly secured the northern portion of the beach- head and immediately dispatched patrols east and north to probe suspected enemy positions. The 1st Battalion, following the 3d ashore, went into an assembly area to act as local reserve and to make ready to aid in unloading supplies at the water's edge if that proved necessary. The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, took the southern half of Red Beach 2 with similar ease. The 3d Battalion of that regiment quickly followed the 2d ashore and sent Company I south to look for the trail expected to connect with Red Beach 1 at Depapre. Company A of the 21st Infantry led the way to Red Beach 1 aboard LVT's of the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, protected by the 2d Engineer Special Bri- gade's Support Battery craft. Scheduled for 0725, Company A's landing actually took place about twenty minutes late. LVT's on the flanks of the initial waves had to cross coral barrier reefs on their way to the shore, while in the center only two LVT's at one time were able to proceed abreast through a narrow channel in the reefs. The landing was unopposed, and the remainder of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, moved ashore quickly. Red Beach 1 contained a veritable maze of trails which crossed each other, recrossed, and wandered off toward all points of the compass. The 1st Battalion thus found it difficult to accomplish one of its principal missions — locating the beginning of the road leading inland to Lake Sentani and the air- fields. After an hour's search, the entrance to this important trail was discovered about 500 yards south-southeast of Depapre. While that reconnaissance was under way, Company A secured and expanded the beachhead. Huts which had survived the naval bombardment were carefully searched, footpaths throughout the area were explored, a few Japanese stragglers were killed, and some potential supply- dispersal areas were located. Back at Red Beach 2, which had been in- tended as the principal landing area for both troops and supplies, operations were not pro- ceeding according to plan. General Irving, when he assumed command ashore at 0930, found the terrain at Red Beach 2 much more difficult than he or members of his staff had anticipated. A major change in landing plans, not only for the 24th Division but also for the rest of the Reckless Task Force, seemed imminent. The Landing Plans Are Changed Contrary to estimates, which had been based primarily on interpretation of aerial photographs, Red Beach 2 proved to be but 56 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES thirty yards deep. Behind this narrow beach was discovered a wide swamp covering most of the area which the task force had planned to use for bivouacs and supply dumps. The swamp was soon found to be impassable for everything except individual infantrymen bearing only small arms. Power tools were useless in the morass. Neither time nor men and equipment were available to adapt Red Beach 2 to the role originally planned for it. A limited dispersal area, rendered inac- cessible by a small stream and by an arm of the swamp, was discovered at the northern edge of the beach, and ultimately the 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment con- structed a road into this space. Artillery, ashore within an hour after the initial land- ing, was emplaced there to deliver fire on inland targets. But the fill used to build this road stopped the flow of the little stream which had drained the swamp into Tanah- merah Bay. To prevent a rise in the swamp's water level, a drainage canal was cut directly through the center of the beach. This pro- cedure speeded the outward flow of swamp water, lowered the water level a little, and created a small additional dry area behind the beach, but it did not provide sufficient dry land for dispersal of all the troops and supplies scheduled to land on Red Beach 2. Meanwhile, more obstacles to the execu- tion of the original logistic plans had been discovered. First, it proved impracticable to build planned roads inland 500 yards on both sides of Red Beach 2 to dry areas be- hind the swamp. Then it was found that there was no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 or with the Depapre-Lake Sentani road. This was an especially serious circumstance, for the landing plans had called for moving almost all troops and sup- plies overland from Red Beach 2 to the road inland. Construction of a road between the two beaches was soon found impracticable and when, after a day and a half of hard work, engineers had succeeded in driving a few yards of road into the hills south toward Red Beach 1, the project was dis- continued. The small completed stretch did serve some useful purpose. On D Day two batteries of 105-mm. howitzers were dragged along the road as far as possible to a cramped position on a little ridge immedi- ately south of Red Beach 2. From this site the howitzers could deliver some fire support for troops advancing inland from Red Beach 1 , but the direction of this fire was limited by a number of hills near by. The same stretch of road also provided dispersal space for a few of the many vehicles which had been unloaded at Red Beach 2 on D Day. Other difficulties were encountered at Red Beach 2. As soon as LST's touched shore, they began disgorging tanks, 90-mm. antiaircraft weapons, and 155-mm. artillery. Practically all the artillery mounts mired to their hubs in deep mud at the inner side of the beach. Bulldozers then had to be taken off essential road construction projects to pull the vehicles out of the way. The 2d and 3d Platoons of Company A, 1st Marine Tank Battalion, ashore at 0830, could not be used tactically and had to find space to bivouac on the beach or on the road to the south. When it was found that the available beach area was inadequate to hold the many tracked and wheeled vehicles still aboard the LST's, work was redirected to unloading bulk cargo. Roller conveyors were set up on the beach but could not be extended into LST cargo decks because those decks were still so tightly packed with vehicles. A long stream of men had to proceed to the stern of each LST to bring out bulk supplies by hand through narrow spaces between vehicles. THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 57 UNLOADING LST'S, Red Beach 2. Since it was impossible to move the sup- plies inland they were piled on the beach, where many stacks of boxes or crates soon reached heights up to eight feet. The beach quickly became so crowded that it was soon obvious that the efforts of Alamo Force to secure beach sleds for the 24th Division had been in vain — there was simply no room to use them. But, despite the seemingly patent impossibility of finding room for all men and supplies on Red Beach 2, the APA's and LST's bearing cargo for the division's two assault regiments were unloaded by 1900 on D Day. By that time the beach was almost solidly covered with supplies, troops, tanks, vehicles, and gun emplacements. It was clear that supplies and personnel of Head- quarters, Reckless Task Force, the task force reserve, miscellaneous service units, and various organizations attached to the 24th Division could not possibly be squeezed onto the beach. Unless Red Beach 1 pro- vided materially greater dispersal space, convoys scheduled to reach Tanahmerah Bay on D plus 1 and D plus 2 would have to be held at eastern New Guinea ports or diverted to other landing areas. Now the beneficial results of General Irving's determination to keep Red Beach 1 in the landing plans became apparent. Be- hind that beach were found some additional dry, flat dispersal areas. Access to the beach 58 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES was hampered by the fronting reef, but the 24th Division solved this problem by setting up a shuttle system from Red Beach 2. Shallow-draft boats carried the supplies to the entrance of Depapre Bay. There, on the water, materiel was transferred to LVT's which served as ferries to the shore. At high tide small boats could reach Depapre — only two could beach there at a time — and at 1730 LCM's took the 2d Platoon and the command section of Company A, 1st Tank Battalion, to Depapre through the reefs. Ultimately the water approach to Depapre was improved when naval demolition per- sonnel 2 blasted a wider and deeper channel through the reef, thus giving small landing craft continuous access to Red Beach 1 . The shuttle to Depapre continued throughout the night of 22-23 April. Some of the congestion on Red Beach 2 was thereby relieved and, by dint of almost superhuman effort, the cargo from seven LST's of the D plus 1 convoy was put on that beach on the 23d, and the AKA of the D plus 1 echelon was unloaded by noon on the 24th. Transshipments to Red Beach 1 were continued, but by noon on 23 April it had become obvious that there was no space to be found anywhere along the shores of Tanahmerah Bay to unload the supplies and troops aboard the D plus 2 convoy. Meanwhile, advance elements of the 24th Division had pushed far inland on their way toward the airfields over the Depapre-Lake Sentani road. Contrary to expectations, this road was found to be ungraded and ex- tremely narrow. It was a mere track which, winding in a series of hairpin turns over the Takari Hills east of Depapre, hung precari- ously along the sides of slopes that in some * From a mine sweeper ( YMS ) accompanying the Western Attack Group. The men worked under the direction of the Naval Beach Party commander. cases were as steep as 60 degrees. It was far from being the well-traveled motor road ex- pected. Neither the Army's wheeled vehicles nor the Marine's tanks could reach the crest of the Takari Hills over this road. The tanks were relegated to the role of perimeter de- fense around Depapre.3 Heavy construction, which was destined to be impeded by many landslides, had to be undertaken before the trail inland could be used for a main supply line as originally planned. Until it was im- proved, only a small number of men could be sustained over the track, and all their supplies would have to be hand-carried for- ward from Depapre. To Headquarters, Reckless Task Force, the logistic difficulties inherent in support- ing a large-scale drive inland over the Depapre-Lake Sentani trail far outweighed the tactical advantages of such a movement. The 41st Infantry Division, on the other hand, was meeting with unexpectedly rapid success in its drive to the airfields from Humboldt Bay, the shores of which had been found better suited to troop and supply dis- persal than those at Tanahmerah Bay. The Reckless Task Force staff therefore rec- ommended that a sweeping change in plans be made. General Eichelberger, accepting these recommendations, decided to make the Humboldt Bay area the principal task force landing point and to change the emphasis of attack to the 41st Division's drive inland. Accordingly, about noon on D plus 1, the D plus 2 convoy to Tanahmerah Bay was diverted to Humboldt Bay. Task force head- 3 There being no possible way to employ the tanks in their proper roles in the Tanahmerah Bay area, they merely bivouacked in that region until 2 May, when they were sent to Humboldt Bay. There, the services of the tank company were not needed, and on 4 May the company left the Hollandia area via LST to rejoin the rest of the 1st Tank Battalion on Pavuvu Island in the Solomons on 13 May. THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 59 quarters, the task force reserve, and miscel- laneous service units, all of which were still awaiting a chance to unload at Tanahmerah Bay, were also directed to move to the Hum- boldt Bay beaches. A part of the task force headquarters which had already landed on Red Beach 2 was reloaded on an LST and sent to Humboldt Bay.4 Red Beaches 1 and 2 had proved able to provide dispersal areas for a bare minimum of supplies for the 24th Division's two as- sault regiments, but they were inadequate for the larger load assigned to them prior to the landings. The division would therefore have to support its drive inland with only the supplies and equipment unloaded at Tanahmerah Bay through D plus 1 . The 24th Division's Drive to the Airfields Leaving Company A at Red Beach 1 , the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, commanded by Lt. Col. Thomas E. Clifford, Jr., had started up the Depapre-Lake Sentani trail at 0837 on D Day.s At any one of the numerous hairpin turns and defiles over the first two or three miles of the track, a squad of Japanese riflemen could have delayed an entire infantry division. Surprisingly, no determined opposition was encountered. Enemy defensive installations (many of them incomplete ) at important points were 4 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 46. ' Unless otherwise indicated, information on the 24th Division's drive to the airfields is based on: 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 60-100, 180- 82, and 191-93; 24th Div G-3 Jnl Hollandia; 21st Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 2-3; 21st Inf Jnl Hol- landia; Notes, 27 Oct 50 and 15 Dec 50, provided by Lt Col Chester A. Dahlen [ex-CO 3d Bn 21st Inf] and Mr. Clarence E. Short [ex-S-3, 21st Inf], in OCMH files; Ltr, Brig Gen Charles B. Lyman to Gen Ward, 23 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH files. The bulk of Company A, 21st Infantry, after securing Red Beach 1 and finding the trail entrance, re- mained on the beach until 24 April. found to be unoccupied. The Japanese had not been ready for the attack and those who had been in the Tanahmerah Bay area had apparently fled in panic when the 24th Division began to land. The 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, was therefore able to ad- vance as rapidly as terrain conditions and necessary security measures permitted. The First Day of the Advance Moving through fire lanes down which no bullets flew and past pillboxes in early stages of construction, the battalion column reached the village of Mariboe at 1047 hours. Only a few scattered enemy rifle shots had been encountered during this march and the village was secured without opposition. Over three miles by trail inland from Depapre, Mariboe was the 24th Divi- sion's first inland objective. It was evident from scattered Japanese equipment in and around Mariboe that the Japanese had evacuated that village not long before the 1st Battalion's arrival. Colonel Clifford now halted his men. Since radio communication with the divi- sion command post on Red Beach 2 had been lost, he sent messengers back over the tortuous trail to report progress to General Irving. At the same time patrols were sent toward Kantome, nearly two miles southeast of Mariboe. They reported few signs of enemy activity along the trail beyond Mari- boe. Colonel Clifford apparently did not wait to re-establish contact with higher headquarters but, acting on his patrols' re- ports, ordered the battalion to push on. En- countering little opposition along the main trail, the unit reached Kantome" about noon. From that village patrols were sent almost ten miles eastward along the trail through Paipou, Jangkena, Waibron-Baroe, and 60 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Waibron-Bano to Dazai, the division's inter- mediate objective. The patrols encountered no active resistance, although signs of recent enemy occupation abounded at numer- ous points along the trail to Dazai. Colonel Clifford then sent the main body of the bat- talion on to Jangkena, about eight miles by trail inland from Depapre. At Jangkena the advance was again halted because night was approaching and because only sporadic radio contact could be maintained with regi- ment or division headquarters. Colonel Clifford possessed little or no knowledge of the situation to the rear other than the difficulties presented by terrain. Ahead, 10,000 Japanese were thought to be concentrated around the airfields. Jangkena was on flat, swampy ground and was not an easily defensible position. Should the 1st Battalion push on to Dazai, also on flat ground, Japanese troops might outflank the unit, cut its line of communications to De- papre, and destroy it at leisure. If the Japa- nese bypassed the battalion they could cut off the advance of the rest of the 21st Infan- try at any one of the many defiles over the first two or three miles of the trail inland from Depapre. Colonel Clifford therefore decided to pull his men back to Kantome for the night, leaving only outposts along the trail east of that village. Kantome was lo- cated near the foot of the Takari Hills, which he thought would present a serious obstacle to any Japanese flanking maneuvers. The soundness of Colonel Clifford's de- cision was demonstrated about midnight when a small Japanese force, which had apparently moved overland around the 1st Battalion's outposts, struck the battalion's left. The jungled hills in the Kantome neighborhood prevented further enemy movement and the Japanese force, although it managed to keep the 1st Battalion awake most of the night, did not penetrate the perimeter. At dawn on the 23d the Japa- nese gave up their attempts to cut the trail to the rear and withdrew. About the time that the 1st Battalion had started withdrawing to Kantome for the night, radio communications with regi- mental headquarters had been re-estab- lished. It was then learned that the 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry (less Company I), had moved from Red Beach 2 to Depapre. During the morning of D Day the 3d Bat- talion, under the command of Lt. Col. Chester A. Dahlen, had been engaged in probing the southern flank of Red Beach 2. It had soon become apparent, however, that no Japanese were in that area, and General Irving had accordingly ordered the unit to move to Red Beach 1 to support the advance of the 1 st Battalion. This move started about 1400 and as each element of the battalion reached Red Beach 1, it started up the Depapre-Lake Sentani trail. Company I continued overland through the hills be- tween Red Beaches 1 and 2. By nightfall the battalion's forward elements had reached the crest of the Takari Hills. The rest of the unit (still less Company I) continued mov- ing after dark to close in on the leading elements, finally bivouacking along the trail. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 21st Infantry had also begun moving to Red Beach 1, responsibility for the defense of Red Beach 2 passing to the 19th Infantry. Col. Charles B. Lyman, commanding the 21st Infantry, moved his command post to Depapre about noon. By the morning of the next day, 23 April, the bulk of the 2d Bat- talion was concentrated at Depapre. Com- pany I rejoined the regiment about 1400 the same day, after a march over very rough and jungled terrain from Red Beach 2. Colonel Lyman now had his entire regiment THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 61 under his control, ready to exploit the initial success of the 1st Battalion. Late at night on the 22d, he instructed the regiment to resume the advance eastward at 0700 on D plus 1. Logistic Problems Delay the Advance The 1st Battalion began moving out of Kantome on schedule on the 23d and by 1 045 had re-entered Jangkena. Shortly after 1 200 the unit reached Dazai, farthest limit of patrol advance the previous day, and then pushed on to Sabron. No signs of enemy op- position other than a few rifle shots from woods on both sides of the trail had been encountered. At 1445, after lunch and a rest, the battalion moved cautiously out of Sab- ron. About 1 ,500 yards beyond that village a small stream crossed the main track. This crossing had been reconnoitered by patrols early in the afternoon, and there had been found the first signs of organized resistance. Two platoons of Company B, leading the advance from Sabron, safely crossed the small stream but soon found themselves in the middle of a well-concealed Japanese am- bush on the east bank. Rifle and heavy machine gun fire made the stream's steep banks untenable, and the forward platoons hurriedly withdrew to the west, leaving four dead men behind. Over his now well-func- tioning radios, Colonel Clifford requested air support. The message was relayed to Task Force 58 carriers lying offshore and three planes quickly appeared to strafe the enemy position. In addition, the 1st Battal- ion's 81 -mm. mortars and heavy machine guns were also brought forward to lay a barrage on the enemy defenses. But all this fire failed to dislodge the Japanese. In an attempt to outflank the enemy position, Colonel Clifford sent small patrols across the stream both above and below the crossing. These efforts proved futile, for the patrols could not locate the enemy flanks and were kept away from the main Japanese position by small arms fire. After a lively fire fight at the crossing, which lasted almost to dusk, Colonel Clifford decided to pull back toward Sabron so that mortars and artillery could fire freely on the stream-crossing area. During the night 105-mm. howitzers of the 5 2d Field Artillery Battalion fired on the enemy positions at the crossing for over an hour. The Japanese replied with mortar, grenade, and small arms fire which was di- rected against the 1st Battalion's perimeter near Sabron. About 2100 a Japanese field piece, believed to have been a dual purpose 90-mm. antiaircraft gun, opened fire on the battalion from the vicinity of the airfields. The enemy's harassing fire continued almost to dawn on the 24th, and again the Ameri- can unit was kept awake much of the night. The rest of the 21st Infantry was now echeloned along the trail behind the 1st Battalion. The 3d Battalion, which had ad- vanced to within 1,000 yards of Dazai, was also harassed by Japanese fire during the night of 23-24 April, but the area of the 2d Battalion (which had moved up to Mariboe from Depapre) was quiet. The 2d and 3d Battalions' advances had been made with- out opposition. Even with the support of the remainder of the regiment echeloned on the trail to its rear, the position of the 1st Battalion was not enviable. The unit was over twelve miles by trail inland; it had only enough rations left for breakfast; and it was running low on ammunition. No supplies had been re- ceived since landing, and hard fighting on the 24th seemed unavoidable. Fortunately the 24th Division's plans for the Hollandia operation had taken into 62 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES consideration many of the potential logistic problems that might be encountered in the Tanahmerah Bay area. The division G-4 Section had made a detailed study which had shown that a full infantry regiment could be supplied by hand-carry from Red Beach 2 over the Depapre-Lake Sentani trail inland as far as Jangkena. When no road connecting Red Beach 2 with Red Beach 1 had been found, the division moved the main supply point to Depapre, from which the advance inland would be sup- ported. With this change in plans, the G-4 Section undertook new computations and calculated that the hand-carry distance could be extended to Dazai. This conclusion was based on the assumption that adverse weather conditions would not make the Depapre-Lake Sentani road nearly im- passable. On 23 April heavy rains started to turn the road into a quagmire through which struggling men could scarcely carry their own equipment and food, to say nothing of extra supplies for the leading battalion. By evening on that day logistic support of the 21st Infantry had therefore become a major problem. There was no question but that the regiment would have to be sup- ported by hand-carry, for it was estimated that at least two weeks' hard work by en- gineers would be required before the road from Depapre as far as Mariboe could be made passable even for jeeps. But the 1st Battalion had already advanced east of Dazai, beyond which point, according to the G-4 estimates, support by hand-carry would be next to impossible. When the 2d and 3d Battalions had moved inland on the 23d, both had carried extra supplies, principally food and ammu- nition, but these supplies were inadequate to support the 1st Battalion as well. The 24th Division thereupon decided to increase the number of men assigned to hand-carry- ing duties. The overwater shuttle system from Red Beach 2 to Depapre was now working smoothly and few combat troops were needed at Red Beach 2 to assist in moving supplies or to defend that area, which had proved to be bare of Japanese forces. Therefore the 2d Battalion, 19th Infantry (initially division reserve), was moved to Depapre on D plus 1. The Anti- tank and Gannon Companies of both the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments were also dispatched to Red Beach 1 on the same day. To speed the flow of supplies inland, all these troops were stationed at various points along the trail from Depapre to Mariboe. The supplies were moved by a combination of a shuttle system and forward displace- ment of companies. But the best efforts of three infantry bat- talions and four antitank or cannon com- panies proved inadequate to assure con- tinued support of the 1st Battalion, 21st In- fantry. In addition, trail conditions were becoming worse and hand-carrying progres- sively more difficult. General Irving there- fore requested that aircraft (the nearest base for which was at Nadzab, almost 500 miles southeast of Hollandia) drop supplies at Jangkena on 24 April so that the 1st Battal- ion could continue its advance without de- pending on hand-carrying parties. General Irving himself reconnoitered the trail a little way forward from Depapre dur- ing the afternoon of 23 April. After his trip he realized that continued rapid advance in- land was no longer possible under the hand- carry scheme. He also learned that the weather was so threatening that little de- pendence could be placed on air supply. Accordingly, late in the afternoon of the 23d, he ordered the 21st Infantry to con- THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 63 HAND-CARRYING SUPPLIES. Men of the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, carrying supplies forward. solidate its forward positions at Sabron and Dazai. Elements of the regiment not already at those two villages were to remain eche- loned to the rear for hand-carrying duties. Further offensive efforts were to be limited to patrol action until the inland supply sit- uation could be improved. Supply Difficulties, 24-25 April By exhaustive work during the afternoon of 23 April and the following night, rear elements of the 21st Infantry had managed to build up a small reserve of rations and ammunition at Dazai. The next morning the 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, moved to Depapre from Red Beach 2 to augment the number of hand-carrying parties along the road inland. The Cannon and Antitank Companies of the same regiment, carrying extra supplies, pushed over the Takari Hills to Mariboe and Jangkena, respectively. Inland, most efforts during the day were limited to patrolling. In the morning Gen- eral Irving slogged his way overland to Colonel Lyman's forward command post with the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry. After learning about the situation in the forward 64 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES area, he instructed Colonel Lyman to ad- vance no farther than the point at which the two forward battalions, the 1st and 3d, could supply themselves from Dazai. Ac- cordingly the 3d Battalion spent the day sending out flanking patrols and closing up on the 1st. The latter unit sent out patrols to the scene of the previous day's ambush and found that artillery and mortar fire had killed or driven away from that area almost all the Japanese defenders. At nightfall the 1st Battalion's position had been little changed from that which it had held at day- light, forward displacement of the main body having been limited to less than 200 yards. The 3d Battalion established a new perimeter about 500 yards to the rear of the 1st, while the 2d Battalion was spread from Dazai back to Mariboe, its companies act- ing as links in an ever-growing chain of hand-carrying parties. To the rear of the 2d Battalion, additional links had been established by dark on the 24th. Most of the 2d Battalion, 19th In- fantry, and the Antitank and Cannon Com- panies of the 21st Infantry had been hand- carrying supplies from Depapre to Mariboe during the day and by nightfall had set up a small supply dump at the latter village. The 1st Battalion, 19th Infantry, had been handling supplies all day at Red Beach 1 and had also taken over responsibility for the security of that beach, allowing Com- pany A, 21st Infantry, to rejoin its battalion inland. The Cannon Company of the 1 9th Infantry had moved forward with supplies to Mariboe, and the Antitank Company of the same regiment had reached Jangkena with some rations and ammunition. The Cannon and Antitank Companies of both the 19th and 21st Infantry Regiments had, perforce, left their organic weapons and transportation behind them and were acting purely as service troops. In spite of the efforts of all these units, the supply of rations, ammunition, and medical equipment for the two advance battalions was but little augmented on the 24th. Worse still, the scheduled airdrop at Jangkena had been canceled because of poor weather, and the continuing rain was turning most of the Depapre-Lake Sentani road into a sea of mud. There was little hope for quick im- provement in the situation. But General Irving was optimistic and he felt sure that conditions would improve on the 25th. He requested another airdrop which, in order to get the supplies farther forward, he wanted made at Dazai. On the basis of this request and because the number of carrying parties along the main trail had been increased and some supplies had been moved to Dazai on the 24th, the division commander ordered the 21st In- fantry to continue its advance the next day. First objectives were wooded hills on either side of the main road about 3,000 yards beyond Sabron. The 25th of April dawned heavily over- cast and rain threatened, auguring ill for the proposed airdrop. Nevertheless, ad- vance patrols of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, moved out at 0500. Colonel Ly- man planned to have the two forward bat- talions advance on a wide front to make sure that no Japanese would be bypassed and left behind to cut the tenuous supply line back to Depapre. But the jungle was so thick on both sides of the trail that it was impossible for the main bodies to move rapidly in the dense undergrowth. The bulk of the two battalions therefore pushed for- THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 65 ward in column along the road, while nu- merous small patrols kept up as best they could in the jungle off the trail. After an artillery bombardment of known and suspected enemy positions, the rest of the two battalions followed the advance pa- trols. Only scattered small arms fire slowed the advance, although it was necessary to halt from time to time as patrols searched the terrain far to both sides of the main trail. About 1115 the advance stopped tempo- rarily while demolition teams destroyed two recently abandoned Japanese armored vehicles.* The first objectives were cleared by noon, at which time the 1st Battalion halted to rest at a point about 1 ,000 yards short of the next natural barrier, a branch of the Dejaoe River. Soon 1st Battalion patrols reached the river. A small enemy delaying position at the crossing — a ford — was quickly out- flanked by the 21st Infantry patrols and by midafternoon patrols had moved across the stream toward Julianadorp, a farm settle- ment to the east. Meanwhile, automatic weapons fire had been received from Japa- nese guns emplaced on high ground north of the ford. Scouts sent out to locate the source of this fire found enemy antiaircraft guns protected by riflemen and machine gunners. The Japanese positions were soon neutralized by mortar fire, and the main bodies resumed the advance about 1530. Progress was slow during the rest of the afternoon. Japanese patrols which threat- ened the line of communications became active north of the main road, and it was necessary for the 21st Infantry to send out its own combat patrols to hunt down and disperse the Japanese parties. These opera- " One report states that these vehicles were light tanks, but all other sources describe them as ar- mored cars or trucks. tions, which delayed the advance of the main body, were not finished until 1700. Then Colonel Lyman halted the advance for the night. The 1st Battalion dug in on the nose of a low hill about 500 yards west of the Dejaoe River branch crossing and approximately 125 yards north of the Depapre— Lake Sentani trail. The 3d Bat- talion and regimental headquarters biv- ouacked for the night in the vicinity of the day's first objectives, to the rear of the 1st Battalion. The supply situation in the forward area had been little improved during the 25th. Rain had fallen steadily all day, there had been no airdrop, and the Depapre— Lake Sentani road had become practically im- passable. The 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had moved forward through Sabron to Dazai, laboriously hand-carrying supplies as it struggled eastward in the rain and mud. By this means small supply dumps had been built up at both villages by dusk, but the battalion's displacement had left a large gap in the carrying line. West of Dazai the next sizable carrying party was the Antitank Company of the 19th Infantry, at Paipou. Behind that unit was the Cannon Company, 19th Infantry, at Mariboe. General Irving ordered both units to move at dawn on the 26th to Dazai, carrying with them all possible supplies. These displacements would leave the trail from Dazai west to Mariboe bare of hand-carrying parties, thus disrupting the supply relay system. General Irving there- fore ordered the 1st Battalion, 19th Infan- try, to move to Jangkena and instructed a company of the 2d Battalion of the same regiment to push on to Mariboe. The re- mainder of the 2d Battalion, which was to be assisted by miscellaneous artillery, medi- cal, and quartermaster units, was made re- 66 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES sponsible for moving supplies up the trail from Depapre as far as the crest of the Takari Hills. Finally, the Antitank and Cannon Companies of the 21st Infantry were ordered to push from Mariboe to Dazai, hand-carrying extra supplies as they advanced. Thus, by morning of the 26th, three in- fantry battalions, two antitank companies, and two cannon companies were assigned to carrying supplies. These troops were sup- ported by parts of the Service Companies of both the 19th and 21st Infantry Regi- ments, by elements of various engineer and quartermaster organizations, and by volun- teer groups from other units whose services were not needed for their normal duties. At least. 3,500 combat troops were directly em- ployed in moving supplies to the two for- ward battalions. Since his two forward battalions were now beyond the most effective and accurate support range of artillery emplaced at the beaches, Colonel Lyman asked that 4.2-inch mortars of Company A, 641st Tank De- stroyer Battalion, be sent inland. Such was the condition of the Depapre-Lake Sentani trail that plans were made to move only one mortar. A detachment comprising two gun crews and the ammunition carriers of an entire platoon were detailed for the task, and the movement of the mortar was given the highest priority. About the same time a single 105-mm. howitzer of Battery A, 5 2d Field Artillery Battalion, was started over the Takari Hills. Battery C, 11th Field Ar- tillery Battalion, offered support a different way. Because its guns could no longer help the infantry inland, the battery volunteered to a man to carry rations and other supplies over the Depapre-Lake Sentani road. Such help was indeed welcome. The spirit was excellent in the 24th Division, but spirit alone could not conquer all the difficulties of terrain. Neither the 4.2-inch mortar nor the 105-mm. howitzer were to reach posi- tions from which they could support the 21st Infantry's advance on 26 April. While these steps were being taken to de- liver both supplies and support weapons to the front, General Irving decided to order the advance continued. He reached this de- cision despite the fact that the supply situa- tion was still serious. It had been impossible to drop supplies from the air on the 25th and even hand-carrying had been stopped late in the afternoon by heavy rains which had flooded many small streams. Parts of the Depapre-Lake Sentani trail were now knee- deep in water. The two forward battalions were low on ammunition, and they would have to go on half-rations if the supply sit- uation were not quickly improved. But Gen- eral Irving was again optimistic about the weather, believing that air supply would be successful on the 26th. Furthermore, he had received information which indicated that the Japanese were evacuating the airfield area. For these reasons he considered that a continuation of the advance would not be unduly hazardous. In ordering the advance, the division commander was knowingly pushing his men far beyond the limit at which they could be supplied by hand-carry. If the airdrop should again fail or if track conditions should not improve, one of the two forward battalions would probably have to be eche- loned back along the trail to augment the carrying parties, and the advance would probably have to be halted. Should enemy opposition prove stubborn, the forward bat- talions might have to withdraw, perhaps as far as Dazai, to replenish their meager sup- plies of rations and ammunition. General Irving was taking a calculated risk which THE HOLLAND IA OPERATION 67 assumed the success of the airdrop and an absence of determined Japanese opposition. The Airfields Are Secured After passing an uneventful night, the 1st and 3d Battalions, 21st Infantry, resumed the advance at 0830 on 26 April. There was no opposition as the main bodies moved across the Dejaoe River and on through Julianadorp. About 11 30 both units stopped at Ebeli Plantation, about 1,800 yards east of Julianadorp, to clear out a bunker which was occupied by four Japanese riflemen. While the 3d Battalion dispatched Com- pany L north some 600 yards off the main trail to flush some Japanese from Ebeli Saw- mill, the rest of the troops moved on east- ward. By noon advance elements were atop a hill whence they could see the inland air- fields, and minutes later forward patrols reached the outermost dispersal areas of Hollandia Drome, the most westerly of the three Japanese airfields on the plain north of Lake Sentani. Now the advance was halted as the battalions regrouped and Colo- nel Lyman issued a new attack order. The 1st Battalion was instructed to clear a Japanese encampment area left of the trail and north of the center of Hollandia Drome. The 3d Battalion was to push directly on to the airfield, secure it, and then advance as far as the edge of a swamp lying southeast of the strip. By 1350 the 1st Battalion had secured its objective, having encountered little resist- ance. The 3d Battalion's forward patrols reached the western edge of the main run- way about the same time and, locating no opposition worthy of mention, arrived at the eastern end of the field half an hour later. At 1530 Colonel Lyman radioed to division headquarters that the entire Hollandia Drome area had been secured. By dark the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, had closed at Hollandia Drome. The bad weather which had forced can- cellation of attempted airdrops on 24 and 25 April had finally broken sufficiendy for a few planes from eastern New Guinea to get through to Hollandia. Twelve B-25's of the 17th Reconnaissance Squadron, Fifth Air Force, flew the nearly 500 miles from Saidor to drop rifle, carbine, machine gun, and mortar ammunition, hand grenades, and rations at Dazai.7 Moreover, the 2d Bat- talion, 21st Infantry, had managed to bring forward some extra rations, ammunition, and medical equipment. As the rain stopped, fresh carrying parties following the 2d Bat- talion found trail conditions greatly im- proved. Finally, some wheeled transport was now available at both ends of the Depa- pre-Lake Sentani road. Hard work by engi- neers had made the road passable for jeeps from Depapre halfway up the first steep slopes of the Takari Hills. At Hollandia Drome the 2 1st Infantry had captured a few Japanese trucks. These were sent west from the airstrip as far as possible along the main trail, which was passable to a point near Julianadorp. There the supplies dropped from the air during the day, as well as those still being hand-carried overland from De- papre, were picked up and taken back to the airfield area. As soon as Hollandia Drome was secured, T The information on the airdrop on 26 April was supplied to the author on 24 May 1949 by Capt. Bernhardt L. Mortensen, Air Historical Group, Headquarters, USAF. C-47's could not be used for the transport because the nearest Allied air bases were beyond practicable round trip range of such aircraft. While the B-25 mission did not fill all the needs of the forward battalions, other rations brought over the trail on the 26th, coupled with larger airdrops on the 27th and succeeding days, saved the situation from becoming critical. 68 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES patrols of the 21st Infantry pushed on to- ward Weversdorp, a farm about 2,500 yards beyond the eastern end of the field. At 1 645, between Weversdorp and the airdrome, contact was established with elements of the 186th Infantry, 41st Division, which had been attacking westward from Humboldt Bay into the airfield area.8 The Seizure of Hollandia Town While the 24th Division had been driving inland to Hollandia Drome, the 162d and 186th Infantry Regiments of the 41st Di- vision had pushed toward the fields from Humboldt Bay, twenty-five miles east of Tanahmerah Bay. The 41st Division had begun landing on White Beaches 1—4 on the shores of Humboldt Bay at 0700 on 22 April. Initial assaults were made by the 16 2d Infantry over the sandspits across the inner reaches of Humboldt Bay. The 186th Infantry followed the 1 62d ashore to initiate a drive southwest and inland from Hum- boldt Bav toward the airfields on the Lake Sentani Plain.9 The Beachhead at Humboldt Bay The convoy bearing the 41st Division to Humboldt Bay did not have the same diffi- culty locating landmarks as did the ships at 1 This final paragraph is based on 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 80; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Hollan- dia, p. 8; 21st Inf Jnl Hollandia. These sources dis- agree as to the locations of the meeting between the 24th and 41st Division units on the afternoon of 26 April, the 186th Infantry report putting it west of Weversdorp and the 21st Infantry journal placing it east of that farm. From a close check of the timing of all reports concerning this contact, it seems that a point some place between Weversdorp and the east- ern edge of Hollandia Drome is correct. 9 Letterpress LF FO 1, 9 Apr 44, in G-3 Annex to 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia. Tanahmerah Bay, and the ships found their assigned transport and fire support areas without much trouble. The naval fire sup- port conducted by American light cruisers and destroyers and the air support missions flown by Task Force 58 planes were ex- ecuted as planned. There was no opposition to either the naval gunfire or the aircraft activity, and surprise was as complete as that achieved at Tanahmerah Bay. Assault troops of the 41st Division quickly un- loaded from the APD's which had carried them to Humboldt Bay and boarded land- ing craft, personnel, ramp (LCPR's), cox- swained by naval personnel, for the short run to the beaches. The first of these boats touched shore exactly on schedule at 0700. The leading waves of landing craft were supported by rocket fire from two Seventh Fleet LCI's which fired principally on Pan- cake Hill, just north of White Beach 1, and by rocket or automatic weapons fire from two LCVP's of the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. There was no answering fire from Japanese weapons and no opposi- tion at the beaches.10 The first assault was made by Companies K and L, 162d Infantry, which landed along an 800-yard front on White Beach 1 , located on the more northern of the two sandspits dividing Humboldt Bay from Jau- tefa Bay.11 Succeeding waves of the 3d Bat- talion, 162d Infantry, came ashore in LCVP's and LCM's manned by the Boat Battalion, 5 3 2d Engineer Boat and Shore M CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, pp. 5, 26-27; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay, pp. 3-4. 11 Information in this and the following subsection is based on : 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 2-7; 162d Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 1-3; 41st Div G-3 Jnl Hollandia; 162d Inf Jnl Hollandia; 186th Inf Jnl Hollandia; draft MS 2d ESB Hist, Ch. VII, pp. 7-8, 30-31. GENERAL DOUGLAS MACARTHUR and General Horace H. Fuller, on the beach at Humboldt Bay, New Guinea, 22 April 1944. 70 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Regiment. Simultaneously, a reinforced rifle platoon of Company A, 162d Infantry, was put ashore from Army LCVP's on White Beach 2, immediately south of White Beach 1. Company I, 186th Infantry, landed in the same manner on White Beach 3 on the southern sandspit. There was no enemy op- position to these two secondary landings. Within half an hour the remainder of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry, the 1st and 2d Battalions of the same regiment, six tanks of the 603d Tank Company, and elements of the 116th Engineer Battalion were all safely ashore on the northern spit. The rifle platoon of Company A, 162d Infantry, advanced rapidly south along the spit and by 0745 secured Cape Pie, at the peninsula's southern extremity. This action eliminated the possibility of a Japanese sur- prise attack and secured the southern end of the spit. Company I of the 1 86th Infan- try, also unopposed, quickly secured Cape Tjeweri at the northern tip of the southern spit, and then began moving southeast along the shore of Humboldt Bay toward Holle- kang to forestall any Japanese counter- attacks from that direction. Meanwhile, the remainder of the 3d Bat- talion, 162d Infantry, had landed on White Beach 1 and had started north to secure Pancake Hill which, located at the inland end of the northern peninsula, overlooked all the 41st Division's landing beaches. So surprised had the Japanese been by the landings and by the speed of the 3d Bat- talion's advance, that the American troops, encountering only scattered rifle fire, were able to take Pancake Hill before 0800. Atop that important terrain feature they found a Japanese antiaircraft gun from which the canvas weather covering had not been removed. This weapon had not been touched by the preassault naval bombard- ment and was still in perfect condition. Had the Japanese antiaircraftmen been alert, they could have created havoc among the 41st Division troops landing on the beaches below Pancake Hill. After the hill was occupied, most of the 3d Battalion pushed up the shores of Hum- boldt Bay, while one company moved over- land north from Pancake Hill. No resistance worthy of mention opposed this two- pronged attack, the objective of which was to surround and seize another dominating terrain feature, Jarremoh Hill. This hill, rising some 1,000 feet, overlooked the sand- spits and the shores of Challenger Cove, a northwesterly arm of Humboldt Bay. On the west shore of the cove was located the town of Hollandia. Hollandia Falls By 1430 the 3d Battalion had cleared Jarremoh Hill and was digging in for the night along a ridge overlooking Hollandia. The battalion commander wanted to push on into the town before dark, but General Fuller, commanding the 41st Division, vetoed this proposal. On the basis of intelli- gence reports which indicated that the Jap- anese were occupying Hollandia in some strength, General Fuller had decided that the seizure of the town would have to wait until the morning of the 23d. During the night naval guns and 105-mm. howitzers of the 146th Field Artillery Battalion — em- placed on firm ground north of White Beach 1 — bombarded Hollandia, softening the 3d Battalion's task for the morrow. In the meantime the 2d Battalion had be- gun advancing from White Beach 1 to the track connecting Hollandia with Pirn, on the western shore of Jautefa Bay. Company E led off on the left at 0756, moving past THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 71 the southwest side of Pancake Hill, while Company G took a route east of the hill. The rest of the battalion soon started out after Company E but found the terrain west of Pancake Hill unexpectedly swampy and rough going for a large body of troops. The battalion commander therefore ordered the units on that side to turn and follow Com- pany G. Company E kept on overland and quickly reached the Pim-Hollandia track at a point about 1,000 yards west of Pan- cake Hill. By midmorning Company G had arrived on the trail north of Company E. The rest of the battalion concentrated on the trail between Companies E and G early in the afternoon. Contact was soon established with the company of the 3d Battalion which had ad- vanced to the Pim-Hollandia road from Pancake Hill earlier in the day. The 2d Bat- talion then moved up the road toward Hol- landia, and by nightfall had joined the 3d on the ridge overlooking the town. Mean- while, the 1st Battalion had assembled as division reserve at the base of Pancake Hill. By dark on the 22d the 162d Infantry had carried its advance to the 41st Division's first phase line. To that time, opposition had been so light that American casualties, in- cluding those of the 186th Infantry, totaled only six men killed and sixteen wounded. As at Tanahmerah Bay, the Japanese had made no effort to man their prepared de- fenses which, though not as extensive as had been expected, could have produced consid- erable trouble for the 41st Division. The di- vision staff was both pleased and worried by the lack of enemy resistance and could make no estimate as to the character of Japanese opposition which might be met on the 23d. Nevertheless, since it was expected that the 162d Infantry would have little trouble in seizing Hollandia, that action was ordered. The 2d and 3d Battalions, 162d Infantry, jumped off at 0730 on the 23d. The units moved rapidly down the ridge to Hollandia and at 1115 reported that they had secured the town. There was no opposition. The 1st Battalion, 162d Infantry, had meanwhile relieved a battalion of the 1 86th Infantry which had been waiting in division reserve west of Pancake Hill. The 2d Bat- talion, 1 62d Infantry, after helping the 3d to secure Hollandia, moved into high ground west and northwest of that town. During the remainder of the attack phase of the Hol- landia operation, the entire 162d Infantry patrolled the hilly environs of Hollandia, securing the northern shores of Humboldt Bay, the beaches of Challenger Cove, and rough hills along the western side of Jautefa Bay. To the 1 86th Infantry fell the task of driving inland to the main objective, the air- fields on the north shore of Lake Sentani. The Drive Inland from Humboldt Bay The Landing of the 186th Infantry LVT's carrying Companies K and L of the 186th Infantry hit White Beach 2 about 0715, ten minutes ahead of schedule, on 22 April.12 Original plans had provided that these LVT assault waves would cross White Beach 2 and the mangrove swamp to its rear and proceed overwater across Jautefa Bay to White Beach 4, located north of Pirn, near the eastern terminus of the main road leading inland to the airfields. But the man- grove swamp proved impassable for the 12 Information in this and the following two sub- sections is based principally on: 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 2-1 1 ; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 9-12; 41st Div G-3 Jnl Hollandia; 186th Inf Jnl Hollandia, 186th Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 1-8; draft MS 2d ESB Hist, Ch. VII, pp. 32-34. 72 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES LVT's. The amphibians withdrew from the beach and, under cover of Support Battery craft of the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, proceeded into Jautefa Bay through the narrow channel between Capes Pie and Tjeweri. At 0810 Company L started moving ashore about 900 yards north of Pim. Com- pany K landed 500 yards farther north about 0825. The remainder of the 3d Bat- talion (less Company I, which was operat- ing on White Beach 3 ) arrived in the White Beach 4 area about 0915. The first objec- tive was Leimok Hill, lying 1,800 yards northwest of Pim. Part of the battalion se- cured the hill by 1000, and other elements advanced southward toward Pim. That vil- lage and its usable jetty were secured, against light opposition, by 1645, while Suiker- brood Hill, on Jautefa Bay south of Pim, was cleared by 1800. The danger that ene- my troops atop dominating heights near Pim might make White Beach 4 untenable was over. The 3d Battalion established a night per- imeter at Pim, extending its defenses along a trail leading west from that village to the point at which the Pim-Hollandia track joined the main road inland to Lake Sen- tani, thus securing the roadhead from which movements to inland objectives had to be- gin. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, which had followed the 162d Infantry ashore on White Beach 1, had proceeded north and west around the mangrove swamp and down the Pim-Hollandia track to Lei- mok Hill. There it relieved the 3d Battalion and established a night defensive perimeter. The 2d Battalion (less two rifle companies) moved into divisional reserve on the Pim- Hollandia track west of Pancake Hill; its remaining two companies stayed afloat un- til D plus 1 . Orders were issued late at night on the 2 2d to the 1 86th Infantry, Col. Oliver P. Newman commanding, to move out the next morning at daybreak. The objective was the inland airfield area and the axis of advance was the Pirn-Lake Sentani road. Back on White Beach 1, the Naval Beach Party and the 5 3 2d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (the Shore Party), aug- mented by the Cannon Companies of the 162d and 186th Infantry Regiments, worked hard to unload all D-Day shipping before dark. Seven LST's were discharged on White Beach 1. Roller conveyors were used for the 375 tons of bulk cargo each LST carried in addition to its mobile load. Cargo and equipment aboard the APA HMAS Westralia was lightered to White Beach 1 or 2 by small craft. Since White Beach 3 was very steep and had no suitable landing spots, most cargo had to be un- loaded on the northern sandspit. That spit was already cluttered with Japanese stores ; it was narrow; and exits to inland dispersal areas were limited. These factors combined to lead to a great deal of congestion. To the Shore of Lake Sentani At 0800 on 23 April the 1st Battalion left its night positions on Leimok Hill and started out over the main track, passing through the 3d Battalion. The movement was supported by the 205th and 218th Field Artillery Bat- talions, set up near Cape Pie, and by aircraft from the carriers of Task Force 58. By 0900 the 1st Battalion had reached Brinkman's Plantation, about 2,200 yards by trail south- west of Pim. So far, there had been no oppo- sition. Now Companies A and C parted from the main body to patrol northwest up the Borgonjie River. Proceeding to a fork about 2,000 yards upstream, the two companies repulsed a series of unco-ordinated attacks THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 73 which were launched against the right flank of the 186th Infantry during the afternoon by a Japanese force estimated at 150. The two companies remained at the stream- branching during the night of 23-24 April, and on the latter day they moved overland southwest to rejoin the main force on the Pirn— Lake Sentani trail. Leaving Companies A and C to guard its right flank, the remainder of the 1st Bat- talion had continued the advance along the main trail against negligible opposition. By noon the battalion had reached the outskirts of a large Japanese dump and storage area about 2,500 yards beyond Brinkman's Plan- tation. The unit halted to await the results of an air strike on suspected enemy positions west of the storage area and for the 3d Bat- talion to close up from the rear. It was hoped that the 186th Infantry could reach the second phase line, Koejaboe and the northeast shores of Lake Sentani, during the afternoon of the 2'3d, but air observers and forward patrols had reported considerable Japanese activity along the trail west of the storage area. Colonel New- man felt that the now understrength 1 st Bat- talion did not have enough men to continue an advance against what might prove to be strong enemy defenses. Moreover, the 3d Battalion's movement from Pirn had been slow and the unit did not reach the Japanese storage area until 1500, when it was neces- sary to halt for the day. General Fuller had ordered that offensive action — other than patrolling — cease each day at 1500 so that defensive positions could be prepared before dark. The forward elements of the 1 86th In- fantry set up their night perimeters at the eastern edge of the Japanese storage area. By 1500 heavy rain had begun to turn spots of the Pim-Lake Sentani road — the best yet found in the Hollandia area — into great mudholes. LVT's had started out over the trail from Pirn to bring supplies forward to the advancing infantry and, if necessary, to provide fire support. But many of the LVT's bogged down in the mud along the road. Supply problems seemed imminent. Colonel Newman suggested to division headquarters that on the 24th the advance be resumed with the 3d Battalion passing through the 1st. The latter was to remain in the storage area until rejoined by Com- panies A and C, after which it would follow the 3d Battalion and protect the right flank of the advance by patrolling along high ground north of the main trail. The 3d Battalion's initial objective was a jetty at the point where the main road first touched the shore of Lake Sentani. This jetty was to be held as a base for future operations. Com- pany I, scheduled to rejoin the 3d Battalion on the 24th, was ordered to take a branch trail to Koejaboe and its jetty, southeast of the first jetty. The 2d Battalion was to re- main in reserve in the Pirn area and along the track west of that village. Permission to carry out Colonel New- man's plan came from 41st Division- head- quarters at 0630 on the 24th, and at 0845 the 3d Battalion moved out. Since Japanese air action during the night of 23-24 April had succeeded in firing the American am- munition and ration dumps on White Beach 1, the advance of the 186th Infantry had to be made on half-rations, and the troops were ordered to conserve ammunition. Luckily, little enemy opposition was en- countered during the morning, and by 1 100 3d Battalion patrols were within 500 yards of the initial objective. Light fire from a force of Japanese, estimated at 150, then temporarily delayed the advance, but the first jetty and its environs were secured shortly after noon. 74 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES It had meanwhile become apparent that the 1st Battalion was too widely dispersed to carry out its assigned support and follow-up roles. Two companies followed along the main track as best they could, but extensive patrolling on the high ground north of the trail proved necessary because small parties of Japanese were continually being discov- ered wandering about on the right flank. While these Japanese parties did not seem aggressive in most cases, Colonel Newman wisely chose to take no chances by leaving his flank unprotected. Companies A and C were again assigned to the arduous patrol- ling task. The 3d Battalion was now far in- land and practically unsupported. General Fuller therefore released the 2d Battalion, until now in division reserve, to Colonel Newman's control. The 2d Battalion pushed rapidly west- ward from Pirn, passed through such ele- ments of the 1st Battalion as were still on the trail, and took up positions on the right of the 3d Battalion late in the afternoon. The two units then set up night perimeters in the vicinity of the jetty. The 3d Battalion was established along a line running 700 yards inland from Lake Sentani and the 2d Bat- talion refused the right flank by extending its lines northeast 500 yards to the right rear. About 1630, Companies A and C rejoined the main body of the 1st Battalion in a night perimeter at the junction of the main Pirn- Lake Sentani road and the track leading to Koejaboe, not yet captured. The 1st Bat- talion's position was about 3,500 swampy yards east of the 2d and 3d Battalions. During the day the 34th Infantry of the 24th Division, Reckless Task Force Re- serve, had been transferred from Tanah- merah Bay to Humboldt Bay. Its arrival had allowed the task force commander to re- lease Company I, 186th Infantry, from White Beach 3 and the 2d Battalion, 186th Infantry, from its reserve role. Amphibious Movement on Lake Sentani Colonel Newman's plans for the 25th en- visaged using his entire regiment in a com- bined amphibious and overland advance to the airfields, a maneuver now possible be- cause the 34th Infantry could free 186th In- fantry units from guard duties along the line of communications back to Pirn. Colonel Newman ordered the 3d Battalion, 186th Infantry, to move west along the main road to Nefaar, six and one half miles beyond the night bivouac area. The 1st Battalion was to load on LVT's at the jetty which had been captured the previous afternoon. From that jetty, the troops were to move by LVT over Lake Sentani to a point on the shore west of Nefaar and, upon landing, help the 1st Bat- talion to secure that village. Two companies of the 2d Battalion were to clear scattered enemy troops from high ground on the right flank, whence the Japanese had harassed the battalion's night bivouac. As soon as this task was accomplished, the 2d Battalion would reassemble as regimental reserve and follow the 3d along the main track toward Nefaar. Company I had not reached the 3d Battalion the previous day and was there- fore ordered to operate with the 1st Bat- talion, at the perimeter of which it had ar- rived just before dark. Company B was lent to the 3d Battalion to bring that unit up to full strength for the advance west. The 3d Battalion started moving at 0800 on the 25th and by 1000 had marched al- most 3,000 yards westward against no oppo- sition. The Japanese who had delayed the advance on the 24th had vanished. Com- pany K, moving to the north of the main THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 75 LVT'S CROSSING LAKE SENTANI. Note Fifth Air Force B-25's overhead. road, flushed the few enemy seen during the morning. LVT's of the 2d Engineer Special Bri- gade had now moved up to the jetty which the 3d Battalion had captured the previous day. There, at 1000, two companies of the 1st Battalion loaded on the amphibians and departed for Nefaar. No Japanese fire from the shores of Lake Sentani greeted this land- locked amphibious maneuver, and at 1150 two companies landed at Nefaar. The re- mainder of the 1st Battalion moved by LVT to Nefaar later in the day and at 1530 the 3d Battalion reached that village after an uneventful march overland. The 2d Bat- talion closed on the village shortly thereafter. Vigorous patrolling north and west of Nefaar characterized action the rest of the afternoon, during which only slight resist- ance was encountered. Expected strong enemy opposition had not as yet material- ized, but before dark a platoon of Company A made a brief reconnaissance of Cyclops Drome, most easterly of the three Japanese fields on the north shore of Lake Sentani, and reported evidences of considerable enemy movement and strong defensive po- sitions. Despite these reports, Colonel New- man was confident that his troops would have little or no difficulty in securing Cy- 76 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES clops Drome on the 26th, for he now be- lieved that the enemy had vacated the airfield area. One of the reasons that the 1 86th Infan- try had not reached the airdromes on the afternoon of 25 April was that artillery fire was falling on those fields. Some of this fire may have been from the 155-mm. weapons of the 11th or 168th Field Artillery Bat- talions, emplaced on the 24th Division's beaches at Tanahmerah Bay, but other ar- tillery fire was undoubtedly from Japanese dual-purpose weapons dug in north of the airfields. Whatever the case, communica- tions difficulties prevented the fire from the 24th Division's area being stopped before the time came for the 1 86th Infantry to set up night defenses. The 1st Battalion biv- ouacked about 1,700 yards west of Nefaar and placed outposts in high ground 700 yards north of the main trail. The 3d Bat- talion went into position about 1 ,000 yards behind the 1st, while the 2d remained at Nefaar for the night. For the morrow, Colonel Newman or- dered the 1st Battalion to seize the north- western half of Cyclops Drome. One com- pany of the 3d was to secure the southeastern part of the field and the remainder of the battalion was to act as general reserve. The 2d Battalion was to move by LVT from Nefaar to another jetty located about 2,000 yards southeast of Sentani Drome and the village of Ifaar. Pushing rapidly up a trail from the jetty to Ifaar, the battalion was to seize that village and Sentani Drome. The 1st and 2d Battalions moved out as planned shortly after 0800 on the 26th. By 1040 the 1st Battalion had secured Cyclops Drome against no opposition. About 1000, Companies F and G of the 2d Battalion landed against scattered rifle fire at the jetty below Ifaar, a mile overwater from Nefaar. The rest of the battalion came ashore in the same area in the early afternoon. Advance elements of the 2d Battalion were on Sentani Drome at 1130, and by 1215 the battalion commander was able to report that the air- field and its environs had been secured. During the remainder of the afternoon patrol action around both airfields ac- counted for a few Japanese stragglers. Op- position throughout the day had been con- spicuous by its absence — the Japanese had disappeared. The 3d Battalion moved up to the airstrips before dark, and at nightfall the entire 1 86th Infantry set up a defensive per- imeter around Cyclops and Sentani Dromes. Patrols of the 1st Battalion were sent west beyond the fields and at 1645 made contact with patrols of the 21st Infantry between Weversdorp and Hollandia Drome. This contact completed the pincers movement in- stituted by the 24th and 41st Divisions on 22 April. All important objectives of the Reckless Task Force had been secured. Mopping-Up Operations Although the contact between the 24th and 4 1 st Divisions ended the major tactical phase of the Hollandia operation, it was necessary to clear the area of scattered en- emy troops, attempt to find large organi- zations of Japanese forces, and cut enemy escape routes.13 With these objectives in view, elements of the 1 86th Infantry recon- noitered the north shores of Lake Sentani, and Poegi and Ase Islands in the lake dur- ing 27 April. These and many later patrols, most of which were transported by 2d En- " This subsection is based principally upon : RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 14; 41st Div Opns Rpt Hol- landia, pp. 11-16; 186th Inf Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 8-12; 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 85- 92, 98-110; draft MS 2d ESB Hist, Ch. VII, pp. 23-24. THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 77 gineer Special Brigade LVT's or amphibian 6x6 trucks (DUKW's), encountered few Japanese in the area covered. Other troops of the 186th Infantry flushed about 400 Japanese on Hill 1000, approximately 4,000 yards northeast of Cyclops Drome. On the 29th, with the help of fire from the 205th Field Artillery Battalion, the 1st Battalion seized the hill, killing or dispersing the en- emy. Thereafter the 186th Infantry pa- trolled into the Cyclops Mountains north and northeast of the airdromes. The 162d Infantry's principal action after clearing the environs of Hollandia was to seize Cape Soeadja, at the northwest limits of Humboldt Bay, on 27 April. The regi- ment continued patrolling in the Hollandia area until 6 May when it was relieved by the 34th Infantry. The latter unit was greatly dispersed. Some elements patrolled around Pirn and along the road inland to support the drive of the 186th Infantry, while the 2d Battalion moved to the Hollekang-Cape Djar area, east of Humboldt Bay. Ultimately, the en- tire 2d Battalion moved to Tami Drome, on the coast six miles east of Hollekang, to protect engineers who were repairing the Tami strip. The battalion later established an outpost at Goya, about five miles inland south of Hollekang, in order to halt Japa- nese movements in that area. The 1st and 3d Battalions furnished guards for supply dumps, working parties at the beaches, truck drivers, and construction personnel for a number of minor projects. The 21st Infantry sent a reinforced com- pany to Marneda, about five miles southwest of Lake Sentani, to establish a patrol base, and another company held a base at Iris Bay, northwest of Tanahmerah Bay, for a short time. | (&re Map 2. )\ The 19th Infantry sent patrols overland to the coast north of the Cyclops Mountains to secure trails run- ning through the mountains to the Depa- pre— Lake Sentani road or the airfields. Other elements of the regiment were trans- ported by 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment boats to Demta Bay, west of Tanahmerah Bay, and maintained an out- post there for some days. Still other units of the 24th Division probed overland from the western end of Lake Sentani to Genjem, a main inland trail junction through which passed many Japanese who were attempting to escape westward from the Hollandia area. The 24th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, later reinforced by Company B, 21st In- fantry, patrolled along the western, south- western, and southern shores of Lake Sentani. By 6 June the mopping-up efforts of the Reckless Task Force had succeeded in clearing all but a few Japanese stragglers from the immediate area of the airfields, Hollandia, Tanahmerah Bay, and Tami.1* Logistic Problems of the RECKLESS Task Force Evening of 26 April found the Reckless Task Force in an excellent position tacti- cally. The principal objective — the inland airfields — had been seized within four days despite radical changes in the original scheme of maneuver. Japanese opposition had been negligible and in much less strength than expected; there was no evi- dence that any large-scale enemy counter- attack could or would be made against the Hollandia area; and land-based air support for the Reckless Task Force was being made available from fields captured at " Details concerning mopping up in the area west of Lake Sentani after 6 June are to be found in Chapter IV below. 78 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Aitape, 125 miles to the southeast. On the other hand, the restricted beaches at Tanah- merah Bay and the poor condition of the Depapre— Lake Sentani road gave no prom- ise that supplies for the 24th Division would be adequate for some time to come. Con- gestion on the beaches at Humbolt Bay, the rapid deterioration of the Pirn-Lake Sentani road, and a disastrous fire on White Beach 1 during the night of 23-24 April made supply of the 41st Division difficult. In brief, the logistic problems of the entire Reckless Task Force had assumed amazing propor- tions. The Fire The units moving ashore at Humboldt Bay on 22 April found Japanese supplies covering White Beaches 1 and 2. Air bomb- ing and naval support fire prior to the landings had scattered these enemy supplies all over the northern sandspit, while smoke and flames issued from much of the materiel as a result of the bombardment. A compli- cated dispersal problem for the supplies of the 41st Division and its attached units was thereby created.15 The 116th Engineer Battalion, ashore shortly after H Hour, immediately set to work clearing White Beach 1 . In accordance with Reckless Task Force plans, the bat- talion endeavored to construct an exit road from the beach to the Pim-Hollandia track, but the terrain north of the beach proved more rugged than anticipated and the swamp northwest of the beach more formid- able than expected. Rapid road building was impossible and the project was tem- porarily abandoned while all efforts were "RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 18-19; GTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, p. 28. turned to unloading D-Day shipping. On D plus 1, more troops, vehicles, and supplies began pouring onto White Beaches 1 and 2. Only slow progress could be made on exit roads, and beach congestion increased. The situation was not helped by the necessity for basing both antiaircraft and field artillery units along the northern sandspit. Some relief was effected during the day as boats of the 532d Engineer Boat and Shore Regi- ment began ferrying a few supplies directly from the transports to Pirn and transferring more there from the two principal unloading beaches.18 Shortly after dark on the night of 23-24 April, a lone Japanese aircraft, apparently guided by still smoldering fires in old Jap- anese dumps, dropped a stick of bombs on White Beach 1 . One of these bombs, landing at the edge of a Japanese ammunition dump below Pancake Hill, started a series of con- flagrations which soon spread to an Amer- ican gasoline dump near by and thence to other Reckless Task Force equipment. Efforts to stop the fires during the night proved fruitless, for intense heat and con- tinuous explosions drove back troops who tried to put out the flames or salvage mate- riel. The fires raged all night and through most of the next day.17 Much confusion resulted from the fires. Shortly before midnight it was rumored at 41st Division headquarters that a Japanese force of unknown strength had landed on White Beach 1 or 2 and possibly on White Beach 4. This erroneous report was relayed to forward units.18 But even after this rumor had been proved false, both the 162d and 16 RTF" Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 18-19, 55. " RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 10, 19; 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 6-7; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay, p. 4. 18 Msg, 41st Div to 186th Inf, 2100, 23 Apr 44, in 186th Inf S-l Jnl Hollandia. THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 79 186th Infantry Regiments were ordered to cease all forward movement, go on half- rations, and make every attempt to conserve ammunition.19 As daylight came and the sit- uation at the beaches became clearer, the 186th Infantry was instructed to continue its advance inland, but was again ordered to issue only half-rations and to continue all efforts to conserve ammunition and other supplies. The 162d Infantry was allowed to execute its plans to seize the town of Hollan- dia but after that was to limit its operations to patrolling and defensive measures until further notice.20 The fire had a far worse effect on the logistical situation than on the tactical. Well over 60 percent of the rations and ammu- nition landed through D plus 1 was burned or blown up during the following two days. The equivalent of eleven LST loads of sup- plies was lost, while twenty-four men were killed and about one hundred wounded or injured as a result of the fires and ex- plosions.21 General Eichelberger immediately radi- oed to Alamo Force a request for duplica- tion of all bulk stores which had been unloaded from LST's at Humboldt Bay on D Day and D plus 1. It was further re- quested that these loadings be sent forward with the first reinforcement convoy, sched- uled to arrive on D plus 8. 22 When these instructions reached the Reckless Task Force's G— 4 liaison groups at the staging areas in eastern New Guinea, ships of the M Msgs, 41st Div to 186th Inf, 0400 and 0545, 24 Apr 44, in 186th Inf S-l Jnl Hollandia. M 41st Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 7. "RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 11, 19; Rad, CTG 77.2 to CTF 77, 23 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 23-24 Apr 44. 72 Rad, RTF to Alamo, 5619, 24 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26 Apr 44; RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 19. D plus 8 convoy were already being loaded not only with supplies but also with service troops. In order that enough materiel might be sent forward to replace the eleven LST loads which had been lost, the troop space was reassigned to supplies. A good deal of confusion was caused in the rear bases by the speed at which decisions had to be made, lack of traffic control at the loading area, absence of ammunition data except for dead- weight tonnage, and incomplete un- derstanding of time and space requirements by those responsible for the new loading plans.23 Some of the paper work for shipping plans, especially for resupply echelons, had apparently not been completed, and the Reckless Task Force Q-A later reported: ". . . the Task Force was extremely handi- capped by the lack of stowage plans and manifests on shipping in the harbor and awaiting call forward. This resulted in the loss of valuable time in unloading urgently needed cargo and the calling forward of most ships was like reaching in a grab bag".24 As a result of inadequate information and the confusion in the staging areas, it was impossible for the G-A Section to ascertain exactly what types and quantities of am- munition arrived with the hurriedly re- loaded D plus 8 replacement ships. It can be assumed, however, that all ammunition losses were adequately replaced at least after D plus 12, by which time the end of Jap- anese resistance in the Hollandia area had eliminated the ammunition problem.25 Even though the ammunition resupply problem had been solved without undue difficulty, it was the opinion of the G-4 that the Reck- 23 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 37, 65-66. 24 Ibid., p. 40. 25 Ibid., pp. 37, 65-66. 80 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES less Task Force had been extremely fortu- nate: "Had the enemy attack from the air been in force, the loss of life and property would have probably delayed the operation for a considerable period of time." 26 But the general congestion at Humboldt Bay was not improved for some time. On D plus 2, with fires still raging on the northern spit, Reckless Task Force headquarters, the task force reserve, and miscellaneous service units, together with their supplies and equipment, arrived from Tanahmerah Bay. In addition, five LST's of the D plus 2 convoy from eastern New Guinea bases hove into view. There were now eleven LST's awaiting unloading in Humboldt Bay, and the best beaches, White 1 and 2, could not be used. Beaches at Hollandia and other points around the shores of Challenger Cove were obstructed by reefs. Extensive demolitions would be necessary before LST's could use that area. White Beach 4, at Pirn, was inaccessible to LST's. The only remain- ing area was White Beach 3 and the shore line to its south along the Cape Tjeweri sandspit. White Beach 3 was ill suited for beaching LST's and there were some objections from Admiral William M. Fechteler's Central Attack Group to Reckless Task Force plans for using that beach. But the admiral realized that many of the available LST's had to be unloaded promptly so that they could be returned on schedule to the Cen- tral Pacific Area, whence they had been borrowed. He also knew that the cargo aboard some LST's was badly needed ashore to replace the supplies destroyed on White Beaches 1 and 2. He therefore decided to use White Beach 3 until White Beaches 1 and 2 were again safe. Admiral Fechteler ordered his LST commander, Capt. Roger 26 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, p. 36. Cutler (USN) , to run the LST's into White Beach 3 from the northern side of Hum- boldt Bay at full speed in order to ram the ships as high as possible on the sandspit. Captain Cutler's LST skippers did such a good job that the Central Attack Group later had considerable difficulty retracting many LST's from the beach.27 Supplies and equipment unloaded at White Beach 3 were transferred by small craft to Pirn, where, since very limited dis- persal areas were available, a bottleneck soon formed. The road inland from Pirn, barely passable for wheeled vehicles on D Day, was rapidly deteriorating under con- tinuous heavy trucking and rain. Finally, demands for the use of lighterage between White Beach 3 and Pirn far exceeded the available supply of small craft. Some addi- tional complications arose from disagree- ments between naval and engineer special brigade units regarding the employment of small boats. Luckily, ample manual labor was available, especially after the arrival of the 34th Infantry and various service units from Tanahmerah Bay. LST's were un- loaded rapidly at White Beach 3, and work around the clock kept the unloading areas at Pirn clear enough for steady use of the limited beach and small jetty there. White Beaches 1 and 2 were usable again on D plus S.28 By the morning of 25 April an inventory of supplies could be taken. With the supplies and ammunition landed from the D plus 2 convoy and those transferred from Ta- nahmerah Bay, the situation appeared brighter. During the afternoon General 21 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20; Ltr, Adra Fechteler to Gen Ward, 8 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH files. " RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay— Humboldt Bay— Aitape, pp. 28-29; CTG 77.2 Opns Rpt Humboldt Bay, p. 4. THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 81 Eichelberger was able to report to Alamo Force that three and one half units of fire for all weapons were on hand and that enough rations were available to feed all troops for six days.29 Supplying Forces Inland The problem of supplying the troops on the Lake Sentani plain did not end with the seizure of the airfields on 26 April. For some time thereafter the 24th Division continued to receive some of its supplies by laborious hand-carry from Tanahmerah Bay, but this relatively inefficient method did not get ade- quate quantities of food forward. The di- vision's inland troops were on half-rations much of the time. Despite continuous work by engineers, the 41st Division's main sup- ply line — the Pirn— Lake Sentani road — could not stand the demands made upon it, and from time to time sections of the road had to be closed so that heavy equipment could make repairs on it. Early half-successful airdrops had added little to the supplies of the troops inland, but air supply was the only feasible method of supporting the inland forces. Cyclops Drome was ready for limited employment on 27 April, and Hollandia Drome could be used by 1 May. But the mere availability of these fields did not solve the supply problem. First, weather prevented regular air supply runs for a while and, second, it was initially some- what difficult to assemble the needed sup- plies at rear bases, from which supplies were already on their way forward to Hollandia by water or were being loaded aboard ship for water transportation. Neither time nor planes were available to carry out a program "Rad, RTF to Alamo, 0304, 25 Apr 44, and Rad, RTF to Alamo, 2050, 25 Apr 44, both in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26 Apr 44. of unloading the ships, reloading their car- goes on aircraft, and flying the supplies to the Hollandia fields. This difficulty was overcome in part by the seizure of Tami Drome, on the coast six miles east of Hum- boldt Bay. Tami Drome was ready for use by trans- port aircraft on 3 May. From unloading points at Humboldt Bay, small craft light- ered supplies to the mouth of the Tami River, whence trucks hauled the materiel to Tami Drome. From that field CM-7 aircraft shuttled supplies to Cyclops and Hollandia Dromes, probably executing one of the short- est field-to-field air supply missions on record.30 But these efforts at local air supply proved inadequate, and with no marked improve- ment of road conditions the supply situa- tion for troops inland deteriorated rapidly. The 186th Infantry, for instance, subsisted for three or four days principally on rice and canned fish from captured Japanese ration dumps.31 The 24th Division was in like straits. Finally, all local measures became insufficient to meet the needs of the inland infantry units, to say nothing of the thou- sands of engineer troops who began pouring into the airfield area on 27 April. Conse- quently, on 4 May, the Reckless Task Force requested that 20,000 rations be flown daily to the Hollandia airfields from eastern New Guinea Services of Supply bases. This particular phase of the air trans- port was begun immediately and ceased 80 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 14, 19-20; Alamo Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp. 48- 51; 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 88-89, 153- 54. 31 This information on the 186th Infantry was sup- plied to the author by Colonel Newman, ex-com- manding officer of the 186th Infantry, who read and made notes on this and other draft chapters of the volume during March 1950. These notes are here- after cited as Newman Notes. Copy in OCMH files. 82 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES about 15 May, by which time local over- land transportation had greatly improved. Many expedifents were employed to get the roads into shape both for supply move- ments and to send inland the heavy engi- neering equipment that was needed to repair the three airfields. To avoid some of the worst stretches of the Pirn-Lake Sentani road, especially those along the north shore of the lake, overwater movements were exe- cuted. Small boats and amphibian vehicles were laboriously hauled to Koejaboe (cap- tured on 25 April) from Humboldt Bay, and from the Koejaboe jetty supplies and equipment were transported across the lake to Nefaar. Meanwhile, engineers kept up steady work on the road inland from Pirn. Landslides, mud, and lack of heavy equip- ment hindered rapid reconstruction of the Depapre— Lake Sentani road, over which few attempts were made to move supplies after 26 April.32 In order to organize and control supply activities, the Reckless Task Force set up supply "Sub-Sectors" at Tami Drome, Cape Pie, Cape Tjeweri, and Pirn. The officers in charge of each Sub-Sector were made re- sponsible for clearing the beaches, making the most efficient use of available lighterage, speeding the flow of supplies inland, and controlling local troop movements. This de- centralization of responsibility from the task force G-A relieved that section of burden- some detail work and operating functions, permitting it to revert to the normal role of planning, overseeing, and co-ordinating. As time passed, roads were repaired or new 32 RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 19-20. It is the author's remembrance that the good road which was finally built from the airfields to Tanahmerah Bay was completed in July 1944. This road, an impres- sive engineering feat, led to Seventh Fleet fuel in- stallations at Tanahmerah Bay, where PT boats were based. ones constructed, air supply became auto- matic, shipping difficulties were straightened out, and the supply situation gradually improved.33 Although the terrain and the unlucky bomb hit on White Beach 1 did much to complicate the supply problems of the Reckless Task Force, other explanations for the difficulties are to be found in the task force G^i Section's reports: "Operation 'G' [Hollandia] was a logistical nightmare due primarily to the fact that too much was thrown too soon into too small an area. Under the circumstances, it is felt that the Operation progressed far more smoothly than should be reasonably expected." 34 And again: "Operation G almost com- pletely 'bogged down' due to the fact that in both objective areas [Tanahmerah and Humboldt Bays] many more vehicles, pieces of heavy equipment, and supplies were landed on the first three days than could be cleared from the beaches." 35 What might have happened at Hollandia had the Japa- nese been prepared can only be surmised. The End of the Operation The Reckless Task Force retained con- trol over supply and construction in the Hollandia area until 6 June. During this period the task force, under the direction of Alamo Force, initiated that construction which ultimately resulted in the develop- ment of Hollandia into a major base from which many future operations were sup- ported. The Reckless Task Force paid particular attention to airdromes, roads, docks, headquarters buildings, and dis- persal areas. On 6 June the Services of " RTF Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 20, 39. "Ibid., p. 41. 35 Ibid., p. 36. THE HOLLANDIA OPERATION 83 Supply assumed responsibility for the con- tinuation of this development.36 At Hol- landia the Services of Supply established Base G, under which construction was speeded. Major headquarters that ulti- mately moved to Hollandia included Gen- eral Headquarters of the Southwest Pacific Area, United States Army Forces in the Far East, Allied Air Forces, Allied Land Forces, the U. S. Seventh Fleet, the Fifth Air Force, Alamo Force (Sixth Army), and the U. S. Eighth Army. After 6 June patrolling in the area con- tinued, much of it by the 24th Division, which was later succeeded by other units. By the 6th, American casualties amounted to 124 men killed, 1,057 wounded, and 28 missing. During the same period, 611 Jap- anese were captured and over 3,300 killed. Alamo Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, p. 54-. Most of the Japanese losses occurred after 26 April (the day the airfields were cap- tured) during mopping up, and the bulk of the enemy were killed in small groups. The pace of the mopping-up operations is illustrated by the fact that 800 Japanese were killed during the week ending 6 June. In exchange for each American killed or wounded, to 6 June, the enemy lost four men. For this price, the Allies secured a for- ward area which lay in the heart of territory previously held by the Japanese. The Hol- landia area was to prove an excellent air, naval, and logistic base from which future operations in western New Guinea were to be staged and protected, and from which a large part of the force which invaded the Philippines in October 1944 set sail.87 " Alamo Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, pp. 31, 58; Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43,31 May 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. CHAPTER IV The Japanese: Pearl Harbor Through Hollandia To the Allies the Hollandia operation had proved an unexpectedly easy tactical suc- cess, since the Japanese had been strangely ill prepared to defend adequately this po- tentially powerful base. General MacArthur had sent one and two-thirds reinforced divi- sions against Hollandia on the assumption that 14,000 Japanese, including nearly two regiments of infantry, would be found there.1 But no strong Japanese resistance and little co-ordinated defense had been en- countered there.2 It appears that about 1 1,000 Japanese of all services were at Hol- landia on 22 April and that ground combat elements were represented by no more than 500 antiaircraft artillerymen.3 1 Memo, GHQ SWPA, no addressee, 1 Mar 44, sub: Considerations Affecting the Plan to Seize Humboldt Bay Area with Strong Support of Car- riers, in Alamo G-3 Tnl Hollandia, 2-14 Mar 44; see also above JCh. II. Just prior to D Day, new G-2 estimates raised the total to 15,000 Japanese, but lowered combat strength to 1,000. GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 755, 16 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 16 Apr 44. This revised estimate was made too late to affect Allied plans. 2 At first, when no fighting took place at the beachheads, General .MacArthur's G-2 considered it probable that the Japanese had withdrawn inland to make a final, determined stand around the air- fields. GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI 764, 25 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Apr 44. 3 Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 44, 7 Jun 44, copy in G-2 DofA files; 18th Army Opns, III, 41-48; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 48-51. The Alamo source states that 8,981 Japanese There are many reasons for Japanese un- preparedness at Hollandia. First, the Japa- nese had been caught by surprise, tactically speaking. Second, there had been sweeping changes in their command structure at Hol- landia just before 22 April. Third, not enough combat equipment was available at Hollandia even to arm properly the thou- sands of service troops who were there. Finally, and most important, time had worked against the Japanese in the case of Hollandia just as time had worked against them throughout the Pacific since their first successes in late 1941 and early 1942. Strategy and Dispositions to April 1944 The Japanese Situation to Mid-1943 The Japanese entered World War II with limited objectives in mind, having no plan were at Hollandia on 22 April. The 18th Army cita- tion provides two figures: the first, as of ten days prior to the Allied landings, gives a total of 14,700; while the second, for which no specific date is given, sets figures of 10,000 Japanese Army troops and 1,000 Japanese Navy troops. In the light of other estimates, the first 18th Army figure is believed to overlook the number of Japanese Army Air Force pilots and ground crewmen evacuated from Hollan- dia during April before the Allied landings and, ap- parently, makes no allowance for casualties resulting from Allied air action before 22 April. The 2d Area Army monograph states that approximately 10,000 Japanese were at Hollandia on D Day. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 85 to press home their attacks or to meet and defeat the main body of the forces opposing them. Initially, they intended only to knock out the U. S. Pacific Fleet, to seize Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, to occupy the Philippine Islands, and to gain control over a defensive perimeter reaching south- westward from the Kuriles (north of Japan) through Wake Island, the Marianas, the Carolines, and the Marshalls, to Rabaul. After attaining these objectives, the Japa- nese expected ultimately to obtain from the United States and Britain a negotiated peace which would leave Japan in possession of a "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." Quickly, in late 1941 and early 1942, the Japanese seized their initial perimeter and brought under military control most of the contemplated Greater East Asia Co-Pros- perity Sphere except for southern China. But no negotiated peace was forthcoming. On the contrary, the United States and Britain gave every indication that they would mount counteroffensives long before the Japanese anticipated such action. The United States began to develop a line of communications to Australia and to rein- force that continent as a base for future operations.4 4 Interrog of Fit Adm Osamu Nagano [Chief of the Navy Section, Imperial GHQ, and Supreme Naval Adviser to the Emperor], 30 Nov 45, in United States Strategic Bombing Survey [USSBS], Interrog 498, copy in OCMH files; USSBS, Sum- mary Report [Pacific War] (Washington, 1946) p. 2. In addition to the specific documents cited in this chapter, the author was furnished additional infor- mation by Mr. Clarke Kawakami, research assistant to Commodore Richard W. Bates (USN), of the Naval War College, Mr. Kawakami's remarks on the original draft of this chapter were based on re- search into Japanese sources and on interviews with high-ranking Japanese Army and Navy officers un- dertaken while he was a member of the G— 2 Histor- ical Section of GHQ FEC in Tokyo. Returning to plans considered but not approved prior to the war,5 Japanese Im- perial General Headquarters, early in 1942, developed in a piecemeal fashion plans to expand the perimeter already seized. Dis- carding as impossible of execution a Navy plan to take Australia, Imperial General Headquarters determined to cut the line of communications from the United States to Australia by occupying New Caledonia, the Fiji Islands, and Samoa. Flank protection for the new perimeter was to be obtained on the south by seizing Port Moresby, in southeastern New Guinea, and on the north by securing bases in the American Aleutian Islands. The Japanese hoped that the United States would wear itself out in at- tacks against the new perimeter, find itself unable to mount stronger counteroffensives, and thus afford Japan better opportunity to secure a negotiated peace.0 During the spring and summer of 1942 the initial Japanese attempts to expand the perimeter met with disaster during the Battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. Un- daunted, the Japanese expanded southward from Rabaul down the chain of Solomon Islands to seize air bases in preparation for the advance to Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa. At the same time they attempted to capture Port Moresby by overland action. American landings at Guadalcanal in the 8 As outlined in Combined Fleet Top Secret Opn Order 1, 5 Nov 41, translation in Joint Congressional Investigation Committee, Pearl Harbor Attack (Washington, 1946), Pt. XIII, Exhibit 8, pp. 431- 84. "Japanese Studies in WW II, 72, Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 45-46, 50-54, copy of translation in OCMH files; Kawakami Comments. The plan to move into the Solomons and eastern New Guinea, including Fort Moresby, was developed in late January 1942; the plan to move into Fiji, New Caledonia, and Samoa, in late April; and the plan to seize bases in the Aleutians not until late May or early June. 86 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Solomons during August stopped the Japa- nese expansion to the southeast, and Aus- tralian troops threw the enemy back from Port Moresby later in the year. The Japanese realized by September 1942 that they had overreached themselves and directed their energies to strengthening their forces in eastern New Guinea, the Solomons, and the Bismarck Archipelago.7 To control operations in these areas, the Japanese, in November 1 942, established at Rabaul the headquarters of the 8th Area Army. Under this headquarters was placed the 17 th Army, already operating in the Solomons and eastern New Guinea, and the 1 8th Army, which was set up at Rabaul in November to take over control of opera- tions in eastern New Guinea. About the same time the 6th Air Division was organ- ized, placed under the 8th Area Army's con- trol, and sent to New Guinea. The 17th Army failed in attempts to retake Guadal- canal, while in eastern New Guinea the 18th Army fared no better in trying to maintain its hold on the north coast of Papua at Buna and Gona. The two campaigns made heavy inroads into Japanese ground, air, and naval strength. Imperial General Headquarters paused to take stock.8 At the close of 1942 Imperial General Headquarters estimated that the Allies in- tended to conduct a two-pronged drive toward Rabaul (then the principal Japa- nese forward base in the Southwest Pacific Area) from eastern New Guinea and the Solomons. The Japanese expected that the Allies would then move up the northern coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines 7 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 50-66. ' Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 68- 74; MID WD, Disposition and Movement of Jap- anese Ground Forces, 1941—45, copy in OCMH files; Japanese Studies in WW II, 38, Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 2—4, copy in OGMH files. and, possibly, conduct another advance to- ward the Philippines from northwestern Australia through the Netherlands East Indies. Recognizing that the initiative had been lost, and faced with a lack of shipping and diminishing air and naval power, Im- perial General Headquarters decided upon a strategic withdrawal in order to build up defenses against the expected Allied drives and to prepare bases from which future offensives might be launched. Accordingly, on 4 January 1943, Japan set up a strategic defensive line running through the southern Indies to W ewak, on the northeastern coast of New Guinea be- tween Hollandia and the Buna— Gona area. From Wewak the line ran southeastward to Lae and Salamaua, whence it jumped to the south coast of New Britain, up to Rabaul, and south along the Solomons to New Georgia. To the north the line ran through the Gilbert Islands, the Marianas, W ake, and the Aleutians. The 1 7th Army now began building new defenses in the northern Solomons, with- drawing from Guadalcanal. Lt. Gen. Ha- tazo Adachi, commanding the 18th Army, moved his headquarters from Rabaul to Lae in March and prepared to defend what was left of eastern New Guinea. To strengthen this area the 41st Division was moved from China to eastern New Guinea during the same month. About the same time the bulk of the 51st Division, some of which was already in New Guinea, began shuttling to the Lae area from New Britain. Large-scale attempts to reinforce the 18th Army ended in early March after the Battle of the Bis- marck Sea, during which the / 1 5th Infantry of the 5/5/ Division was practically wiped out when the convoy carrying it from New Britain to Lae fell prey to Allied air action. The 20th Division, already in eastern New THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 87 Guinea, was placed under General Adachi's command in April." Operations in the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies since the beginning of the war had been under the control of the Southern Army,10 subordinate to which were the 14th Army in the Philippines and the 16th Army in the Indies. On 7 January the 19th Army was set up under the Southern Army to relieve the 16th Army of responsi- bility for Timor, the islands of the Arafura Sea, Dutch New Guinea, Ceram, Ambon, Halmahera, and Morotai. The 48th Divi- sion, in the Indies since early 1942, and the newly arrived 5th Division were placed under the 19th Army, which established its command post at Ambon. Troops and sup- plies destined for the 19th Army passed through the Philippines, while the Palau Islands, already in use to some extent for such purposes, assumed new importance as a staging area through which men and equipment going to the 8th Area Army passed. Initially the boundary between the 19th and 18th Armies (and therefore be- tween the Southern and 8th Area Armies) was the Dutch-Australian international border across central New Guinea. But in April 1943 this boundary was changed to 1 40 degrees east longitude in order to place Hollandia within the 8th Area Army's zone of responsibility.11 9 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 70- 78; MID WD, op, cit.; Japanese Studies in WW II, 37, Hist of 8th Area Army, 1942^-5, copy in OGMH files; Japanese Studies in WW II, 41, 18th Army Opns, I, 87-97, copy in OCMH files. General Adachi went to New Guinea twice in March, but his headquarters was not permanently established at Lae until April. 16 Some translations render Southern Army as Southern Area Army. 11 Hist of 8th Area Army, p. 1 1 ; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 4—6; Japanese Studies in WW II, 21, Hist of Southern Area Army, 1941-45, pp. 29-35, copy in OCMH files. The 15th Army, in Burma, Japanese Strategic Withdrawals ■to April 1944 Slow but steady Allied progress in eastern New Guinea and the Solomons during the spring and summer of 1943 prompted Im- perial General Headquarters to send air re- inforcements to the 8th Area Army, The 7th Air Division, organized in January 1943 for operations in the Netherlands East Indies, was transferred to the command of the 8th Area Army in late May or early June and began sending planes to eastern New Guinea in June. To co-ordinate the opera- tions of the 6th and 7th Air Divisions, the headquarters of the 4th Air Army was set up at Rabaul under the 8th Area Army. The 6th Air Division was to concentrate its strength at Rabaul, the Admiralty Islands, Wewak, and Hansa Bay, east of Wewak. The 7th Air Division was to develop rear area bases immediately west of Wewak and also at Aitape and Hollandia.12 In September 1943 the pace of Allied operations in eastern New Guinea was ac- celerated and it appeared to the Japanese that an invasion of New Britain was prob- able. Unable to think of any feasible way to reinforce the area in the face of increasing Allied air and naval action, Imperial Gen- eral Headquarters decided upon another strategic withdrawal. Having already lost the Aleutians, Japan established a new strategic main line of resistance along the line southern Indies, Dutch New Guinea, the Carolines, and the Marianas, back to the Kuriles. The former all-important east- ern New Guinea-Bismarck Archipelago- northern Solomons area was relegated to the status of a holding front, while behind and the 25th Army, at Singapore, were also under the Southern Army. 12 Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 13-18; Hist of 8th Area Army, pp. 15-31. 88 TH the new defensive line ground strength was to be rebuilt and new air and naval power was to be mustered. By the spring of 1944 the rebuilding was to be so complete that offensive operations, including a naval showdown, could be resumed in mid- summer.13 Rabaul remained the center of the hold- ing front area while Hansa Bay, previously the main port of entry for large ships taking supplies and troops to the 8th Area Army, became a small-boat base. Hollandia took the place of Hansa Bay as the principal un- loading point and was to be developed into a major base from which the mid- 1944 offensives might be supported. The distri- bution point for the eastern Indies and Dutch New Guinea became Halmahera, while Manokwari, on the Vogelkop Penin- sula of western New Guinea, became the main supply base for western New Guinea. Other air and supply bases were to be de- veloped at Sorong, at the western tip of the Vogelkop, and on the islands in Geelvink Bay. The Palaus retained their status as a staging area for men and supplies moving southeastward toward New Guinea.14 In October and November 1943 Allied forces of the South Pacific Area drove up the chain of Solomon Islands to Bougain- ville, new stronghold of the 17th Army; Central Pacific Area forces invaded the Gilberts ; and Southwest Pacific Area troops trapped part of the 18th Army on the Huon Peninsula of eastern New Guinea. The Jap- anese Navy sent the bulk of its carrier-based air strength to Rabaul in a vain attempt to 13 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 84- 96 ; Japanese Studies in WW II, 50, Southeast Area Naval Opns, III, 2-5, copy in OCMH files. 11 Southeast Area Naval Opns, III, 4; Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, p. 92 ; Hist of South- ern Area Army, pp. 44-47; Japanese Studies in WW II, 42, 18th Army Opns, II, 134, copy in OCMH files. APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES stem the tide of Allied advance, but this move ended in disaster for practically all of the Japanese Navy's carrier-based air- craft. Coupled with concurrent losses of cruisers, the decimation of the carrier-based air power resulted in the temporary im- mobilization of the Japanese Fleet.10 Imperial General Headquarters now gave up hope of long holding the eastern New Guinea-Solomons-Bismarck Archipelago area and became perturbed about the open- ing of a new Allied front in the Central Pa- cific, presaged by the invasion of the Gil- berts. Imperial General Headquarters was again worried lest the Allies mount an offen- sive toward the Philippines from northwest- ern Australia, and it still firmly believed that a drive northwest up the north coast of New Guinea was to be undertaken by the forces under General Mac Arthur's command. To strengthen the eastern Indies and western New Guinea, plans were made to send the 3d, 36th, and 46th Divisions to that area from China or Japan. To control future operations in the region, the Headquarters, 2d Area Army, was dispatched from Man- churia to Davao, Mindanao, in the Philip- pines, where it arrived during late Novem- ber 1943. Sent south with Lt. Gen. Korechi- ka Anami's 2d Area Army headquarters was the headquarters of the 2d Army, under Lt. Gen. Fusataro Teshima, who established his command post at Manokwari on the "Southeast Area Naval Opns III, 5; GHQ SWPA, G-3 Hist Div, Chronology of the War in the SWPA, 1941-45, copy in OCMH files; Tabular Rec- ords of Daily Movements of Japanese Battleships, Carriers, and Cruisers, in WW II Seized Enemy Records, Record Group 242, Doc 11792, National Archives; Vols. Ill and IV of Aircraft Carriers, part of a series of "Greater East Asia War Campaigns : Materials for Investigation of Meritorious Service," in WW II Seized Enemy Records, Rec Grp 242, Docs 12552 and 12060, respectively. Last two as translated and analyzed by Mr. Thomas G. Wilds, Pacific Section, OCMH. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 89 Vogelkop Peninsula. The 2d Army and the 19 th Army were both placed under the con- trol of the 2d Ar°.a Army which, in turn, was directly under Imperial General Headquar- ters. The 2d Area Army was to hold the area from 140 degrees east longitude, west to Macassar Strait and south from 5 degrees north latitude. Hollandia remained within the 8 th Area Army's zone of responsibility.16 The 36th Division began arriving at Sarmi, 125 miles west-northwest of Hol- landia, in December 1943, while one regi- ment, the 222d Infantry, reached Biak Is- land in Geelvink Bay the same month. Remnants of the 46th Division, most of which was sunk in transit by Allied sub- marines, arrived in the Lesser Soendas about the same time. Because of developments in central China, the 3d Division was left in that country. Initially, the 14th Division was substituted for the 3d, but neither did it ever reach New Guinea. The 36th Division passed to the control of the 2d Army, and the 46th was placed under command of the 19th Army. The 7th Air Division, which had hardly started moving toward eastern New Guinea, was taken from the control of the 8th Area Army and reassigned to the 2d Area Army. The air division headquarters was set up at Ambon in November, and shortly thereafter the few planes remaining among those previously sent to eastern New Guinea went to Ambon.17 Finally, to " Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 9-1 3 ; 2d Area Army Opn Plan A-l, 23 Nov 43, as cited in Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 14-2 1 ; Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 45-47; Hist of Army Section, Imperial CHQ, pp. 94—96 ; Kawakami Comments. Lt. Gen. Kenzo Kitano, the 19th Army's commander, commanded the 4th Division in the Philippines in 1942. This di- vision spearheaded the final Japanese drive which resulted in the American surrender at Bataan and Corregidor. See Morton, The Fall of the Philippines. 17 Japanese Studies in WW II, 32, 2d Army Opns in the Western New Guinea Area, pp. 1-2, copy in strengthen the front against the threat of Allied advance across the central Pacific, Imperial General Headquarters dispatched the 52d Division to the Carolines. There it and other Japanese Army units either al- ready in the Central Pacific or on their way to that area passed to the operational control of the Combined Fleet.18 During the last months of 1943 and the opening months of 1944 Allied offensive moves continued at an ever-increasing rate. In the Southwest Pacific the entire Huon Peninsula area was cleared of Japanese troops, and a foothold was seized in western New Britain. In the South Pacific the Jap- anese could not stem the Allied advance in the northern Solomons, and the Allies moved on to seize an airfield site on Green Island, east of Rabaul and within easy fighter range of that base. The final steps in the isolation of Rabaul were the seizure of the Admiralty Islands by Allied forces of the Southwest Pacific Area in February and March 1 944, and the capture of Emirau Island by South Pacific Area troops in March. In the Central Pacific events moved just as rapidly. In January and February Allied forces advanced into the Marshall Islands, while carrier-based aircraft of the U. S. Pacific Fleet struck heavily at Truk, previously the Combined Fleet's strongest advance base.10 OCMH files; Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 44- 57; Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 25-29; Interrog of Col Rinsuke Kaneko ( JAAF), 21 Nov 45, in USSBS [Pacific], Naval Analysis Division, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, 2 vols. (Washington, 1946, OPNAV-P-03-100), II, 404-08; 2d Area Army Opn Order, no number, 28 Nov 43, as translated in GHQ SWPA, ATIS Current Translation 131, 31 Jul 44; Kawakami Comments. 18 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ., p. 93; Japanese Studies in WW II, 55, Central Pacific Opns, pp. 17-18, copy in OCMH files. 10 GHQ SWPA, G-3 Hist Div, Chronology of the War in the SWPA. 90 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES The Japanese high command was again forced to issue withdrawal orders and to make attempts to strengthen forward area positions. The Allied advances in eastern New Guinea prompted the 8th Area Army to order the 18th Army to retreat to Ma- dang. On 8 January 1944 General Adachi moved his 18th Army headquarters by sub- marine from Sio, on the Huon Peninsula, to Madang, only eight days before Aus- tralian troops seized Sio. Shortly after that narrow escape, the command post was moved still farther westward to Wewak.20 About 10 February the Combined Fleet, recognizing that the establishment of Allied air bases on the Admiralties and Marshalls would bring all the Carolines within range of Allied bombers, decided that the Truk fleet base was no longer tenable. The opinion was forcibly strengthened by the Pacific Fleet carrier strike on Truk later in the month, and Combined Fleet headquarters was moved to the Palaus. About the same time, the Japanese Navy abandoned all hope of conducting successful operations in the Bismarck Archipelago-northern Solo- mons area and withdrew the last remnants of its air power from Rabaul.21 More drastic redispositions and new changes in command structure were effected by both the Japanese Army and Navy in March and early April 1944. The Combined Fleet had no intention of making the Palaus a permanent base but planned to use the base only as a temporary advanced anchor- age until new base facilities in the Philip- S0Hist of 8th Area Army, p. 46; MID WD, op. cit.; Interrog of Gapt Shigeru Iwaki, 21 Feb 46, in GHQ SCAP, ATIS Doc 14924-A, copy in OCMH files. 21 Southeast Area Naval Opns, III, 2-9; Interrog of Comdr Chikataka Nakajima [staff of CinC, Com- bined Fleet], 22 Nov 45, in USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 432-35. pines could be developed. The ultimate withdrawal of Combined Fleet headquar- ters and surface units from the Palaus was speeded by the carrier raids of the U. S. Fifth Fleet on those islands at the end of March, when the American carriers were providing strategic support for the Hol- landia operation. The Japanese Navy, as a result of these carrier raids and, later, the threat of Allied land-based bomber attacks on the Palaus from Hollandia, ceased to be much interested in the Palaus. But Imperial General Headquarters, in March, was still determined to strengthen the central Pacific. Accordingly, early that month, the headquarters of the 3 1st Army, Maj. Gen. Hideyoshi Obata commanding, was set up on Guam in the Marianas to ex- ercise command under direction of the Combined Fleet of all Japanese Army units in the Central Pacific islands. The 29th Division was sent out to the Marianas in March also, and plans were made to send the 43d Division to the same islands.22 The portion of the strategic main line of resistance for which the 31st Army was responsible extended along the line Bonins— Volcanos- Marianas- Ponape-Truk-Wo- leai-Yap-Palaus. At the Palaus the line tied into the 2d Area Army's zone of responsi- bility. So far, the Palaus had been little more than a staging area, and few combat troops were on the islands. In March, line of com- munications troops, replacements, and rear echelons of various 8th Area Army units in the Palaus passed with their commander, Maj. Gen. Takeo Yamaguchi, to the control 23 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ,, p. 93; Central Pacific Opns, pp. 17-18; MID WD, Order of Battle of the Japanese Armed Forces, 1 Mar 45, pp. 72, 100. The 43d Division's convoy suffered heavy losses on the trip to the Marianas, but the remnants of the division arrived in the islands in May. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLAND IA 91 of the 2d Area Army. More wide-sweeping changes were due in the Palaus, for by March Imperial General Headquarters was worried lest the Palaus were to become an immediate target of Allied invasion. It was therefore decided to send strong reinforce- ments to the Palaus, and the 14th Division was scheduled for shipment to the islands from northern China. The 35th Division was promised to the 2d Area Army in place of the 14th, but, since it would be some time before the 14th Division could reach the Palaus, the 219th Infantry (less one battal- ion, but with a battalion of artillery at- tached) of the 35th Division was sent on to the Palaus, where it landed during March. The remainder of the 35th Division pro- ceeded to Halmahera and western New Guinea via the Philippines, delayed as a result of Allied submarine attacks on the convoy carrying it southward. The U. S. Fifth Fleet's carrier raid on the Palaus at the end of March apparently prompted Imperial General Headquarters to expect an invasion of the Palaus in the near future. Obviously, the understrength regimental combat team of the 35th Divi- sion could not hold those islands, and there- fore efforts were made to speed the shipment of the 14th Division. Destined originally for western New Guinea and even later for the Marianas, the 14th Division finally set sail for the Palaus early in April, reaching those islands safely on the 24th of the month, just two days after the Allied landings at Hol- landia. During the ensuing weeks the ele- ments of the 35th Division already in the Palaus left to rejoin their parent unit in western New Guinea. Lt. Gen. Sadae Inoue, commanding the 14th Division, was ap- pointed Commander, Palau Sector Group, in which capacity his area of responsibility included Yap in the Carolines, as well as the Palaus. General Yamaguchi's staging area forces already in the Palaus passed to Gen- eral Inoue's command, probably about the same time that the 14th Division arrived in the islands.23 Equally radical changes had been made to the south. Recognizing that the 8th Area Army and the 17th Army were irretrievably cut off, Imperial General Headquarters, on 14 March 1944, wrote them off as a loss, or- dering them to hold out as best they could. About the same time the 18th Army and the 4th Air Army were transferred to the juris- diction of the 2d Area Army, for it was evi- dent that the 8th Area Army's headquarters at Rabaul could no longer exercise effective control over the two units. The boundary between the 2d and 8th Area Armies was moved eastward to 147 degrees east longi- tude (the Admiralties, however, remained under the 8th Area Army). The 18th Army, then reorganizing at Madang, was brought well within the 2d Area Army's zone, as were the Japanese bases at Hansa Bay, Wewak, Aitape, and Hollandia. Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 2d Area Army to hold all the territory west of Wewak within its zone and to pull the 18th Army west from Madang to We- wak, Aitape, and Hollandia. The 2d Area Army was also instructed to develop Hol- landia into a major supply base, but neither this development nor the 18th Arm// "s with- drawal was to interfere with more important defense preparations in western Nfcw Guinea and the islands between the Vogelkop Peninsula and the Philippines. Given this leeway, the 2d Area Army decided to con- centrate its efforts in strengthening a stra- 23 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ, pp. 87- 93, 109, 121-23; Central Pacific Opns, pp. 17-18; Japanese Studies in WW II, 56, The Palau Opns, pp. 4-5, 45-47, 57-61, copy in OGMH files ; Kawa- kami Comments, 92 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES tegic defensive front along the line from the Lesser Soendas through the Aroe Islands in the Arafura Sea, north to Mimika on the southwest coast of Dutch New Guinea, and thence to the Wakde-Sarmi area, 1 25 miles northwest of Hollandia. Although this de- cision would obviously leave the 18th Army out in the cold insofar as supplies or rein- forcements were concerned, Imperial Gen- eral Headquarters approved the 2d Area Army's plan without recorded comment.24 To strengthen the 2d Area Army, the 32 d and 35th Divisions had already been dis- patched toward western New Guinea and Halmahera, where they began arriving in late April. Air redispositions also took place. The 4th Air Army headquarters and the 6th Air Division moved from Wewak to Hollandia in March (both had moved from Rabaul to Wewak in late 1943). Though reinforced, the 6th Air Division was prac- tically wiped out by Allied air attacks during March and April,25 but its headquarters remained at Hollandia. Defensive planning of the 4th Air Army and the 2d Area Army was thrown askew by the aircraft losses at Hollandia, and the Japanese had to decide whether they could again afford to risk a large number of planes as far forward as Hollandia, or whether remaining air power should be reconcen- trated farther westward. Since the 2d Area Army had already decided to establish its main defensive line west of Hollandia, the decision was obvious — no more large num- bers of aircraft were to be sent to Hollandia. The 4th Air Army's headquarters moved 24 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ,, pp. 107— 1 1 ; 2d Area Army Opn Order A-40, 20 Mar 44, as translated in Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 48, 5 Jul 44, copy in G-2 Dof A files. 25 The destruction of the 6th Air Division is dis- cussed in Ch. II, above. west from Hollandia on 15 April and re- established the command post at Manado in the Celebes, to which town the 2d Area Army moved its headquarters from Davao a few days later. At the same time, to co- ordinate command in the southern regions, the 2d Area Army passed from the direct control of Imperial General Headquarters to the control of the intermediate link, the Southern Army. Simultaneously, the 4th Air Army passed to the direct command of the Southern Army.2a Halmahera, already the principal distri- bution point for the eastern part of the Netherlands East Indies and for Dutch New Guinea, also gradually developed into a focal point for the Japanese defense of the southern approaches to the Philippines. The Palaus' former status as a major staging base was gradually curtailed, and the islands lost their importance to the 2d Area Army.21 General Anami was again instructed by Imperial General Headquarters rapidly to develop, behind the new strategic main line of resistance, supply and staging bases from which a general offensive might be resumed in mid-1944.38 26 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ,, pp. 1 10— 13, 120-23;Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 30-44,47-48, 53-55; Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 16-18, 36; 18th Army Opns, III, 41-46; 4th Air Army Opn- Order A-250, 22 Mar 44, in GHQ SWPA, ATIS Enemy Publication 268, 4 Jan 45, copy in OGMH files; Intcrrog of Col. Kaneko, 21 Nov 45, in USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 404-08; AAF SWPA Int Sum 197, 8 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 7 Apr 44. 21 Alamo Force, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit with Re- spect to Morotai, 1 Aug 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Morotai, 2-8 Aug 44; Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpts 44 and 51, 7 Jun and 26 Jul 44, respectively, copies in G-2 Dof A files; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 53-55. 28 Hist of Army Section, Imperial GHQ,, pp. 84-96. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 93 Japan's Pacific Order of Battle, April 1944 Thus, in the area of principal immediate interest to Allied forces of the Southwest Pacific as they moved toward Hollandia in April 1944, the Japanese high command centered in General Count Hisaichi Ter- auchi's Southern Army, with headquarters at Singapore.29 Under the Southern Army was the 2d Area Army, headquarters at Manado, which in turn controlled the 2d, 18th, and 19th Armies. The 2d Area Army had about 170,000 troops under its com- mand. In western New Guinea and the Hamahera region was the 2d Army, headquarters at Manokwari, comprising the 32d, 35th, and 36th Divisions, and miscel- laneous other units, totaling about 50,000 men. The strength of the 19th Army, spread over most of the rest of the Netherlands East Indies, was also about 50,000 troops, cen- tered around the 5th, 46th, and 48th Divi- sions. The 8th Area Army, controlled directly by Imperial General Headquarters, retained under its command in the Solomons and Bismarck Archipelago the 17th Army, the 38th Division, the 65th Brigade, and the remnants of the 6th and 17th Divisions. Total strength of the 8th Area Army in April 1944 was perhaps 80,000 men. In the Philippines the Southern Army had under its command the 14th Army, comprising the 1 6th Division and four independent mixed brigades. The 14th Army had about 45,000 combat troops under its control, and total Japanese strength in the Philippines was about 100,000 men, including air, naval, and army service troops. On the Central Pacific islands was the 31st Army, under the operational control of the Central Pacific 10 Southern Army headquarters moved to Manila in mid-May 1944. Fleet and consisting of the 14th, 29th, and 52d Divisions, with the 43d Division on the way. The 31st Army was about 60,000 men strong. The 14th Division and other units in the Palaus, including naval and air, totaled about 30,000 men.30 When the 18th Army, passed to the con- trol of the 2d Area Army in March 1944, General Adachi had under his control from 50,000 to 60,000 men. His three infantry divisions, the 20th, 41st, and 51st, had all been badly battered in fighting in eastern New Guinea and, since January, had been suffering heavy casualties during withdrawal from the Huon Peninsula area. At the time of the change in command, the 20th Divi- sion was painfully reorganizing at Madang (east of which it was fighting a rear guard action against Australian troops) and Hansa Bay. The 41st Division was deployed in the Madang area and was preparing to move westward, while the 51st Division was assembling at Wewak for rehabilitation and reorganization. The total strength of the three divisions at the time of the Allied landings at Hollandia probably did not ex- ceed 20,000 trained combat effectives.31 M The figures given above were derived by Mr. Burke C. Peterson, of the Pacific Section, OCMH, from a mass of Japanese and Allied sources. The lo- cation of units was derived from the Japanese Army sources cited in the preceding section. 81 MID WD, Disposition and Movement of Jap- anese Ground Forces, 1941—45, copy in OCMH files; GHQ SWPA, G-2 Monthly Sum of Enemy Dispositions, 30 Apr 44, copy in OCMH files; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI's 761 and 828, 22 Apr and 28 Jun 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, 22 Apr and 28 Jun 44; 18th Army Opns, Annex A-Statistics, Supplemen- tary Chart No, 1. Definitive figures for the strength of the 18th Army in April 1944 are simply not avail- able and all sources are contradictory. General Mac- Arthur's G-2 Section put the 18th Army strength for April at about 45,000 men. Alamo Force and Allied Land Forces consistently gave much higher estimates, running from 55,000 to 65,000, while the Japanese source cites a figure of about 75,000 for 1 April. Chart 5 — Japanese Army Operational Organization in the Southwest Pacific Area: April 1944 (a) td Army 3id Division ISlh Division 2d Aira Aimy (Slfi Aimy 20th Division Divlt'ion IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS (A.rny Stclion) 1 IWi Army Slh Division 46lr, Division Soulhem Army 4Glh Division i\ h Afr Army 61-h Air Division 7fh Aif Division 1 4th A(mV 16th Diviiion III 30lh 1MB M 35d 1MB 33 d 1MB loth Army m Division 3B,h Division Slh Aiec Aimy 1 7lh Aimy 6th Division 6Slh Brigade 8 r Army, ne CtiQrf 6. 1 mixtd brigade. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 95 Co-operating with the 18th Army was the Japanese 9th Fleet, principal Japanese naval headquarters in New Guinea. The 9th Fleet's commander was Vice Adm. Yoshikazu Endo, whose command post was located at Wewak until late March, when it moved to Hollandia. Admiral Endo's command consisted primarily of service troops, naval antiaircraft gunners, and a few shore defense units. His surface strength comprised only a miscellaneous collection of landing craft and armed barges. The ma- jority of the naval service troops in eastern New Guinea were members of the 27th Special Base Force, while the few Japanese naval personnel at Hollandia were under Capt. Tetsuo Onizuka, naval ground com- mander in the area.32 In western New Guinea, acting in con- cert with the 2d Area Army, was the 4th Expeditionary Fleet. The next step up the Japanese naval chain of command was the Southwest Area Fleet, controlling all Jap- anese naval units in the Netherlands East Indies area and operating directly under the Combined Fleet. The 9th Fleet, formerly under the Southeast Area Fleet's head- quarters at Rabaul, passed to the control of Southwest Area Fleet in March 1944.33 There were a few naval aircraft based at Hollandia from time to time, but Japanese naval air power was, generally speaking, a negligible factor in the New Guinea and ^Rpt of Capt Shigeru Iwaki (staff, 9th Fleet), 21 Feb 46, in. GHQ SGAP, ATIS Doc 14924-A, copy in G-2 DofA files, Doc 257846; Interrog of Capt Toshikazu Ohmae (IJN), 25 Nov 45, in USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 409-10; GHQ SCAP, ATIS Doc 16947, Full Translation of Answers to Questions Concerning the Admiralties and Hollandia, 14 Apr 46, copy, in G— 2 DofA files, Doc 261219; 18th Army Opns, III, 41^42. 83 Japanese Studies in WW II, 34, Naval Opns in the Western New Guinea Area, 1943-45, pp. 1-10, copy in OCMH files. Netherlands East Indies areas in April 1944. The Japanese Army Air Force, after the destruction of the 6th Air Division at Hol- landia and the withdrawal of the 4th Air Army's headquarters to Manado, likewise had little left with which to stem an Allied advance in New Guinea. The 4th Air Army had never been at full strength during its operations in the Bismarck Archipelago and New Guinea areas. Its heavy combat losses were aggravated by poor equipment, inade- quate aircraft maintenance, supply difficul- ties, and rough fields which could not be kept in repair. Its history in New Guinea was principally one of frustration.34 The Japanese at Hollandia Japanese Planning and Command at Hollandia The Japanese high command had been for some time aware of the potential im- portance of Hollandia and of the necessity for building up the defenses of the area. The enemy had decided to develop a major base at Hollandia as early as the withdrawal of the strategic main line of resistance in Sep- tember 1943.35 The 2d Area Army, when it took over control in western New Guinea in November, perceived that holding Hol- landia would have great advantages and believed that Hollandia ought to be strongly defended as an outpost for the protection of the strategic defense lines base at Wakde- Sarmi, to the west. General Anami, com- manding the 2d Area Army, in November 54 Southeast Area Air Opns, pp. 16-18, 36; 4th Air Army Opns Order A-250, 22 Mar 44, as trans- lated in GHQ SWPA, ATIS Enemy Publication 268, 4 Jan 45, copy in OCMH files; Interrog of Col Kaneko, 21 Nov 45, in USSBS, Interrogations of Japanese Officials, II, 404-08. 36 Hist of Southern Area Army, pp. 90—96. Chart 6 — Japanese Naval Operational Organization in the Central and Southwest Pacific Areas: April 1944 IMPERIAL GENERAL HEADQUARTERS (Navy Section) Combined Fleet Headquarters Southwest Area Fleet 9th Fleet 2d Expeditionary Fleet lit Expeditionary 4th Expeditionary Fleet 3d Expeditionary Fleet 27lh Special Base Force 31st Army 14th Division 29th Division 43d Division 5Sd Division THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDIA 97 gave some thought to sending elements of the 36th Division east from Sarmi to Hol- landia. This plan was abandoned, however, for at the time Hollandia was still within the 8th Area Army's zone of responsibility.3" The 18th Army (if not the 8th Area Army) attached some importance to Hol- landia. In January 1 944 General Adachi stated that Hollandia was to be ". . . the final base and last strategic point of [the 18th Army's'] New Guinea operation." 17 He outlined a plan for withdrawal to Hol- landia should 18th Army operations in east- ern New Guinea result in defeat, and he ordered the forces at Hollandia to exert themselves to develop the defenses of that base. General Adachi complained that the troops at Hollandia, being out of the active combat zone, were leading a life of ease, and he hinted that all was not well with the command structure at the base. In an ad- dress to the Hollandia garrison, delivered by proxy during January, the general ex- horted forces there to expend ". . . all your effort and be determined to sacrifice every- thing for the glorious cause." 38 But exhor- tations were hardly sufficient — some definite plan of action for the development and defense of Hollandia was needed. The 2d Area Army supplied the outline of such a plan when it assumed control of the 18th Army in March. General Adachi was instructed to hold firmly at Wewak, Aitape, and Hollandia; to institute a de- laying action westward from Madang and Wewak; to use and co-operate with the 4th Air Army during this withdrawal; and gradually to consolidate the bulk of the 18th Army at Hollandia. General Adachi was to M Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 22-23, 26-27. CT 18th Army Opn Order, no number, 22 Jan 44, as translated in Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 39, 3 May 44, copy in G— 2 DofA files. "Ibid.; 18th Army Opns, II, 141-46. start withdrawing all his forces west from Madang and Hansa Bay beyond the Sepik River immediately, and these forces were to be concentrated at Wewak as quickly as possible. Finally, a cadre of one division was immediately to be sent to Hollandia.89 General Adachi received his new orders on 25 March, but his reaction was not exactly that probably expected by the 2d Area Army. The 8th Area Army had planned to continue operations east of We- wak, to make Madang the front line, and to build up strength to counterattack Allied forces.10 Possibly General Adachi, upon his transfer to the 2d Area Army, may have had some mistaken loyalty to his former com- mander and a feeling that the 8th Area Army plan was the better, although he fi- nally recognized that the latter plan would be practically impossible of execution. At any rate, General Adachi's interpretation of the 2d Area Army's definitively worded order was rather strange. He ordered the 41st Division to hold the Madang area by rear guard action until the end of April, but at the same time the bulk of the division was to be sent westward 100 miles along the coast to Hansa Bay. The 20th Division was to move initially to Hansa Bay. Upon its relief there by the 41st Division, the 20th was to proceed to But, some thirty-five miles west of Wewak, and, ultimately, to Aitape. The 51st Division was ordered to move from Hansa Bay to Wewak and, beginning in late July or early August, was to push on toward Hol- landia. Instead of sending one division to Hollandia immediately and getting the rest of the 18th Army started on its way to that area as ordered by the 2d Area Army, Gen- ™2d Area Army Opn Order No. A-46, 20 Mar 44, as translated in Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 48, 5 Jul 44, copy in G-2 DofA files; 18th Army Opns, III, 17-20; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 30-46. 40 18th Army Opns, III, 4-8. 98 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES eral Adachi decided to concentrate all his forces at Wewak. One concession to the let- ter and spirit of the 2d Area Army's order was made: ". . . and, if conditions permit, strengthen the Hollandia sector also." 41 The Japanese apparently expected the Allies to launch a large-scale amphibious attack along the north coast of Australian New Guinea about the end of April. How- ever, the enemy placed Hansa Bay and Wewak, in that order, ahead of Hollandia as probable targets for the expected assault. General Adachi apparently believed that the Allies were going to move on Hansa Bay and therefore evidently considered that he had ample time in which to reinforce Hol- landia ( although he did betray some slight concern about the Aitape area) but little time to strengthen Hansa Bay. His pro- pensity for devoting most of his attention to Hansa Bay may also have resulted from some wishful thinking. While he had no great fear of Allied forces then patrolling in the area south and east of Madang, he did have some trouble disengaging his units from that region. Moreover, the 18th Army had considerable difficulty crossing the broad swamps and wide washes at the mouth of the Sepik River, between Hansa Bay and Wewak. It would have been much simpler to hold at Hansa Bay.42 The 2d Area Army was not satisfied with the progress of the 18th Army's westward movement. Therefore, on 1 2 April, General Anami sent his chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Takazo Numata, to Wewak. Perhaps co- incidentally with General Numata's arrival at Wewak, the 80th Infantry of the 20th 11 18th Army Opns, III, pp. 4-8, 9-11; 18th Army Opn Order, no number, 25 Mar 44, as trans- lated in Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43, 31 May 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. The quotation is from the 18th Army's translated order. " 18th Army Opns, III, 17-28, 39-40. Division was ordered to prepare for move- ment to Aitape. The displacement of the 80th Infantry apparently started soon there- after, but few men of that regiment had reached Aitape by 22 April. General Nu- mata flew back to his headquarters on 13 April, after he had instructed General Adachi to start troops moving to Hollandia as well as Aitape. On 18 April the 66th In- fantry of the 51st Division was ordered to strike out from Wewak for Hollandia, where the regiment was expected to arrive about mid- June. The 66th Infantry had not started its movement when for obvious rea- sons General Adachi, on 22 April, revoked the regiment's marching orders.43 There is no evidence that the Japanese had any prepared defense plans for Hol- landia. It could hardly have been otherwise. If General Adachi had entertained misgiv- ings about the command situation at Hol- landia in January, by 22 April he may well have been experiencing sleepless nights over it. The Headquarters, 4th Air Army, previ- ously senior headquarters at Hollandia, had left that base for Manado on 15 April. The Commanding General, 6th Air Division, had arrived at Hollandia from Wewak dur- ing late March, but he and other members of that unhappy air unit's staff had been re- lieved in disgrace after the loss of his planes. His place was taken by Maj. Gen. Masa- zumi Inada, who had been sent to Hollandia from his western New Guinea logistic sup- port command, the 2d Field Base Unit, by the 2d Area Army in mid -April. Admiral Endo, 9th Fleet, commander and senior naval officer at Hollandia, had arrived from "18th Army Opns, III, 17-20, 28-32, 40-41; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp, 45-46; 20th Div Opn Order, no number, 12 Apr 44, as translated ia Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 49, 12 Jul 44, copy in G-2 DofA files; Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 38, 26 Apr 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLAND IA 99 Wewak only late in March. Finally, the sen- ior officer of all services at Hollandia was Maj. Gen. Toyozo Kitazono, who had reached Hollandia from Wewak (where he had commanded the 3d Field Transporta- tion Unit) only ten days before the Allied landings. General Kitazono had no time to develop a comprehensive defense plan for Hollandia, let alone co-ordinate such a plan with General Inada and Admiral Endo.44 In fact, there can be some doubt that Gen- eral Kitazono was in a hurry about develop- ing the needed defenses. He had served long and well with the 18th Army and probably brought with him to Hollandia at least some of General Adachi's belief that either Hansa Bay or Wewak would be the site of the next major Allied invasion. Japanese Reactions to Hollandia What happened to General Kitazono is uncertain, but somehow he escaped the Hollandia area to survive the war. What- ever was General Kitazono's situation, the 2d Area Army, on 22 April, ordered General Inada of the 6th Air Division to assume command at Hollandia. At 0930 that morn- ing General Inada issued a grandiose plan of resistance. Japanese troops in the area were ordered to take up positions near the town of Hollandia and also to ". . . destroy the enemy expected from Tanahmerah Bay." Most of the troops that he was able to organize General Inada finally concen- trated near Sabron on the Depapre-Lake Sentani road. There the 24th Infantry Di- vision, advancing inland from Tanahmerah Bay, found the only significant organized resistance encountered during the Hollandia operation. "18th Army Opns, III, 41-46, 48-54; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 30-44, 48-51. But, despite General Inada's best efforts to bring order out of the chaos created by the surprise invasion, most of the Japanese troops in the Hollandia area fled ignomini- ously into the hills as the first shots were fired from Allied naval guns. Late in the after- noon of 22 April, General Inada, apparently a realist, practically gave up the fight. Faced with the rapid disintegration of his organi- zations, at least 90 percent of which were service units, he issued a new order which expressed a defeatist sentiment usually for- eign to Japaneses thought: "The division [6th Air Division] will be on guard against enemy landings and will attempt to with- draw at night." 45 West of Hollandia the 2d Area Army at- tempted to take action to counter the Allied invasion. General Anami, feeling that Hol- landia was too important a base to be meekly abandoned, wanted to dispatch eastward and overland the bulk of the 36th Division from the Wakde-Sarmi area. Acting on instructions from the 2d Area Army, the 2d Army ordered two battalions of the 224th Infantry and a battalion of the 36th Division's field artillery to start toward Hollandia on 24 April. It was expected that the rest of the division could start moving eastward from Sarmi about 10 May. The Southern Army, however, would not permit the Sarmi area to be denuded of troops and on 25 April vetoed the plan to send 36th Division units eastward. General Anami stubbornly argued the necessity for the recapture of Hollandia and further recommended that a large-scale amphibious operation for its reoccupation be mounted in western New Guinea in mid-June. The "Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 48-51 ; 18th Army Opns, III, 48-54; 6th Air Div Opn Orders 45 and 46, 22 Apr 44, as translated in 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 146-47. The quotations are from the translated operation orders. 100 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Southern Army was adamant and took pains to point out to General Anami that it would be- impossible, because of lack of shipping and air support, to stage a large amphibious task force within the foreseeable future. Finally, on 30 April, the Southern Army canceled further preparations for a push to Hollandia by the 36th Division. The best General Anami was able to obtain from his discussions with the South- ern Army (and representatives had been flown to the senior headquarters to plead the 2d Area Army's case) was tacit approval to continue the movement toward Hollandia of such 36th Division elements as had al- ready been dispatched eastward from Sarmi. These units, both infantry and artil- lery, had been placed under the control of Col. Soemon Matsuyama, commander of the 224th Infantry, and had been desig- nated the Matsuyama Force. The last ele- ments of the Matsuyama Force cleared the Sarmi area on 4 May. The point of the col- umn had advanced to Armopa, about half way between Sarmi and Hollandia, when, on 1 7 May, the Allies made a new landing near Sarmi. The 36th Division immediately ordered the Matsuyama Force to retrace its steps. Thus ended Japanese efforts to re- capture Hollandia from the west.48 Except for the one lucky bomb hit on sup- plies at Humboldt Bay, Japanese air reac- tion to the seizure of Hollandia was prac- tically nonexistent, although on 22 April the 4th Air Army was ordered to concentrate all its aircraft on western New Guinea fields " Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 51-53 J Hist of South- ern Area Army, pp. 61-64; 224th Inf Opn Orders, no numbers, 24 Apr and 1 7 May 44, as translated in Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 48, 5 Jul 44, copy in G-2 DofA files; Kawakami Comments. More mate- rial on Matsuyama Force operations is set forth be- low in the chapters concerning action in the Wakde- Sarmi area. to prepare for strong attacks against the Allied shipping and ground forces at Hol- landia. The project was unsuccessful. The 4th Air Army did not have the necessary planes to stage major attacks; Allied naval aircraft intercepted most of the planes the Japanese were able to send toward Hollan- dia; Allied air action prevented the Japa- nese from keeping their western New Guinea fields operational; and by the time the American carriers had to leave the area, land-based air support was available to the Allies either at or within range of Hollandia. Japanese naval reaction by air, sea, or subsurface means was equally insignificant. On 2 1 April, having learned of the depar- ture of a large Allied convoy from the Ad- miralties, the Combined Fleet issued orders to the Central Pacific Fleet to attack the convoy with all available submarines. But difficulties arose in getting the submarines assembled for a concerted attack and, ex- cept for a few sightings off Hollandia, the subsurface vessels stayed away from the area. The Combined Fleet was itself pre- paring for a naval showdown in the Pacific, but this battle was not scheduled until mid- summer. The Hollandia operation caught the Combined Fleet by surprise and com- pletely unprepared for battle. The Japanese Navy quickly decided that it was powerless to undertake any action against Allied forces at Hollandia.17 Japanese Withdrawal from Hollandia At Hollandia, General Inada decided to assemble his forces at Genjem, a village about fifteen miles west of Lake Sentani. Near Genjem, situated on the main east- west inland trail of the Hollandia area, the " Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 48-51 ; Naval Opns in Western New Guinea Area, pp. 4—7 ; Kawakami Comments. THE JAPANESE: PEARL HARBOR THROUGH HOLLANDER Japanese had started some agricultural proj- ects. By reason of its location and agriculture the Genjem area was the logical place for gathering forces that were retreating before the Allied advance. Most of the Japanese supplies at Hollandia had been stored around the shores of Humboldt Bay. With these lost, the Japanese could muster less than a week's supply of rations from inland stockpiles, but they might augment these rations from the projects at Genjem. The next phase of General Inada's withdrawal plan was an overland trek of 1 25 miles to the Wakde-Sarmi area. From Genjem one trail led west toward Sarmi, and another trail ran north 16 miles to Demta, a bay village located on the east-west coastal trail. By 30 April some 7,000 Japanese troops had assembled in the vicinity of Genjem. Here they were reorganized, without maps and already short of rations and medical supplies, into nine or ten echelons for the long march westward through inhospitable country. The first echelon, consisting of stranded pilots and ground crews as well as the headquarters of the defunct 6th Air Di- vision, left the Genjem area by 9 May.48 The Japanese troops who struck out from Genjem after 1 May either had to push overland through mainly untracked wilder- ness (the inland trail lost its identity not far west of Genjem and deteriorated into many unmapped and dead-end jungle tracks) or risk encounter with a series of Allied out- posts. Companies I and K of the 19th In- fantry, 24th Division, had set up road blocks at Genjem and Demta during the first week of May. Company K sent numerous patrols over all trails in the vicinity of Genjem and combed neighboring native hamlets for Japanese stragglers. Company I patrolled 48 18th Army Opns, III, 41-46; Hist of 2d Area Army, pp. 51-53. 101 south from Demta and along coastal trails leading both east and west of that village. By 6 June the two companies had killed 405 Japanese and had taken 64 prisoners in the Genjem-Demta region. Many more Japa- nese were found dead of starvation or disease along the trails in the same area. J" The hardships suffered by those Japanese killed in the Genjem-Demta sector were probably fewer than those of the troops who sought to make the trek to Sarmi. Remnants of the first group, which had left Genjem on 26 April, approached Sarmi just in time for the Allied invasion of that area on 1 7 May; the rest had to attempt to bypass Sarmi too. For the most part, the Japanese retreating through Genjem toward Sarmi died slowly from starvation, wounds, and disease. Of those who left the Hollandia area via Genjem, the Japanese themselves esti- mated that only 7 percent survived to reach the Sarmi area.50 Excluding prisoners, there could have been very few survivors of the Japanese Hollandia garrison. The following appear to be reasonable figures concerning opera- tions at Hollandia from 22 April to 6 June 1944: Japanese postwar estimate of the number of men gathered at Genjem for the overland trek to Sarmi 7, 220 Allied estimate of Japanese killed or found dead by Allied forces in the Hollandia area to 6 June 3, 332 Number of Japanese captured in the Hollandia area by Allied forces to 6 June 611 Total number of Japanese troops ac- counted for by Allied and Japanese sources as of 6 June 11, 163 a 24th Div Opns Rpt Hollandia, pp. 98-1 1 0. 18th Army Opns, III, 41-46, 48-54. General Inada survived the trek to Sarmi and before the end of the war held important posts in the Philip- pines and the home islands. Admiral Endo was killed in the Hollandia area on or about 3 May. 102 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Allowing for errors in the first two figures but also taking into account the number of Japanese killed or captured in the Hollandia area after 6 June and those of the Hollandia garrison later killed or captured during oper- ations farther west, the losses of the original Japanese garrison at Hollandia remain at a staggering figure. Assuming that the Japa- nese estimate of 93 percent casualties for the troops who attempted the march to Sarmi is reasonably accurate, then it appears that, including prisoners, less than 1,000 of the approximately 1 1 ,000 Japanese who were stationed at Hollandia on 22 April 1944 could have survived the war.51 "As of 27 September 1944, the last date for which comprehensive figures are available, Alamo Force estimated that 4,478 Japanese had been killed or found dead in the Hollandia area. This is an in- crease of only 1,146 over the 6 June figure, a fact which lends credence to the Japanese estimate that some 7,000 troops tried the march to Sarmi. Of this number, not more than 500 could have reached the Sarmi area, indicating that 6,000, more or less, must have died from starvation or disease during the trek westward. As of 27 September, Alamo Force ac- counted for 656 Japanese prisoners and 13 Formosan prisoners from the Hollandia garrison. These 27 September figures are from Alamo Force G-2 Wkly Rpt 60, 27 Sep 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. CHAPTER V Prelude to the Battle of the Driniumor While operations at Hollandia were rap- idly drawing to a successful conclusion, another action was just beginning at Aitape, 125 miles to the southeast. The Persecu- tion Task Force, with the 163d Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Infantry Division as its combat nucleus, landed near Aitape on 22 April, D Day for Hollandia as well. The principal objective of General Doe's Persecution Task Force was the seizure and rehabilitation of the Japanese-con- structed Tadji airstrips, eight miles east- southeast of Aitape. These fields were to provide bases from which Allied aircraft could support ground operations at Hol- landia after the Fifth Fleet's carriers left the latter area. General Doe's command was also to provide ground flank protection for Hollandia by preventing westward advance of the Japanese 18th Army, assembling some ninety miles southeast of Aitape at Wewak.1 {Map3)\ Securing the Airfield Area The Tactical Plan Knowledge of beach conditions in the Aitape area was obtained principally from 1 The decision to seize Aitape and the organiza- tion of the Persecution Task Force are described in IChapter II J above. aerial photographs, and the Persecution Task Force landing beach was chosen with reference to beach exits and shore objectives as they appeared on these pictures. The shore line opposite the Tadji airfields, which lay only 1,000 yards inland, was uniform and sandy for long distances. There were clear approaches to the beach, which had a medium rise. The selected landing point was located at Korako, a native village on the coast at the northeast corner of the air- field area. From this point, which was desig- nated Blue Beach, a track passable for wheeled vehicles ran directly inland to the Tadji strips.2 The Persecution Task Force was to be- gin landing at 0645, high tide time in the Aitape area. In charge of the amphibious phases of the operation was Capt. Albert G. Noble (USN), whose command, the East- ern Attack Group (Task Group 77.3), was part of Admiral Barbey's Task Force 77. Close air support operations at Aitape were primarily the responsibility of planes aboard eight CVE's and were similar to the air sup- port activities carried out by Task Force 58 at Hollandia. Initially, last-minute beach strafing at Blue Beach was planned to con- ! CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, p. 29; CTG 77.3 [Eastern Attack Group] Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1—2. 104 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Chart 7 — The Persecution Task Force: 22 April-^1 May 1944 HEADQUARTERS PERSECUTION TASK FORCE Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe 163d RCT Brig. Gen. Jens A. Doe tinue until the leading wave of landing craft was within 300 yards of the shore. But Gen- eral Doe believed that such close-in strafing would endanger the troops aboard the land- ing craft. It was therefore decided that strafing would begin when the leading boat wave was 4,500 yards from shore (expected to be at H minus 15 minutes) and would end when that wave approached to within 1,200 yards of the shore, timed for about H minus 4 minutes.3 The Allied Air Forces also had important air support missions at Aitape. A squadron of attack bombers (A-20's or B— 25's) was to be in the air over the landing area from 0830 to 1030 on D Day. After 1030, if no 3 CTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44, and Change 1, 10 Apr 44, thereto, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 4-5 Apr 44; CTF 78 Opn Plan D2-44, 12 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 25 Apr 44. The CVE's operated as TF 78, which was under the command of Admiral Davison. Although Admiral Davison was the senior officer present, Captain Noble retained command in the area during the amphibious phases. This was accomplished by personal agreement between the two officers. Tel conv, author with Vice Adm Al- bert G. Noble, 3 Jan 51. 127th RCT Col. Merle H. Howe earlier calls for bombardment had been made, these planes were to drop their bombs on targets on both flanks of Blue Beach. Two squadrons of attack bombers were to be maintained on daily alert at a field in eastern New Guinea for as long as the situ- ation at Aitape required, and additional air support at Aitape would be provided upon request from Alamo Force.4 Naval fire support for the landings on Blue Beach was to be executed by 5 de- stroyers, 9 APD's, and 1 AK. This was the first time that APD's or AK's had been as- signed fire support missions in the South- west Pacific. Targets for the destroyers were similar to those assigned naval fire support vessels at Tanahmerah and Humboldt Bays. Six APD's were to fire on St. Anna and Tadji Plantation (west of the airstrips), on enemy defensive installations at or near Aitape town, and on the offshore islands — Tumleo, Ali, and Seleo. The AK was to aim its 5-inch fire at Tumleo and Ali Is- 4 AAF SWPA OI 49 (Rev), 28 Mar 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 28 Mar 44. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 105 lands. Close-in support was to be provided for the leading landing waves from 0642 to 0645 by rocket and automatic weapons fire from two submarine chasers. All destroyers, submarine chasers, and the AK were to de- liver fire upon call from forces ashore after H Hour.5 At 0645 the 2d and 3d Battalions, 163d Infantry, were to land abreast on Blue Beach. As soon as a beachhead had been secured the 1st Battalion was to land and, aided by the 2d, was to initiate a drive toward the Tadji strips. After the airfields had been captured, the 2d Battalion was to defend the task force's western flank, the 1st was to establish defenses along the south- ern edge of the airfield area, and the 3d was to defend the eastern flank. On D plus 1 the 1 27th Regimental Combat Team, 32d Divi- sion, was to reach Blue Beach. Then patrols west and east of the beachhead were to begin seeking out Japanese forces, and, as soon as possible, Aitape town was to be captured. Field and antiaircraft artillery going ashore on D Day were to protect and sup- port the infantry's operations and the engi- neers who were to start work on the airfields immediately after they were secured. Engi- neers and other service troops not assigned to airfield construction tasks were to unload ships, improve roads and tracks, build or repair bridges over streams in the beachhead area, and find and clear dump and bivouac sites.8 The Capture of the Airfields At 0500 on 22 April, after an uneventful trip from the Admiralties, the Eastern At- tack Group convoy arrived in the transport cOTF 77 Opn Plan 3-44, 3 Apr 44; GTG 77.3 Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 2-3. * PTF FO 1, 6 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hol- landia, 5—6 Apr 44. area off Blue Beach.7 The assault troops of the 163d Infantry, Col. Francis W. Mason commanding, immediately began debarking into LCPR's from the APD's which had brought them to Aitape. Naval gunfire and aerial support was carried out almost exactly as planned, and the first wave of LCPR's hit the shore on schedule at 0645. It would have been a model landing except for one thing — it didn't take place on Blue Beach. D Day had dawned dull and overcast, making for poor visibility in the landing area. Heavy smoke from fires set in Japanese supply dumps by preassault bombardments further obscured the coast line. With no landmarks to guide them, the coxswains of the leading boat wave missed Blue Beach and the landing took place at Wapil, a small coastal village about 1,200 yards east of Korako. The accident proved a happy one, for it was soon discovered that the Wapil area was much better suited to beaching LST's and large landing craft than any other in the Aitape region. For the assault troops the change in beaches created little difficulty, since the Wapil area had been adequately covered by support fires and there was no opposition from the Japanese. Tactical surprise was as complete as that achieved the same day by the Reckless Task Force at Hollandia. Leaving breakfasts cooking and bunks un- made, the Japanese at Aitape had fled in panic when the naval support fire began. The 2d Battalion, 163d Infantry, had landed on the right, or west. The unit im- mediately swung-"west along the beach to 1 Information in this subsection is based on : CTG 77.3 Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 4-5; CTF 77 Opns Rpt Tanahmerah Bay-Humboldt Bay-Aitape, p. 31; 163d Inf Jnl, Aitape; 163d Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, p. 2; PTF G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, pp. 2-3; Ltr, Gen Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, no sub, in OCMH files. MAP 3 AITAPE LANDINGS, 22 April 1944 108 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES find Korako and the trail leading inland to the Tadji strips. This task was accomplished by 0800 and the two battalions quickly ex- panded the beachhead to a depth of 500 yards and westward about 2,500 yards from Wapil to Waitanan Creek. This area, occu- pied by 1 000, marked the limits of the task force's first phase line. So far, opposition had consisted of only a few rifle shots. Three Japanese prisoners had been captured and over fifty Javanese laborers had willingly given themselves up. The two assault units now waited for the landing of the 1st Bat- talion and for an order from General Doe to move on the Tadji strips. The 1st Battalion was assembled ashore by 1030 and, passing through the 3d, started moving inland toward Tadji Bomber Strip at 1100. Simultaneously, the 2d Battalion began advancing on Tadji Fighter Strip, north of the bomber field. The 3d Battalion remained at the beach area. The advance inland was slow and cau- tious but by 1245 the 2d Battalion had cleared its objective and the 1st soon secured Tadji Bomber Strip against no opposition. The 2d Battalion then moved across Wai- tanan Creek to Pro and Pro Mission, which were found clear of Japanese. The battalion command post was set up at Pro before dark, while the rest of the unit bivouacked along trails leading inland to the fighter strip. The 1st Battalion setded down for the night at the west end of the bomber field. During the afternoon the 3d Battalion sent patrols east from Wapil to the coastal villages of Nor, Rilia, and Lemieng, noting no enemy activ- ity. Three miles east of Wapil, at the mouth of the Nigia River, an outpost was set up. The bulk of the battalion bivouacked along the eastern edges of the two captured strips. By dark on D Day-the principal objec- tives of the Persecution Task Force had been secured. Work could be started on the airfields, needed to insure land-based air support for both the Aitape and Hollandia beachheads. The strips had been secured at an amazingly low cost — two men of the 163d Infantry had been killed and thirteen wounded. Airfield Construction and Supporting Arms No. 62 Works Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, had come ashore at Blue Beach during the morning and had been able to start work on Tadji Fighter Strip at 1300. Repairs continued throughout the night under floodlights, the lack of Japanese op- position and the urgency of the task prompt- ing General Doe to push the work. Although it had been hoped that the strip would be ready for use on D plus 1 , terrain conditions were such that necessary repairs were not completed on schedule. Thus it was 0900 on 24 April before the Australian engineers, who had worked without break for almost forty-eight hours, could announce that the airstrip was ready. At 1630 twenty-five P^lO's of No. 78 Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, landed on the field, and the bal- ance of the wing arrived the next day.8 The ground on which the fighter strip was located was so poorly drained that it was not until 28 April, after steel matting had been placed on the field, that it could be used continuously.3 The works wing then * Ltr, F/Lt Arthur L. Davies [RAAF], Officer-in- Charge, War Hist Sec, Hq RAAF, to author, 8 Mar 48, in OCMH files. 9 PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, p. 5; PTF Engr Rpt, Pt. IV, p. 2, copy in files of OCE GHQ AFPAC. The strip was 4,000 by 100 feet. It was used until 12 July, when it was declared un- serviceable and converted to an emergency field. Proper drainage could not be obtained at the site, but the strip had well served its intended purpose — quick provision of land-based air support for Hol- landia and Aitape. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 109 TROOPS UNLOADING SUPPLIES AT AIT APE. In the background are the two AK's. moved to Tadji Bomber Strip to aid the 8 7 2d and 875th Engineer Aviation Bat- talions. The latter two units passed to the operational control of Wing Commander William A. C. Dale (RAAF), who, besides commanding the works wing, was Perse- cution Task Force Engineer. Extensive re- pairs were necessary at the bomber strip and that field was not ready for use by fighter and transport planes until 27 May and for bombers until early July.10 Other engineer units ashore on D Day directed their energies to ship unloading, road and bridge construction, and dump 10 Alamo Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, p. 50; PTF Engr Rpt, Pt. VI, pp. 2-3; Ltr, F/Lt Davies to author, 8 Mar 48. and bivouac clearance. By 1930 the 593d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment (the Shore Party) and the Naval Beach Party had unloaded all D-Day LST's. The next day one AKA and seven more LST's were discharged. Unloading of the two AK's did not proceed as rapidly as expected, for neither ship had been properly combat loaded. The AK which arrived on D Day was only 65 percent discharged when, dur- ing the night of 27-28 April, it was hit by a bomb dropped from a lone Japanese plane flying in from an unknown base in western New Guinea. The other AK, undamaged, towed the first back to Finschhafen, return- ing then to Blue Beach to complete its own unloading. No other untoward incident 110 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES marred the debarkation of troops and supplies.11 American engineers constructed roads inland from Blue Beach to the airstrips and improved the coastal roads. Light Japanese culverts and bridges in the area had col- lapsed under the weight of American and Australian heavy equipment or had been damaged by preassault bombardment, mak- ing repairs a pressing problem. Australian engineers bridged Waitanan Creek while American engineers threw a bridge across the Nigia River, on the east flank. Pending completion of other bridges, American engi- neers maintained ferry services across the main streams. On 2 May heavy rains flooded all streams in the area, wiping out much bridge construction already accomplished, damaging ferry stages, and making neces- sary extensive repairs or new construction. Continued rain during May made road maintenance so difficult that engineers working on airstrips or bridges had to devote much time to the roads.12 Artillery moved ashore on D Day with- out difficulty. The 167th Field Artillery Bat- talion, supporting the 163d Infantry, was in position and registered on check points by H plus 4 hours but fired no support mission while in the Aitape area. On D plus 1 the 190th Field Artillery Group assumed com- mand of all field artillery, and on the same day the 126th Field Artillery Battalion of 11 CTG 77.3 Opns Rpt Aitape, p. 7; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, p. 3. The loss of the AK Etamin was grim justification of Admiral Bar- bey's reluctance to send AK's forward in early con- voys to a combat area. See Ch. 1 1 J above. According to Admiral Noble, the loss of the Etamin was " . . very keenly felt for several months to come." Ltr, Rear Adm Noble to Gen Ward, 18 Dec 50, in OCMH files. 12 Alamo Force Opns Rpt Hollandia-Aitape, p. 50; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, pp. 2-6 ; PTF Engr Rpt, Pt. IV, pp. 2-3. the 32d Division arrived. Antiairciaft artil- lery came ashore rapidly on D Day and set up positions along Blue Beach and around Tadji Fighter Strip." Securing the Flanks While engineers continued work through the night of 22-23 April, other elements of the task force made preparations to expand the perimeter.14 \{Map III\ About 0800 on the 23d, the 1st Battalion, 163d Infantry, started westward over inland trails to the Raihu River, six miles beyond Blue Beach. A tank of the 603d Tank Company, which was supporting the advance, broke through a Japanese bridge over Waitanan Creek, but the infantry continued westward and within an hour had secured incomplete Tadji West Strip. The 2d Battalion pushed west along the coastal track and by noon reached the mouth of the Raihu. Both battalions bivou- acked for the night on the east bank, the 1st at a point about 4,000 yards upstream. Dur- ing the day the 3d Battalion (which had been relieved on the east flank and at Blue Beach by elements of the 127th Infantry) moved forward with regimental headquar- ters to Tadji Plantation, 1,200 yards east of the Raihu and about 2,000 yards inland. So light had Japanese opposition been that the 163d Infantry had suffered but two cas- ualties— one man wounded and another missing. The next day the 1st and 2d Battalions resumed the advance at 0730. The 1st crossed the Raihu and pushed northwest over ill-defined tracks to establish contact, "PTF G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44; 1 6 7th FA Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 3-6. 14 Information on west flank operations is from : 163d Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 2-3; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, pp. 3-6; I63d Inf Jnl Aitape ; PTF G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 111 about 0930, with the 2d Battalion at the mouth of a small creek 1 ,800 yards west of the Raihu. Colonel Mason now halted the 1st Battalion and ordered it to patrol the trails radiating south and west from its new position. The 2d Battalion moved on along the coast to Aitape, securing that town and the near-by dominating height at Rohm Point by 1 100. The unit had met no Japa- nese and was preparing to push on when, early in the afternoon, Colonel Mason or- dered it to stop. The 3d Battalion was ready to pass through the 1st and move forward over inland trails, but the regimental com- mander suddenly ordered both it and the 1st to retire to the east bank of the Raihu for the night. It is not clear why this with- drawal was ordered. Japanese opposition had been almost nonexistent and the 163d Infantry had lost only one man killed dur- ing the day. General Doe was by now dissatisfied with the pace of the westward advance, and he therefore suggested to Alamo Force that the 163d's commander be relieved. This step was approved by General Krueger, although the regimental commander re- mained in control of his unit until 9 May, only two days before the 163d Infantry be- gan loading for another operation.15 For the next few days there were no major changes in the dispositions of the 163d In- fantry as patrolling inland and along the coast west of Aitape continued. Patrol bases were set up at inland and coastal villages to hunt down Japanese attempting to escape westward from the Aitape area. At the Kapoam villages, about twelve miles up the 11 The circumstances surrounding this relief are found in : Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-72, 24 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 25-26 Apr 44; Rad, Alamo to RTF [I Corps], WF-4652, 29 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 29-30 Apr 44; Ltr, Gen Doe to Gen Ward, 4 Dec 50, in OCMH files. Raihu, elements of the 3d Battalion en- countered the only signs of organized Japa- nese resistance found in the Aitape area to 4 May. At one of these villages — Kamti — outpost troops of the 3d Battalion were sur- rounded by an estimated 200 Japanese who made a number of harassing attacks on 28 and 29 April. These skirmishes cost the bat- talion 3 men killed and 2 wounded, while it was estimated that the Japanese lost about 90 killed. On 30 April the men at Kamti withdrew while Battery A, 126th Field Artillery Battalion, fired 240 rounds of 105- mm. ammunition into the village and its environs. The next morning Company L, 163d Infantry, moved back to Kamti against no opposition. There were few further con- tacts with the Japanese on the west flank and all outposts of the 163d Infantry were relieved by 3 2d Division troops early in May. The 127th Regimental Combat Team (less the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, and Companies F and G of the same regiment) had unloaded at Blue Beach on 23 April.10 About 0700 the same morning, after an air and naval bombardment, Companies F and G landed on Tumleo and Seleo Islands off Blue Beach, securing them against minor opposition by 1400. On 25 April Company G occupied the third large offshore island, Ali, without difficulty. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, arrived at Blue Beach on 26 April and established its headquarters near Korako. The 2d Battalion relieved the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, on the east flank, and the 3d Battalion, 127th Infantry, established a defense line along the southern and eastern edges of Tadji Bomber and Fighter Strips. 18 Information on 127th Infantry activities is based on: 127th Inf Jnl, 23 Apr-4 May 44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-^ May 44, pp. 3-6. 112 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Patrols of the 2d Battalion moved east along the coastal track to the mouth of the Driniumor, about twelve miles beyond Blue Beach ; up the banks of the Nigia River five miles to Chinapelli; and up the west bank of the Driniumor about six miles to Afua. From Afua a trail was found running westward through dense jungle to China- pelli by way of a village called Palauru. From Chinapelli one track ran north to the mouth of the Nigia and others wandered off in a westerly direction toward the Kapoam villages. From the Driniumor two main trails were found leading eastward — one the principal coastal track to Wewak and the other a rough inland trace originat- ing at Afua. The latter trail paralleled the coast line and ran along the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains. North of the trail was a flat coastal plain, generally forested with dense jungle growth and containing numerous swampy areas and a multitude of small and large streams. The plain narrowed gradually from a depth of about ten miles at the Nigia River to less than a mile at the Danmap River, flowing into the Pacific about forty- five miles east-southeast of Aitape. Beyond the Danmap, toward Wewak, was more rolling terrain where hills descended from the Torricelli Mountains down to the sea. The trail east from Afua crossed the many streams between the Driniumor and the Danmap at points three to five miles south of the coast. It was essential to the security of the newly won Tadji strips that any Japanese movements westward from Wewak along both inland and coastal trails be discovered and watched. Therefore, it was decided to send Company C, 127th Infantry, rein- forced by part of Company D, by boat to Nyaparake, a coastal village about seventeen miles east of the Nigia River. There the re- inforced company, known as the Nyaparake Force, was to set up a patrol base and re- port and delay Japanese movements in the vicinity. On 28 April the unit boarded small boats at Blue Beach and sailed eastward along the coast, missing its objective and landing near the mouth of the Dandriwad River, about eight miles east of Nyaparake. This error was quickly discovered but the force re- mained at its position for three days, sending out patrols in all directions. Few signs of enemy activity were observed, and the five Japanese killed in the area appeared to be stragglers rather than representatives of any organized unit of the 18th Army. On 1 May the unit moved by water back to Nyaparake. Outposts were established about four miles inland at Charov and Jalup, where the principal inland trail crossed the Drindaria River, and patrols were sent to the east and west over the inland trail and in both direc- tions along the coastal track. The Nyaparake Force noticed no signs of organized enemy activity in the areas patrolled during the next few days. Meanwhile, patrols of the 2d Battalion had moved along the coast from the Driniu- mor River to Yakamul, four miles west of Nyaparake. Elements of the 1st Battalion maintained a patrol base at Afua for four days, and 3d Battalion patrols scouted trails from Chinapelli to the Tadji strips and the Kapoam villages. No signs of organized en- emy movements were discovered, and only weary Japanese stragglers attempting to make their way inland and westward were encountered. This complete lack of organ- ized Japanese operations in the area pa- trolled by the 127th Infantry to 4 May, together with the surprisingly easy seizure of the Tadji strips by the 163d Infantry, con- PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 113 tradicted preassault estimates of the enemy situation in the Aitape area. The Enemy Situation to 4 May Prior to 22 April the Allies had estimated that 3,500 Japanese, including 1,500 com- bat troops of the 20th Division, were based at Aitape. The indications are that not more than 1,000 Japanese of all arms and services were actually in the Aitape area on D Day.17 These troops comprised mostly antiaircraft artillerymen and service personnel who fled inland when Allied landing operations be- gan. No organized resistance was encoun- tered except for the skirmishes at Kamti, and the only evidence of centralized com- mand in the area was a captured report, dated 25 April, from the Commander, Aitape Garrison Unit, to the 18th Army. The document told of the Allied landings, described operations to 25 April, set the strength of the Aitape Garrison U nit at 240 troops, and outlined a grandiose plan of attack, which probably culminated in the action around Kamti. Unknown to the Al- lies, there had been a small scouting party of the 20th Division at Aitape on D Day, but after the landings this group withdrew east- ward to rejoin the main body of the 18th Army. Other Japanese survivors in the Aitape area tried to make their way west- ward to Vanimo, a minor enemy barge hideout on the coast between Aitape and Hollandia.18 " Rad Alamo to GHQ, WF-3714, 22 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 21-22 Apr 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 Est of Enemy Sit, Persecution, 24 Jan 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnl, 26 Jan 44; PTF G-2 Jnl, 22 Apr-4 May 44; GHQ SWPA, G-2 DSEI's 710- 61, 1 Mar-22 Apr 44, in G-3 GHQ Jnls, 1 Mar-22 Apr 44. 18 PTF G-2 Jnl, 22 Apr~4 May 44; Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-220, 29 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hol- landia, 29-30 Apr 44; 18th Army Opns, III, 47, 55-56. Between 22 April and 4 May, Japanese casualties in the Aitape area were estimated at 525 killed, and during the same period 25 of the enemy were captured. Allied losses were 19 killed and 40 wounded. All the Allied casualties were American, and with but two or three exceptions all were suf- fered by the 163d Infantry.19 There were a few signs that the 18th Army might be initiating a movement west- ward from Wewak toward Aitape, since interrogations of natives and aerial recon- naissance produced indications of organized enemy activity far beyond the east flank of the Persecution Task Force. The Japa- nese were reported to be bridging the Anumb River, about fifteen miles east of the Danmap. Motor vehicles or their tracks were observed along the beach and on the coastal trail from Wewak west to the Anumb, and aerial observers and Allied ground patrols found that enemy parties were reconnoiter- ing the coastal track from the Danmap River west to the mouth of the Dandriwad. Natives reported that organized Japanese groups were bivouacking at various coastal villages between the Dandriwad and Danmap. Intelligence officers of the Persecution Task Force and Alamo Force interpreted these activities as indicating that an or- ganized westward movement by 18th Army units was under way. Whether or not this movement presaged an attack on the Per- secution Task Force was not yet clear, but it seemed certain that Allied troops on the east flank might soon meet strong Japanese units.20 " PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 22 Apr-4 May 44, p. 6; PTF G-l and G-2 Jnls, 22 Apr-4 May 44. 2'Rads, PTF to Alamo, KL-748 and AE-373, 3 May 44, Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-406, 4 May 44, and Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF-617, 4 May 44 all in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 4-5 May 44. 114 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Contact with the 18th Army on the East Flank While the Persecution Task Force was accomplishing its primary mission — seizure and repair of the Tadji strips — final plans were being made at higher headquarters for another operation in the Wakde-Sarmi area of Dutch New Guinea, 250 miles northwest of Aitape. The 163d Regimental Combat Team and General Doe with most of his staff were to participate in the new advance, which was scheduled for mid-May. General Krueger therefore directed that the 163d Regimental Combat Team of the 41st Di- vision be relieved of combat in the Aitape area and concentrated at Blue Beach by 6 May to begin staging for Wakde-Sarmi.21 Reorganization of the PERSECUTION Task Force The 32d Infantry Division, less two regi- ments, was to move from Saidor in eastern New Guinea to Aitape to relieve the 163d Regimental Combat Team. The 127th Regimental Combat Team of the 32d Di- vision had already arrived at Aitape. Ini- tially, the 128th Infantry was to remain at Saidor as part of the Alamo Force Reserve for Wakde-Sarmi. The remainder of the 32d Division, consisting of the 126th Regi- mental Combat Team and division troops, arrived at Blue Beach on 4 May. Maj. Gen. William H. Gill, the division commander, immediately assumed command of the Per- secution Task Force and two days later his division staff, after becoming acquainted !1 Alamo Force FO 15, 29 Apr 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 29-30 Apr 44; Rad, PTF to Alamo, R-103, 4 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 6-7 May 44. with the situation in the Aitape area, began activity as Headquarters, Persecution Task Force.22 Just before the Wakde-Sarmi operation began, it was decided to move the 128th Infantry from Saidor to Aitape so that the unit would be closer to its potential objec- tive area in case of need. Noncombat ships being available, the 128th Infantry (less the 3d Battalion) was shipped to Blue Beach, where it arrived on 1 5 May. The rest of the regiment, together with rear echelons of other 3 2d Division units, arrived at Aitape later in the month. Early in June the 1 28th Infantry was released from its Alamo Force Reserve role for Wakde-Sarmi and reverted to the control of the 32d Division and the Persecution Task Force.23 As soon as General Gill assumed com- mand of the Persecution Task Force, de- fenses in the Aitape area were reorganized. The area west of Waitanan Creek, desig- nated the West Sector, was assigned to the 126th Regimental Combat Team. To the east, the 127th Regimental Combat Team was to operate in an area named the East Sector. A series of defensive lines in front of a main line of resistance around the air- strips covered the approaches to the vital fields. Positions on the main line of resist- ance were to be constructed rapidly but were to be occupied only on orders from task force headquarters. Beyond the main line of resistance there were set up a local security line, an outpost line, of resistance, and an outpost security patrol line. The lat- B Alamo Force FO 15, 29 Apr 44; 32d Div FO 1, 30 Apr 44, and PTF FO 2, 6 May 44, both in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-3 May 44. ™ Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-840, 17 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 16-18 May 44; Rad, Alamo Adv Hq to PTF, WH-271, 8 Jun 44, in Alamo Adv Hq G-3 Jnl Wakde-Biak, 7-8 Jun 44. 4-1 » Ma, HEADQUARTERS PERSECUTION TASK FORCE (Headquarters J!d Infanlry Division) Maj. Gen. William H. Gill Weil Seclor (Headquarters 1 26lh Infantry) Eoil Seclor (Headquailets 127lK Inlonlry) Col. Meile H. Howe I2*ihln,ani.y 1S7lh inlan 19-20 Ma, HEADQUARTERS PERSECUTION TASK FORCE (Headquarters 32d InlanTry Division) Mai. Gen. William H, Gill (H.adq«a!re«SlS6* Infantry) East Secloi (Headquarter 1271b infonlfy) Eria Gen. Clarence A. Martin 116,1, Inlanliy X Nyapaiolce Force 1 19.7,1. Infanlry (-j Elements Tit Ballation 127lh Infantry ISd Reconnaissance Troap 29 May-IOJune HEADQUARTERS PERSECUTION TASK FORCE (Headquarter* 32d InFanliy Division) Mai. Gen. William H. Gill Wen Seclor (Headquarters 126lh Inlonliy) Persecution Task Force Reserve (Heodqvarlers 138,1. Inlanlry) Easl Sector (Headquarters 127th Inlonliy) fins. Gen. Cloience A. Martin lS6lh Infanlry (less 1sl and Id Bollolions) 128lh Infanlry 1st Battalion, 1S6lh Inlanlry 2d Ballation, 1 2,611. Infantry Boiley Foice (2-5 June only) Heriick Forte (1-5 June only) lu-4SJuiie HEADQUARTERS PERSECUTION TASK FORCE (Headquarters 33d Infanlry Division) Maj. Gen. William H. Gill West Seclor (Headquarters 1J6lh Inlanliy) Cenler Seclor (Headquarters 1 S8lh Infanlry) 12olh Infanliy (less 3d Bollalion) 128lS Infanlty (less 1:1 Bollalion) 127lh Inlonliy Easl Seclor Brig. Gen. Clarence A, Martin III Ballalion, 1S8lh Inlanliy 2d Ballalion, T24lh Infanlry 116 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES ter, lying about ten miles inland, was to mark the general limits of patrolling.24 The 126th Infantry completed relief of the 163d Infantry's outposts and patrol bases on the west flank by 8 May. There- after, outpost troops were rotated from time to time, and gradually many outposts were closed out, as Japanese activity on the west ceased. On 29 May, because Japanese pres- sure was increasing on the east flank, the 1st and 2d Battalions, 126th Infantry, were transferred to the East Sector, and responsi- bility for patrolling and defending the West Sector (which had been extended in mid- May to the eastern edge of Tadji Fighter Strip) passed to the 3d Battalion, 126th Infantry. Patrolling by all elements of the 126th Infantry in the West Sector ac- counted for a few Japanese killed, found dead along inland trails, or captured.25 On 10 June boundaries between various elements of the Persecution Task Force were again changed and redispositions were effected. A new defensive area, desig- nated the Center Sector, was established between the West and East Sectors to cover the ground between the eastern edge of the Tadji airstrips to a line running southwest- ward inland from Pro. The new sector became the responsibility of the 128th In- fantry, while the 126th Infantry retained control in the West Sector and the 127th continued operations in the East Sector, At the same time, the main line of resistance was drawn in toward the airfields from a previous eastern extension along the Nigia River, and the earlier inland defensive lines were either abolished or withdrawn. Troops of the West and Center Sectors continued S1 PTF FO 2, 6 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hol- landia, 2-3 May 44. 25 126th Inf Jnl, 4 May-27 Jun 44; 1st Bn 126th Inf Jnl, 4 May-27 Jun 44; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 3-10. patrolling in the areas for which they were responsible. Only a few enemy stragglers were encountered, and no signs of organized Japanese activity were discovered in those sectors.20 East Sector Troops Meet the Enemy Col. Merle H. Howe, commanding the 127th Infantry, was assigned to the com- mand of the East Sector on 6 May. His mis- sions were to maintain contact with the enemy on the eastern flank, to discover en- emy intentions, and to delay any westward movement on the part of elements of the 1 8th Army. He was ordered to maintain outposts and patrol bases at Anamo and Nyaparake on the coast and at Chinapelli and Afua inland. When he took over his new command, Colonel Howe had little in- formation concerning the Japanese on the east flank beyond the fact that elements of two of the 1 8th Army's three divisions had been identified far east of the Nigia River. Troops of the 20th Division had been dis- covered building defensive positions on the east bank of the Danmap River and ele- ments of the 41st Division were thought to be in the same general area. Finally, air ob- servers had discovered concentrations of Japanese troops at coastal villages between the Danmap and Wewak. There seemed to be definite indications that large elements of the 18th Army were beginning to move westward from Wewak.27 Colonel Howe subdivided his East Sector into battalion areas. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, was to maintain a rein- s' ptf FO 4, 10 Jun 44, atchd to PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 126th Inf Jnl, 4 May-27 Jun 44; 128th Inf Jnl, 4 May-Jun 44. 21 PTF FO 2, 6 May 44, and G-2 Annex thereto, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 2-3 May 44; 127th Inf Jnl file, 4-15 May 44. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 117 forced rifle company at Nyaparake and an outpost at Babiang, to the east near the mouth of the Dandriwad River. The bat- talion was to patrol up the Dandriwad and along the coast east to the Danmap River. The 2d Battalion was made responsible for inland patrols to Chinapelli, Palauru, and Afua. The 3d Battalion was to maintain permanent outposts at Anamo, near the mouth of the Driniumor River, and at Afua, six miles up that stream. Some of these dis- positions were already in effect, with the Nyaparake Force on station and 2d Bat- talion units operating in the Palauru area. The other dispositions were completed by mid-May.28 The Nyaparake Force, comprising Com- pany C and elements of Company D, and commanded by Capt. Tally D. Fulmer of Company C, 127th Infantry, started pa- trolling to the east and inland on 7 May.29 On that day, patrols pushed across the mouth of the Dandriwad River to Babiang and Marubian. After clashing with a well- organized Japanese patrol, the Nyaparake Force elements withdrew to the west bank of the Dandriwad and spent the next day patrolling up that river and questioning natives concerning enemy movements. On the 8th a rifle platoon and a light machine gun section from Company A arrived to strengthen the Nyaparake Force. The advance eastward was resumed the next day along two routes beyond Babiang. One was the coastal trail and the other the "Old German Road," a name presumably referring to the days of German occupation " 127th Inf Jnl file, 4-15 May 44. 20 Information in the remainder of this subsection is based principally upon: 127th Inf Jnl files, 5—15 and 15-31 May 44: 1st Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 3-10; PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 1-2. of this part of New Guinea before World War I. The Old German Road paralleled the coastal track at a distance of about 300 yards inland. Supported by Seventh Fleet PT's based at Aitape, Nyaparake Force pa- trols pushed almost 5,000 yards east of the Dandriwad during the day, encountering some resistance along both routes. At dusk all patrols retired to Babiang, and Captain Fulmer re-examined his situation in the light of information obtained during the day. Large enemy groups had been reported to the west of Nyaparake at Yakamul and even as far distant as the Driniumor River, over halfway back to the Tadji perimeter. To the east, Japanese opposition gave every indication of increasing. Finally, it appeared that the Nyaparake Force was being out- flanked to the south. Reports had come in that enemy parties were moving along the foothills of the Torricelli Mountains imme- diately south of the main inland east-west trail, which crossed the Dandriwad and Drindaria Rivers about four miles upstream. Captain Fulmer strengthened the out- post at Charov, up the Drindaria, in order to keep closer watch on the enemy reported south of that village. At the same time he requested that aircraft strafe the coastal trail and the Old German Road east of Babiang before any further attempt to ad- vance eastward was made. Colonel Howe agreed to request the air support mission, and he ordered the Nyaparake Force to con- tinue pushing eastward after the air strike was completed. Eight P-40's of No. 78 Wing, Royal Australian Air Force, bombed and strafed the two roads east of Babiang at 1130 on 10 May. Marubian, thought to be a Japa- nese assembly point, was also attacked. After the air strikes Captain Fulmer sent the 1st Platoon, Company C, forward from Ba- 118 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES biang while the. 3d Platoon moved on to take Marubian without opposition. A de- fensive perimeter was set up around Maru- bian and an ambush was established on the Old German Road south of that village. No contacts were made with the enemy during the day. The advance continued on the 1 1th and the two forward platoons had reached a point about two miles beyond Marubian by early afternoon when they were halted by Japanese machine gun and small arms fire. The 3d Platoon, on the coastal trail, pulled back about six hundred yards from the point of contact and watched a party of about fifty-five well-equipped Japanese proceed southwestward off the trail and dis- appear inland. The 3d Platoon dug in for the night on the beach, while the 1st Pla- toon, on the Old German Road, returned to Marubian. Captain Fulmer decided to move the rest of Company C, 127th Infantry, to Maru- bian on 12 May. Since this would practi- cally denude the base at Nyaparake of combat troops, the Charov outpost was ordered to return to the base village. These redispositions were accomplished during the morning of the 12th, and the advance east- ward beyond Marubian was resumed about 1300 the same day. The 3d Platoon of Company C, in the lead, soon encountered rifle and machine gun fire from Japanese positions at a stream- crossing near which the advance had stopped the previous afternoon. In an at- tempt to outflank the Japanese, the 1st Platoon moved inland about 300 yards and into line south of the 3d. This maneuver led the 1st Platoon into dense jungle where it was stopped by determined enemy small arms fire. Further probing of the enemy defenses proved fruitless and, as night was approaching, Captain Fulmer pulled the platoon out of action. The unit moved back to the beach and dug in about 600 yards west of the stream crossing, where the 3d Platoon had already set up defenses. About 1100 on the 13th the 2d Platoon, with a section of 81 -mm. mortars and an- other of .50-caliber machine guns attached, arrived in the forward area. The riflemen of the 2d and 3d Platoons then joined forces and pushed on down the coast through the scene of the previous afternoon's encounter until held up at another stream by new enemy defenses. The 1st Platoon remained behind to protect the mortars and machine guns. Scouts having reported that the Jap- anese were firmly entrenched at the new crossing, Captain Fulmer used his heavy weapons to soften the opposition. The 81- mm. mortars and the .50-caliber machine guns fired for about twenty minutes on the enemy defenses, and a section of 60-mm. mortars joined in the last ten minutes of the barrage. Under cover of this fire the 2d and 3d Platoons formed along the west bank of the small stream on a front extending 300 yards inland. The 3d Platoon was on the beach and the 2d on the right. At 1400, as preparation fire ceased, the two platoons started eastward. The 3d crossed the small creek near the mouth without difficulty and pushed eastward nearly 500 yards before encountering any resistance. The situation in the 2d Platoon's sector was quite different. There the ground was covered with sago palms, underbrush, and heavy jungle growth which limited visibility to five or ten yards. The platoon ran into concentrated rifle and machine gun fire im- mediately after starting its attack and was unable to force a crossing of the small stream. The platoon leader disengaged his force and tried to cross the creek farther in- land. But the enemy refused his left flank PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 119 and the maneuver failed. Because the dense rain forest masked their fires, mortars and heavy machine guns could not support further advances in the inland sector. Cap- tain Fulmer therefore pulled the platoon out of action on the right flank, drew it back to the beach, and sent it across the stream along the route taken by the 3d Platoon. After crossing the creek and drawing abreast of the 3d Platoon, the 2d Platoon again attacked in a southeasterly direction. The unit overran a small Japanese supply dump and aid station and advanced 50-100 yards inland but was again pinned down by enemy machine gun fire. One squad at- tempted to find the left of the enemy's de- fenses by moving 1 00 yards deeper into the jungle. This effort proved futile. Since the platoon's forward elements were now being fired on from both the south and the east and because it was again impossible to sup- port the unit with mortar or machine gun fire, no further progress could be expected. The 3d Platoon had been forced to halt be- cause of the danger of being cut off by the Japanese opposing the 2d Platoon. Captain Fulmer called off the attack to set up night defenses. The 3d Platoon anchored its left flank on the beach at a point about 150 yards east of the small stream, extending its lines about 50 yards inland and westward another 75 yards. The 2d Platoon tied its left into the right of the 3d and stretched the perimeter west to the mouth of the creek. About 200 yards beyond the eastern edge of this perim- eter was an outpost of eight men, including mortar observers who were in contact with the main force by sound-powered telephone. Inside the larger perimeter were 60-mm. mortars, light machine guns, .50-caliber machine guns, and an aid station. Since the 8 1 -mm. mortars could not obtain clearance in the area chosen for the main force, they remained under the protection of the 1st Platoon in a separate perimeter about 500 yards to the west. It seemed certain that the Japanese who had been holding up the ad- vance during the day would attack during the night, and it was considered probable that such an attack would come through the heavy jungle at the southern, or inland, side of the main perimeter, where visibility was limited to five yards even in daylight. The expected attack was not long in com- ing, although not from the direction antic- ipated. Shortly after 0200 on 14 May, after a short preparation by grenades, light mor- tars, and light machine guns, 100 to 200 Japanese of the 78th Infantry, 20th Divi- sion,50 attacked from the east against the coastal sector of the perimeter. This assault was broken up by rifle and automatic weap- ons fire and by lobbing mortar shells to the rear of the advancing enemy group. The Japanese disappeared into the jungle south of the narrow beach. For the next hour Cap- tain Fulmer's mortars placed harassing fire into suspected enemy assembly points east of the small stream. Meanwhile, the eight- man outpost reported that many small par- ties of Japanese were moving up the beach within 300 yards of the main perimeter and then slipping southward into the jungle. Such maneuvers seemed to presage another attack. The second assault came about 0330, this time against the eastern and southeast- ern third of the defenses. The Japanese were again beaten back by small arms and mor- tar fire, but at 0500 they made a final effort which covered the entire eastern half of the perimeter. This last attack was quickly broken up and the Japanese quieted down. 30 This identification is from 18th Army Opns, III, 83-84. 120 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES About 0730 on the 14th, elements of Com- pany A, 127th Infantry, began moving into the forward perimeter to reinforce Captain Fulmer's beleaguered units. The 1st Pla- toon of Company C and the 81 -mm. mortar section also moved forward in preparation for continuing the advance. But now questions arose at the headquar- ters of the East Sector and the Persecution Task Force concerning the feasibility of fur- ther advance. Captain Fulmer was willing to continue forward if he could be rein- forced by a rifle platoon of Company A, another section of heavy machine guns, and another section of 8 1 -mm. mortars. Colonel Howe and General Gill looked on the matter from a different point of view. It would be extremely difficult, they realized, to estab- lish an overland supply system for the ad- vancing force and they knew that there were not enough small boats available in the Aitape area to insure overwater supply. Further advance would accomplish little unless a large base for future operations could be established well beyond the Maru- bian area, a project for which insufficient troops and amphibious craft were available. Moreover, the principal mission of the Per- secution Task Force was to protect the Tadji airfields, not to undertake large-scale offensive operations. General Gill finally decided to withdraw the Nyaparake Force's advance elements from the Marubian area and replace it with Company A, under the command of Capt. Herman Bottcher,31 who was to carry out a holding mission on the west bank of the Dandriwad. " Captain Bottcher had been awarded a DSC and a battlefield promotion from the ranks during the Papuan Campaign. His exploits there are recounted in Milner, Victory in Papua. Withdrawal from Yakamul On 1 3 May the bulk of Company A ar- rived at Ulau Mission, just west of the Dandriwad's mouth.32 Company C re- mained at Marubian temporarily. There was little action on the 1 3th, but events the next day prompted General Gill to change his plans again. On the 14th Japanese patrols moved between Company C and the Dandriwad River, cutting the company's overland line of withdrawal. At the same time strong enemy patrols harassed Com- pany A's positions at Ulau Mission. It seemed apparent that the American outposts could not long withstand this pressure and, therefore, both the Ulau and Marubian units were picked up by small craft on the 15th and taken westward to Nyaparake, whence the advance eastward had begun a week earlier. During the next few days the Nyaparake Force continued patrolling, making con- tacts with well-organized enemy units which appeared to be more aggressive and larger than those previously encountered in the East Sector. Companies C and D returned to Tadji Plantation on 19 May and were 82 Information in this subsection is based on : 127th Inf Jnl files, 15-31 May and 1-11 Jun 44: 1st Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 32d Ren Tr Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 6-14; PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44: PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 4-9: 1st Bn 126th Inf Jnl, 4 May-27 Jun 44; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 2-7; PTF FO 3, 19 May 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 2d Bn 80th Inf, Field Diary, 31 May-14 Jul 44, as translated in 32d Inf Div G-2 files, in ORB RAC AGO collection; 18th Army Opns III, 84—88; Incl 2, Comments and Observations, pp. 1-2, to Ltr, Maj Gen Clarence A. Martin to Gen Ward, 12 Nov 50, no sub, in OCMH files. The latter document is hereafter cited as Mar- tin Comments. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 121 replaced at Nyaparake by the 3 2d Recon- naissance Troop. On the same day Brig. Gen. Clarence A. Martin, Assistant Division Commander, 32d Division, was placed in command of the East Sector and charged with the missions previously assigned to Colonel Howe — to maintain contact with and delay enemy units moving westward. General Martin was directed to move all East Sector troops except the Nyaparake Force to the west bank of the Driniumor River. The Nyaparake Force, now compris- ing the 3 2d Reconnaissance Troop and Company A, 127th Infantry, was placed under the command of Captain Bottcher, who was transferred from Company A to the command of the reconnaissance unit. To render the force more mobile, all its heavy equipment was sent back to Blue Beach, and the unit was instructed to retire to the Driniumor River in case Japanese pressure increased. Captain Bottcher's patrols soon found that enemy pressure was indeed increasing. Some Japanese patrols were active to the east while others outflanked the force to the south and, about 1850 on 22 May, attacked from the west. During the following night the Nyaparake Force fought its way out of this encirclement and retired two miles along the beach to Parakovio. The next day General Martin sent most of Company A back to Tadji and that night and during the morning of the 24th the remaining elements of the Nyaparake Force withdrew along the beach to good defensive positions at the mouth of a small creek about 3,000 yards west of Yakamul. The Japanese followed closely, occupying Yakamul and sending scouting parties westward along inland trails toward Afua and the Driniumor River. By now it was evident that the Japanese had crossed the Drindaria in some force and it appeared that the aggressive enemy patrols had missions other than merely screening movements far to the east in the Wewak area. Deeming the Japanese move- ments a threat to the security of the Tadji airfields, General Gill decided to make an effort to drive the enemy's forward units back across the Drindaria. For this purpose he assigned the 1st Battalion, 126th Infan- try, to the East Sector. The battalion was to move forward to the Nyaparake Force's perimeter, where Company G, 127th In- fantry, was to relieve Captain Bottcher's men. The 126th Infantry's unit was to be supported by Battery C, 126th Field Artil- lery Battalion, from positions at the mouth of the Driniumor and by Battery B from the perimeter of Company G, 127th Infantry. Company G completed the relief of the now misnamed Nyaparake Force on 31 May, and about 1 100 on the same day the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, reached the forward position. Lt. Col. Cladie A. Bailey's battalion pushed rapidly onward through Yakamul, from which the enemy withdrew hurriedly, and moved on to Parakovio against little opposition. Despite the lack of determined resistence on 3 1 May, it was soon to become evident that one battalion was not going to be strong enough to drive the Japanese forces already west of the Drindaria back across that stream. By this time elements of the 78th and 80th Infantry Regiments, 20th Division, had been defi- nitely identified west of the Drindaria. Al- though the Persecution Task Force did not yet know it, large segments of both regi- ments were operating in the Yakamul area, where they were supported by a few weap- ons of the 26th Field Artillery Regiment, 20th Division. These Japanese forces now began to strike back at the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, which, on 1 June, was able 122 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES to advance only 400 yards beyond Parakovio before it was stopped by enemy machine gun and artillery fire. At 1115 General Martin ordered the unit to retire to Yaka- mul. Using Yakamul as a base, the battalion was to develop the enemy situation along the Harech River from the coast to the foot- hills of the Torricelli Mountains, five miles inland. During the night of 1-2 June, Japanese artillery shelled the battalion command post and enemy patrols drove in outposts which had been set up just east of Yakamul. The next morning the battalion was divided into two parts. At Yakamul was stationed Com- pany A, Headquarters Company, and part of Company D. {Map 4] This combined group, numbering about 350 men, was put under the command of Capt. Gile A. Her- rick of Company A and designated Herrick Force. The rest of the battalion, now called Bailey Force, moved south down the trail from Yakamul to patrol along the Harech River. The Japanese soon became very active around the perimeter of Herrick Force. On 3 June the enemy launched a series of minor attacks against Company A, which was sep- arated from the rest of Herrick Force by a small, unbridged stream about four feet deep and varying in width from ten to fifty yards. Under cover of these attacks, other Japanese groups bypassed Herrick Force to the south and on the next morning appeared west of Yakamul, between Her- rick Force and the two-mile distant per- imeter of Company G, 127th Infantry. Sporadic small arms fire, intensifying during the afternoon, was directed at all parts of the Herrick Force perimeter during 4 June. About 1 640 this fire was augmented by mortar and artillery shells, a develop- ment which seemed to presage an imminent Japanese infantry attack. At 1830 an enemy force of more than company strength surged out of the jungle on the southeast side of the American perimeter in an apparent at- tempt to drive a wedge between Company A and the rest of Herrick Force. The attack was halted by automatic weapons fire and the barrier presented by the small stream. The enemy then turned northeast from the creek against Company A. Simultaneously, a small group of enemy attacked west along the beach. Because Company A was in danger of being surrounded, Captain Herrick ordered the unit to withdraw across the small stream to Yakamul. Since the Japanese had the stream covered with small arms and at least one well-concealed machine gun, the with- drawal was a slow process and consumed over an hour. During the movement the Japanese continued to attack and, toward the end of the hour, succeeded in overrun- ning some of Company A's automatic weap- ons positions. Deprived of this support, most of the remaining troops retreated rapidly across the stream, leaving behind radios, mortars, machine guns, and twenty to twenty-five dead or wounded men. Most of the wounded managed to get across the stream after darkness, which was approach- ing at the time of the enemy's final attack. By 1940 the Japanese were in complete possession of the Company A position, whence they could send flanking fire toward the Yakamul perimeter. Captain Herrick ordered his men to dig in deeply. He re- organized his positions and even put some of the lightly wounded on defensive posts. Japanese ground attacks kept up until 2200, and sporadic bursts of mortar, grenade, and machine gun fire continued throughout the night. When he learned of the situation at Yaka- mul, General Martin ordered Bailey Force to return to the coast and relieve Herrick PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 123 Force. Radio communication difficulties prevented delivery of this order until 2000 and it was 2200 before Colonel Bailey could organize his force in the darkness and heavy jungle and start it moving north. By that time the Japanese had a strong force block- ing the trail to Yakamul. Bailey Force there- fore had to swing northwest toward the perimeter of Company G, 127th Infantry, two miles west of Yakamul. After an ardu- ous overland march through trackless, heavily jungled terrain, the leading elements of Bailey Force began straggling into Com- pany G's perimeter about 1130 on 5 June. General Martin then ordered Bailey Force to move east and drive the Japanese from the Yakamul area, but this order was changed when the East Sector commander learned that Bailey Force had been march- ing for over thirteen hours on empty stom- achs and was not yet completely assembled at Company G's perimeter. Bailey Force was thereupon fed from Company G's limited food supply and sent west along the coastal trail to the Driniumor River. Company G and the battery of the 126th Field Artillery Battalion which it had been protecting moved back to the Driniumor late in the afternoon. Meanwhile, the evacuation of Herrick Force from Yakamul had also been ordered, and about 1115 on 5 June small boats ar- rived at Yakamul from Blue Beach to take the beleaguered troops back to the Tadji area. Insofar as time permitted, radios, am- munition, and heavy weapons for which there was no room on the boats were de- stroyed. As this work was under way, a few light mortars and light machine guns kept up a steady fire on the Japanese who, now surrounding the entire perimeter, had been harassing Herrick Force since dawn. At the last possible moment, just when it seemed the Japanese were about to launch a final infantry assault, Captain Herrick ordered his men to make for the small boats on the run. The move was covered by friendly rocket and machine gun fire from an LCM standing offshore, while the Japanese took the running men under fire from the old Company A positions. So fast and well or- ganized was the sudden race for the boats that the Japanese had no time to get all their weapons into action, and only one American was wounded during the board- ing. The small craft hurriedly left the area and took Herrick Force back to Blue Beach, where the unit was re -equipped. By 1500 the troops had rejoined the rest of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, on the Driniumor River. Losses of the 1st Battalion, 126th Infan- try, during its action in the Yakamul area were 18 men killed, 75 wounded, and 8 missing. The battalion estimated that it had killed 200 to 250 Japanese and wounded many more. 33 Operations Along the Driniumor While the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, had been patrolling in the Yakamul area, elements of the 127th Infantry had been operating to the west along the Driniumor River from the coast six miles upstream to Afua.34 Until the end of May little Japanese 83 A Japanese postwar estimate sets Japanese losses in the Yakamul area from 31 May through 6 June at 100 men killed or wounded. Whatever the true figures, the estimate of the 1st Battalion, 126th In- fantry, appears rather high. 34 Unless otherwise indicated, material in this sub- section is from: PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May— 28 Jun 44, pp. 3-10- PTF G-3 Jul, 4 May-2B Jun 44; 127th Inf Jnl files, 15-31 May, 1-11 Jun, 12-18 Jun, and 19-27 Jun 44; 1st Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 3d Bn 127th Inf Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44; 127th Inf Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 4-9 ; Martin Comments, pp. 2—4. YAKAMUL AREA. Reproduction of original sketch (top), prepared in the field by S-3, 1st Batallion, 126th Infantry. Aerial photography of the same area (bottom). 126 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES activity had been noted in the Anamo^Afua area, but on the 31st of the month a ration train carrying supplies up the west bank of the Driniumor to two platoons of Company L, 127th Infantry, at Afua was ambushed and forced back to the coast. Later in the day a party of Japanese estimated to be of company strength was seen crossing the Driniumor River from east to west at a point about 1,000 yards north of Afua. By dusk it appeared that at least two companies of Japanese had crossed the river near Afua and had established themselves on high, thickly jungled ground north and northwest of the village. During the next four days elements of the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, maneuvered in fruitless attempts to drive a Japanese group, 75 to 100 strong, off a low, jungled ridge about a mile and a half north of Afua. Colonel Howe, concerned about the lack of success of his troops, early on the morning of 5 June radioed to the battalion com- mander: "This is the third day of maneu- vering to drive the enemy off that ridge. So far today we have had no report of enemy firing a shot and we are not sure they are even there. I have been besieged with ques- tions as to why we don't fight the enemy. Unless we can report some accomplishment today I have no alibis to offer. Push either Fulmer [Company C] or Sawyer [Company B] in there until they draw fire." 35 During the morning Companies B and C organized a final attack and occupied the ridge, which the Japanese had abandoned during the night. Meanwhile the Persecution Task Force had decided to establish an outer defensive line along the Driniumor River. Originat- ing in the Torricelli Mountains south of " Msg, 127th Inf to 1st Bn 127th Inf, 5 Jun 44, in 127th Inf Jnl file, 1-11 Jun 44. Afua, the river ran almost due north through many gorges and over steep falls to a sharp bend at Afua. From Afua to its mouth, a six-mile stretch, the river had an open bed varying from 75 to 150 yards in width. Ex- cept during tropical cloudbursts, this section of the river was not much more than knee deep. Dense rain forests extended to the river's banks at most places, although there were some areas of thinner, brushlike veg- etation. Islands, or rather high points of the wide bed, were overgrown with high cane- brake or grasses, limiting visibility across the stream. The 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, dug in for 3,600 yards along the west bank of the river north from Afua, while the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, covered the same bank south from the river's mouth about 2,000 yards. A gap of some 3,000 yards which was left between the two units was covered by patrols. On 7 June, when the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, replaced the 1st Battalion, 126th Infantry, on the northern portion of the defense line, a company of the former unit was strung out along some 500 yards of the gap. On the same day Japanese activity broke out anew in the Afua area, this time about 1,300 yards west of Afua on the Afua- Palauru trail, which had now become a main supply line for troops stationed in the Afua area. Two days later the Japanese had disappeared from the Afua-Palauru trail, much to the surprise of the Persecution Task Force. The task force G—2 Section de- cided that the enemy had withdrawn when his ration and ammunition supply was de- pleted, and this belief was strengthened during the next day or so when, contrary to previous sightings, all Japanese patrol move- ments in the Driniumor River area seemed to be from west to east. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 127 For a couple of days some thought had been given to withdrawing the 1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, from Afua because of the apparent threat to the Afua-Palauru supply line, but on 10 June Headquarters, Perse-, cution Task Force, decided to leave the battalion in place. On the same day the East Sector was ordered to speed develop- ment of strong defensive positions along the Driniumor. The river line was to be held as long as possible in the face of a Japanese attack and, if forced back, the East Sector troops were to delay enemy advances in successive positions — one along the line X-ray River-Koronal Creek, about halfway to the Nigia River, and the other at the Nigia itself — before retreating to the main line of resistance around the airfields. The East Sector was to patrol east of the Driniumor in order to maintain contact with the enemy:30 After 10 June Japanese patrols in the Driniumor area became less numerous and less aggressive, but more determined enemy parties were located in hilly and heavily forested terrain along the southern branches of Niumen Creek, which lay about 3,000 yards east of the Driniumor. The Japanese appeared to be forming a counterreconnais- sance screen along Niumen Creek in order to prevent East Sector troops from finding out anything about deployments farther east. So successful were the enemy efforts that few patrols of the 127th Infantry (the 3d Battalion replaced the 1st at Afua on 22 June) managed to push beyond Niumen Creek. In the area covered by the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, some patrols were able to move east along the coast as far as Yakamul, but about 20 June the Japanese put more J" PTF FO 4, 10 Jun 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May- 28 Jun 44; Martin Comments, pp. 2-3. forces into the Yakamul area and stopped American patrolling in the region. In an attempt to gather additional information, one patrol was carried far down the coast to Suain Plantation. There a landing was made in a veritable hornet's nest of Japa- nese activity and the few men who reached the beach were hurriedly withdrawn. No more such long-range efforts to obtain infor- mation were made. The closing days of June found the Per- secution Task Force still in firm possession of the Tadji airfield area. Operations on the west flank had overcome all Japanese oppo- sition in that region, and no more enemy activity had been encountered there after early May. On the east flank, however, the situation was far different. All elements of the Persecution Task Force which had moved east of the Driniumor River had been gradually forced back until, at the end of the month, even small patrols were hav- ing difficulty operating east of the river. As the month ended, the task force's eastern defenses were along the west bank of the Driniumor, where the 1st Battalion, 128th Infantry, and the 3d Battalion, 127th In- fantry, were digging in, anticipating future attacks by elements of the 18th Army. Ex- cept for minor outposts, the rest of the Per- secution Task Force was encamped behind the Tadji airfield main line of resistance. Support of East Sector Operations East Sector forces were supplied by a variety of methods. Units along the coast were supported directly by small boat from Blue Beach or by native ration trains mov- ing along the coastal track. Supplies to the Afua area went south from the coast along the Anamo-Afua trail or, later, over the inland track from the Tadji fields through 128 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES Chinapelli and Palauru. Wheeled transport was impracticable except along short stretches of the coastal track. In early June, when the Japanese ambushed many ration parties which attempted to reach Afua, ex- periments were made with air supply from the Tadji strips. Breakage and loss were heavy at first, but air supply rapidly became more successful as pilots gained experience and ground troops located good dropping grounds. A dropping ground cleared on the west bank of the Driniumor about 2,200 yards north of Afua soon became the prin- cipal source of supply for troops in the Afua area.87 Communications during operations east of the Driniumor were carried out prin- cipally by radio, but between units along the river and from the stream back to higher headquarters telephone became the prin- cipal means of communication. Keeping the telephone lines in service was a task to which much time and effort had to be devoted. The Japanese continually cut the lines, or American troops and heavy equipment ac- cidentally broke the wires. The enemy often stationed riflemen to cover breaks in the line, thus making repair work dangerous. Usually, it was found less time consuming and less hazardous to string new wire than to attempt to find and repair breaks. As a result, miles of telephone wire soon lined the ground along the trails or was strung along the trees in the Driniumor River area and back to the Tadji perimeter.38 37 PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 12-19; 127th Inf Jnl files, 1-11, 12-18, and 19-27 Jun 44; PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44. ffl Intervs with Brig Gen Julian W. Cunningham, ex-CG 1 1 2 Cav RCT, and Capt Leonard Lowry, ex- CO Company I, 127th Inf, Apr 47, copies in OCMH files. Many of the remarks concerning tele- phone and radio communications in this section are based on the experience of the 112th Cavalry in operations along the Driniumor River after 28 June. Before mid- June most telephone mes- sages in the East Sector were sent "in the clear," but evidence began to indicate that the Japanese were tapping East Sector lines. On 19 June, therefore, the Persecution Task Force directed that no more clear text telephone messages be used in the East Sec- tor. As in the case of the telephone, all radio messages, of which some concerning routine matters had been previously sent in the clear, were encoded after mid-June.3fl Radio communications presented no par- ticular problems in the coastal region, but inland radio trouble was chronic and some- times acute. Radio range was limited, especially at night, by dense jungle and at- mospheric conditions, while almost daily tropical storms originating over the Torri- celli Mountains hampered both transmission and reception. At times the only way radio could be employed in the Afua area was by having artillery liaison sets transmit to artil- lery liaison planes flying directly overhead. There were some indications that the Japa- nese tried to jam East Sector radio circuits, but there was never any proof that the sus- pected jamming was anything more than static caused by adverse atmospheric condi- tions.40 Principal naval support for units in the Aitape area after the end of April was pro- According to Captain Lowry, who had been in the Aitape area since 23 April, the remarks apply equally well to the period before 28 June. The journals of all units of the Persecution Task Force during the period 22 April to 28 June contain many entries concerning the difficulties of communication, espe- cially radio, in the Aitape area. 36 PTF G-3 Jnl, 4 May-28 Jun 44. 40 The suspicion that the Japanese tapped tele- phone lines and jammed radio circuits is to be found in the journals and reports of most of the American units which operated in the Aitape area. However, no Japanese documents captured at the time, no on- the-spot interrogations of prisoners, and no postwar Japanese reports contain any evidence that the en- emy engaged in cither practice. PRELUDE TO THE BATTLE OF THE DRINIUMOR 129 TADJI FIGHTER STRIP after 28 April. vided by Seventh Fleet PT's. These speedy craft devoted most of their attention to Japanese barge traffic east of Aitape, sink- ing or damaging so many of the enemy craft that the 18th Army units were forced to limit their westward movements to poor overland trails. One of the largest single "bags" was obtained during the night of 26-27 June when fifteen Japanese barges were sunk near Wewak. In addition to their antibarge activity, the PT's also undertook many reconnaissance missions both east and west of Aitape, and, from time to time, pro- vided escorts or fire support for East Sector units operating east of the Driniumor. PT's also carried out many daylight patrols in co-operation with Australian aircraft based on the Tadji strips. The principal targets of these air-sea operations were Japanese coastal guns and troop concentrations along the beach between the Drindaria and Danmap Rivers.*1 Close air support and other air missions requested by the Persecution Task Force were carried out under the direction of No. 10 Operational Group, Royal Australian Air Force. From 24 April through 12 May this group's combat planes comprised three P-40 squadrons of No. 78 Wing. The wing moved out of the Aitape area toward the end of May and from the period 25 May to 9 June only the 1 10th Reconnaissance Squadron, U. S. Fifth Air Force, was sta- tioned at Tadji. On the 9th a squadron of Beaufighters (twin-engined fighters) of the Royal Australian Air Force's No. 71 Wing « PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 10-11. 130 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES arrived at Tadji and by the 15th two more squadrons of the same wing, both equipped with Beauforts (twin-engined fighter-bombers), had reached Aitape. On the 22d of the month, Headquarters, No. 10 Operational Group, left Tadji and con- trol of air operations in the Aitape area passed to Headquarters, No. 71 Wing, In May the Australian aircraft flew over 1,600 sorties and dropped almost fifty-seven tons of bombs of all types on ground targets from Aitape to Wewak. During June the pace of air operations was stepped up and from the 7th of that month until 6 July the two Beaufort squadrons alone flew 495 sorties and dropped about 325 tons of bombs. When more bombing than the Tadji-based Beauforts could provide was needed, A-20's and B-25's of the Fifth Air Force, flying first from Nadzab in eastern New Guinea and later from Hollandia, swung into action. The Australian Beau- forts were also occasionally pressed into serv- ice as supply aircraft, dropping rations and ammunition to American forces along the Driniumor. Most supply missions were, however, undertaken by Fifth Air Force C-47's from Nadzab or Hollandia or some- times employing one of the Tadji strips as a staging base. Both Fifth Air Force and Australian planes also flew many reconnais- sance missions between Aitape and Wewak. These operations, together with the bomb- ing of coastal villages occupied by the Japa- nese, suspected enemy bivouac areas, bridges over the many streams between the Driniumor and Wewak, and Japanese field or antiaircraft artillery emplacements, ma- terially assisted the East Sector in the exe- cution of its delaying and patrolling missions.42 4J Ltrs, F/Lt Davies, Officer-in-Charge, War Hist Sec, Hq RAAF, to author, 2 Apr and 8 May 48, in OCMH files; PTF Opns Rpt Aitape, 4 May-28 Jun 44, pp. 10-11. CHAPTER VI Deployment for Battle Reinforcement and Reorganization of the PERSECUTION Task Force Prior to 22 April the Persecution Task Force had little information concerning the intentions of the 18th Army, but soon after that date the task force learned that the Japanese unit had planned to move from Wewak toward Hollandia. In May and June, East Sector operations had produced many indications that a westward displace- ment of the 18th Army was in full swing. The Decision to Reinforce Aitape For some time the G-2 Section of Head- quarters, Alamo Force, did not believe that the movements noted by the Persecution Task Force presaged a Japanese attack on the Aitape perimeter. Instead, Alamo Force considered it more probable that the 18th Army was merely establishing strong points along the coast west from Wewak in order to delay Allied pushes eastward or to pro- vide flank protection for the main body of the 18th Army which might attempt to by- pass Aitape and Hollandia to the south and join the 2d Army in western New Guinea.1 Strength was added to these beliefs when patrols of the Allied Intelligence Bureau 1 Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 40, 10 May 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. (AIB),2 operating far inland beyond the Torricelli Mountains, reported westward movement of many small Japanese parties along inland trails.3 Because more definite information was lacking, Alamo Force, un- til mid- June, clung to the idea that the 18th Army might bypass Aitape.4 The first identifications of organized enemy units east of Aitape had been secured during operations near Marubian in mid- May, when it was found that elements of the 20th Division were operating in that area.5 Later the same month the Persecu- tion Task Force discovered from captured s The AIB was an operating agency of G-2 GHQ SWPA. It sent patrols behind enemy lines to gather information by a variety of means. Most of the white personnel of AIB parties operating in eastern New Guinea were Australians familiar with the terrain by reason of prewar residence or exploration. Native police were also used, but only occasionally were American personnel attached to the AIB parties in eastern New Guinea. In the Aitape area, the PTF sent out a few long-range American patrols. A few radio intelligence teams, operating to some extent under PTF direction and for other purposes on mis- sions for GHQ SWPA, were also sent inland from the Tadji perimeter. 3 Alamo Force, G-2 Daily Rpt, 18 May 44, in Alamo G-2 Jnl Hollandia, 10 May-15 Jun 44. 1 Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 45, 14 Jun 44, copy in G— 2 DofA files, indicates a final change of attitude on the part of the Alamo G— 2 Section. "Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-3134, 15 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 14-15 May 44; Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-336J, 16 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 16-18 May 44. 132 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES documents and prisoners that elements of both the 20 th and 4 1st Divisions were along the Dandriwad River.8 Documents cap- tured by AIB patrols at the end of May in- dicated that the two divisions were to attack both Hollandia and Aitape. At that time the Alamo Force G— 2 Section estimated that the 18th Army might be mounting a two-pronged assault on Aitape,7 and by early June the G-2 Section believed that the 20th Division was in place east of Aitape, waiting only for the 41st Division to move up before launching an assault against the Persecution Task Force. The other divi- sion of the 18th Army, the 51st, was thought to be at Wewak, and it was believed that the unit was not to move westward. Thus, by early June it seemed evident to Alamo Force that the Japanese parties previously encountered south of the Torricelli Moun- tains comprised service troops no longer needed at Wewak or troops who had started moving westward before 22 April. The Alamo Force G-2 Section expected that the 20th and 4 1st Divisions could be in position to attack the Persecution Task Force by the end of June.8 General Krueger believed that a Japanese assault could gain only temporary containment of Allied forces at Aitape and that an attack would be a "Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-958, 21 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 19-21 May 44; Rads, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF-3604 and WF-3526, 22 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 22-25 May 44; Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-1152, 29 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 26-29 May 44. ' Rads, Alamo to PTF, WF-5374 and WF-6412, 30 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 30 May-2 Jun 44; Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43, 31 May 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. 8 Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-1450, 10 Jun 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 7-12 Jun 44; Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-1491, 12 Jun 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-19 Jun 44; Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF-3097, 15 Jun 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-19 Jun 44; Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 45, 14 Jun 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. diversionary measure aimed at delaying further Allied advances in western New Guinea. Such action would have much to recommend itself to higher Japanese head- quarters which, the Alamo Force G-2 Section correctly believed, had already be- come reconciled to the loss of the 18th Army? On 1 7 June General MacArthur ques- tioned Alamo Force concerning the advis- ability of reinforcing the Persecution Task Force. Though he considered it improbable that an 18th Army assault could seriously menace the Allied position at Aitape, he thought it possible that the Persecution Task Force might need reinforcing if the 18th Army should muster all its available strength for an attack. He informed General Krueger that the 43d Infantry Division was scheduled for an early move to Aitape in order to stage there for operations farther west. But that division could not arrive at Aitape before the end of the first week in July. General MacArthur therefore sug- gested that if it appeared necessary to rein- force the Persecution Task Force before July, a regiment of the 31st Infantry Divi- sion might be made available immediately.10 To these suggestions General Krueger re- plied that many preparations had already been made at Aitape to meet any attack by the 18th Army. For instance, both ammuni- tion supply and hospitalization facilities had recently been increased. General Krueger believed that the forces already at Aitape 3 Rad, Alamo to PTF, WF-6412, 30 May 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 30 May-2 Jun 44: Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 43, 31 May 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. 10 Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, CX-13847, 17 Jun 44, in Alamo G—3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-19 Jun 44. The 43d Division had previously been in combat in the South Pacific Area. The 31st Division had not yet been in action and was finishing amphibious and jungle training at Oro Bay, New Guinea. DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE could, if properly handled, beat off any Jap- anese attack that might occur prior to the 43d Division's arrival. If it looked necessary, however, he might send the 1 12th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team to Aitape. He considered that unit preferable to a regi- ment of the 31st Division, since he wanted to keep that division intact for a future op- eration. He requested an early decision from General MacArthur as to which unit should be moved to Aitape.11 While higher headquarters was reaching a decision concerning reinforcements, new information obtained by the Persecution Task Force prompted a change in plans. Documents captured after mid-June indi- cated that the Japanese were to complete a thorough reconnaissance south, southeast, and east of the Persecution Task Force's perimeter by the end of June in preparation for an attack by the 20th and 41st Divisions. This attack, it now appeared, awaited only the completion of the reconnaissance and the arrival of the bulk of the 41st Division in the forward area.12 By this time the Persecution Task Force's 155-mm. artillery had been sent to new operational areas in western New Guinea and tentative plans had been made to send the Beaufighter and Beaufort squad- rons of No. 71 Wing westward also. General Gill, upon receiving the new information concerning enemy intentions, requested "Rad, Alamo to GHQ SWPA, WF-3592, 18 Jun 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-19 Jun 44. The 112th Cavalry RCT comprised the 112th Cavalry Regiment, the 148th Field Artillery Bat- talion, and supporting troops. The RCT, which was a separate unit not part of any division, had been in action on New Britain. 12 Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-1659, 19 Jun 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 13-19 Jun 44; Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-1694, 20 Jun 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-25 Jun 44; Alamo Force, G-2 Wkly Rpt 46, 21 Jun 44, copy in G-2 DofA files. 133 that the air support squadrons be retained or replaced; that a battalion of 155-mm. howitzers be sent to Aitape; and that the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team be moved forward immediately.13 A few days later General Mac Arthur's headquarters, which had secured the infor- mation from radio intercepts, informed General Krueger that the 18th Army planned to attack about the end of the first ten days in July, employing 20,000 troops in the forward area and another 11,000 in reserve.14 Alamo Force and the Allied Naval Forces immediately rounded up ships to send the 1 1 2th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team to Aitape, where the unit arrived on 27 June. A 155-mm. howitzer battalion was shipped to Aitape a few days later and No. 71 Wing was ordered to remain there. At the same time General Krueger reconsid- ered his decision not to employ part of the 31st Division and ordered preparations made to move the 124th Regimental Com- bat Team of that division to Aitape. Efforts were also made to speed the shipment of the 43d Division from its New Zealand stag- ing area to Aitape.15 When all the reinforcements arrived, the Persecution Task Force's strength would equal two and two-thirds divisions. General Krueger therefore decided that a corps 13 Rads, PTF to Alamo, AE-1699 and AE-1711, 20 Jun 44, and AE-1806, 24 Jun 44- Rads, Alamo to PTF, WF-3970, 20 Jun 44, and WF-4060, 21 Jun 44. All in Alamo G-3 Jnl Holla Jia, 20-25 Jun 44. 14 Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo Adv Hq, C-14133, 24 Jun 44, and Rad, Alamo Rear Hq to Alamo Adv Hq, WF-4646, 24 Jun 44, both in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-25 Jun 44. At this time Alamo Advance Headquarters was at Hollandia, while the rear echelon of the headquarters remained in eastern New Guinea. 13 Rads, Alamo to PTF, WF-3970, 20 Jun 44, and WF-4060, 21 Jun 44, both in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 20-25 Jun 44. 134 THE APPROACH TO THE PHILIPPINES headquarters would be needed at Aitape. He chose for the command at Aitape Maj. Gen. Charles P. Hall who, together with his staff of XI Corps headquarters, had re- cently arrived in New Guinea from the United States. The change in command was not to entail a change in the principal mis- sion of the Persecution Task Force — de- fense of the Tadji airstrips. To carry out his mission, General Hall was instructed to break the initial impetus of the apparently impending 18th Army attack and, when the strength of the Persecution Task Force and the tactical situation permitted, under- take a vigorous counterattack. With these instructions in mind, General Hall assumed command of the Persecution Task Force as of midnight 27-28 June.16 While this change in command was being effected, more information concerning the plans of the 18th Army was obtained from radio intercepts and captured documents. It became known that the 20th Division was to cross the "Hanto" River on 29 June, ex- ecuting attacks toward Afua and East Sec- tor headquarters installations, which were located at Anamo, on the beach just west of the Driniumor's mouth.17 General Head- quarters forwarded this information to Alamo Force with little attempt at interpre- tation, but the Alamo Force G-2 Section decided that the Hanto River was probably the Driniumor. The prospective attack, Alamo Force believed, would be launched during the night of 28-29 June at a point about two miles inland from the mouth of the Driniumor, It was considered probable that the 78th Infantry, 20th Division, would aim for control of the Afua-Palauru trail, w Ltr OI, Comdr Alamo to CG XI Corps, 25 Jun 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 27-29 Jun 44. " Rad, GHQ SWPA to Alamo, G-14205, 26 Jun 44, and Rad, PTF to Alamo, AE-1884, 28 Jun 44, both in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 27-29 Jun 44. while the 80th Infantry moved on Anamo. Assuming the success of its initial attack, the 20th Division apparently planned to as- semble at "Hill 56," tentatively located about 4,000 yards northwest of Afua, and then push on toward the Tadji airfields. Alamo Force estimated that the maximum strength with which the 20th Division could attack was about 5,200 men,18 If this interpretation of available infor- mation was correct, General Hall had but one day to prepare his new command to meet the attack of the 18th Army. Reorganizations and Redispositions As soon as General Hall and the few members of his XI Corps staff that he had brought forward became acquainted with the situation in the Aitape area, Headquar- ters, XI Corps, assumed the role of Perse- cution Task Force Headquarters, using many men of Headquarters, 32d Division, until the rest of the corps staff could reach Aitape. Next, the command structure of the task force was rearranged, some changes in names were made, and several troop redis- positions were effected. The western part of the main line of re- sistance around the airfields — the area pre- viously assigned to the West and Center Sectors— became the responsibility of the Western Sector, under Brig. Gen. Alexander N. Stark, Jr. The eastern section of the main line of resistance was held by the Eastern Sector under General Gill. This unit also set up an outpost line of resistance along the Nigia River. General Martin's command, redesignated the Persecution Covering Force, was to continue to hold the delaying position along the Driniumor River. The " Rad, Alamo to PTF, WF-1027, 27 Jun 44, in Alamo G-3 Jnl Hollandia, 27-29 Jun 44. DEPLOYMENT FOR BATTLE 135 western boundary of the covering force was a line running south from the coast along Akanai Creek and the X-ray River, a little over halfway from the Driniumor to the Nigia. Since no attacks were expected from the west, troops assigned to the Western Sector comprised principally engineers. The East- ern Sector was composed of the 32d Division less those elements assigned to the Perse- cution Covering Force. Supply, administra- tion, and evacuation for the covering force were responsibilities of Headquarters, 3 2d Division, which, for these purposes, acted in its administrative capacity rather than in its tactical role as Headquarters, Eastern Sec- tor. All three tactical commands operated directly under General Hall's control.19 While these changes were being made, the 112th Cavalry Regimental Combat Team (less the 148th Field Artillery Bat- talion) had arrived at Blue Beach and had been assigned to General Martin's operation control. The combat team was commanded by Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham, while the dismounted (and oft disgruntled about if) men of the 1 1 2th Cavalry Regiment were led by Col. Alexander M. Miller, III.20 The cavalry regiment was about half the strength of an infantry regiment. It com- » ptf FO 5, 29 Jun 44, in PTF G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun- 3 Jul 44 ; miscellaneous orders and memos in PTF G-3 Jnl, 8-1 1 Jul 44. General Stark, Assistant Di- vision Commander, 43d Division, had just arrived at Blue Beach with an advance echelon of division headquarters. As originally set up on 29 June, the three commands were named, from west to east, the Western Defense Command, the Eastern Defense Area, and the Eastern Defense Command. The simi- larity in the names of the two eastern components soon proved confusing and the final changes, as out- lined above, were effected on 8 July. 20 The 148th Field Artillery (105-mm. howitzers) reached Aitape in mid- July, and operated as part of the general artillery support under PTF (XI Corps) artillery. prised only two squadrons, each composed of three troops, as opposed to the three bat- talions of four companies each in an infan- try regiment. Instead of the three heavy weapons companies organic to the corre- sponding infantry unit, the 112th Cavalry had only one heavy weapons troop. More- over, the cavalry unit had arrived at Aitape with less than its authorized personnel. At no time during operations at Aitape did it number more than 1,500 men, in compari- son with the 3,000-odd of an infantry regiment.21 Initially, it was planned that the 1 1 2th Cavalry would take up positions in the Palauru area to defend the right rear of the Persecution Covering Force and act as General Martin's reserve. General Hall, de- ciding that the Driniumor River line needed strengthening, changed this plan and on 29 June sent the regiment forward to the X-ray and Driniumor Rivers. Leaving the rest of the regiment at the X-ray, the 2d Squadron moved on to the Driniumor and took up defensive positions in the Afua area. Upon the arrival of this squadron at the river, the extent of the Driniumor defenses that were previously the responsibility of the 3d Bat- talion, 127th Infantry, was reduced and at the same time operational control of the infantry battalion passed to General Cun- ningham. This addition still did not bring the strength of the latter's command up to that of an infantry regiment.22 About the same time, the mission of the Persecution Covering Force was changed. 21 Interv, author with Lt Col P. L. Hooper, ex- Exec Off, 112th Cav RCT, 25 Mar 48, in OCMH files. "Ibid.; PTF G-3 Jnl, 27 Jun-3 Jul 44; 112th Cav Opns Rpt Aitape, pp. 1-4. The 112th Cavalry RCT did not submit a report for the Aitape cam- paign, but merely indorsed that of the 112th Cav- alry Regiment. Chart 9— The Persecution Task Forge: 28 June-11 July 1944 38-29 June I Western Defense ArtO B,i, Gen Ale.onder N. Slarlt. Jr. Eastern Defense Ateo (Heodquarrers 32d Infatilty Divition) Mai G.n. W.ll.am H.Gill Engineer and Antiaircraft Units 3Sd Inronlry Division (less elemenrt assigned to losritn Defense Command) Mo, Gen. William H. Gill tISlli lav^7 . . Sid Cavalry Regi mental Combat Team (arrived Aitape an 27 June) Brig. Gen. Julian W. Cunningham Eastern Defense Command TSSlh Infantry (Ins 3d (iotmi.cn) » June-S July HEADQUARTERS PEHSEOITION TASK FORCE (H.odquorlen XI Corps) Maj Gen Oiotles P. Hall Western Defense Alto Blin. Gen Alesonder N. Stork, Jp. Engineer and Ant.a.rt.aft Units Eastern Defense Area (Headquarters 3Jd Infantry Division) Mai. G.n. W.lliom (-(_ G.ll Eastern Defente Command Btsg Gen. Clotince A, M,m 32d Infantry Division (lets elements in Eastern Defense Command) Id Battalion, 157lh Infant-, E I SetS Inlonlry (less 3d Battalion) llBrh Cavalry Regimental Combat Te. 154th Inlantty (Persecution Talk force Reserve) Col. Ed~a,d M. Start (added on t July) 8-1 1 July HEADQUARTERS PERSECUTION TASK FORCE (Heoefquotrers XI Corps) Mai. Get.. Cha.les P Hall Bri, Gen Eastern Sector (Headquarters 32d Infantry Divisi Mai. Gen. William H. Gill Engineer and Anliaircroll Units 35d Infantry Division (less elements in Perse- cution Coveting Force) 3d Battalion, 1 B7lh Infantry Persecution Covering Force (Heodquoners ISBlh Infantry) Brig. Gen Clarence A. Martin I 1 1